NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

COLLEGE OF NAVAL COMMAND AND STAFF

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NAVAL STAFF COLLEGE

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THE JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

SYLLABUS AND STUDY GUIDE

FOR

JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS

2004

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FOREWORD

THIS SYLLABUS AND STUDY GUIDE provide a comprehensive overview of the Naval War College Joint Military Operations Department course on Joint Maritime Operations. Prepared for the College of Naval Command and Staff and the Naval Staff College, they also provide session-by-session material to assist the student in daily seminar preparation. Administrative information is also included.

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Chairman,
Joint Military Operations Department

Approved:

James F. Giblin, Jr.
Dean of Academics

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JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS COURSE DESCRIPTION

1. Mission.

In keeping with the Naval War College (NWC) Mission, the Joint Maritime Operations (JMO) curriculum is designed to ". . . prepare U.S. and international military officers and civilians to (1) meet national security challenges as senior leaders in naval, joint, interagency, and multinational arenas, (2) enable students to . . . conduct maritime and joint operations applying sound operational art, (3) develop advanced . . . operational concepts for employment of naval, joint, and multinational forces." Once grounded in operational art, JMO students learn to identify joint battlespace objectives to achieve national and theater strategic aims, as well as develop joint operational design. In addition, students will become well versed in campaign planning based on U.S. Naval and joint doctrine.

2. Course Overview.

The Joint Maritime Operations (JMO) course is an in-depth study of the operational level of war throughout the spectrum of conflict. JMO builds on the learning objectives of the National Security and Decision Making (NSDM) and Strategy and Policy (S&P) curriculums. Where NSDM and S&P emphasize our national military strategy development as well as a nation's imperative for matching policy to its strategic goals, JMO prepares students for the operational arena and to excel through effective operational planning and joint force application to achieve appropriate military objectives. Although maritime operations and sea service contributions are emphasized, all Services' capabilities are studied with ultimate focus on joint operations from the combatant to the joint task force commander levels. Via extensive study of numerous case studies, the JMO student is challenged with five enduring questions from the perspective of a joint force commander and his staff planners:

- What military (or related political and social) conditions must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal? (Ends)
- What sequence of actions is most likely to produce those conditions? (Ways)
- How should the resources of the joint force be applied to accomplish the desired sequence of actions? (Means)
- What is the likely cost or risk to the joint force in performing that sequence of actions?
- What resources must be committed or actions performed to successfully execute the JFC's exit strategy?

The ability to answer these questions is the very essence of the Joint Maritime Operations course.

3. Course Objectives.

- Acquire the capacity to focus thought at the theater-strategic and operational levels of war.

- Improve the ability to assess the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS) as they apply to joint and multinational military operations.

- Develop the expertise to select, allocate, and task military forces across the spectrum of conflict.

- Understand the relationships among national and multi-national military forces, non-DoD or non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and private volunteer organizations (PVOs).

- Improve upon the ability to understand, analyze, and communicate complex issues clearly and effectively, both orally and in writing.

4. Course Organization

Block One constitutes "Course Foundations and Operational Art." In these seminar sessions and lectures the student is introduced to the fundamental themes, which are subsequently woven throughout the ensuing blocks. The operational research paper is detailed in the course foundations session. This 14–17 page paper on a joint operational level subject requires in-depth research and analysis, as well as close faculty and student collaboration. Paragraph eight below provides more detail on the JMO research paper requirement. It also introduces operational art, thoroughly illustrating its enduring concepts using the Battle of Leyte Gulf historical case study. The opportunity to exercise operational art is then offered in a student-led, seminar-wide analysis of the Falklands/Malvinas conflict. Following the case study-based Operational Art examination, international and operational law sessions occur. In addition, the Law of Armed Conflict, as well as rules of engagement (ROE) are addressed in-depth.

In Block Two, "Planning," Service capabilities and armed force employment are considered. The Commander's Estimate of the Situation planning process is introduced and exercised via case study application. To ensure Combatant and Joint Force Commanders' needs are met, the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is central to this block.

Exploring the entire spectrum of conflict, Block Three, "Contemporary Operations and Environments," examines a wide variety of topics necessary for success across the spectrum of conflict, with particular focus on post-hostilities activities, including historical cases covering failed and failing states, the interagency process, insurgency/ counterinsurgency, terrorism, homeland defense, NGOs/IOs, contractors in the battle space, and conflict termination. This block concludes with a synthesis event during which the interagency process must prioritize and apply resources in order to transition from combat to post-conflict operations. In addition, students are expected to apply material covered thus far in JMO while analyzing and ultimately resolving challenging issues.

Block Four concludes the JMO course with the JFC/JTF HQ Exercise. During Block Four, students are introduced to the dynamics of an operational commander's headquarters staff in a hypothetical scenario that requires decisions on the use of military force. Students are expected to apply operational art, the Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) and other concepts studied throughout the course, to develop solutions. The trimester ends with the JFC/JTF HQ Exercise.

In summary, JMO's design allows each student to benefit from the combined contributions of faculty, guest speakers, and—most importantly—the shared professional expertise and research achievements of the corporate student body.

5. Student Guidelines.

The syllabus establishes the basis for required course work. In each session, "Focus" specifies the general context of the topic. Next, the "Objectives" section cites the session goals, including objectives required for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase I certification. The "Background" section provides assistance in framing the individual session. Finally, the "Questions" and "Readings" sections serve to focus student preparation and enhance understanding of the topic.

The Joint Maritime Operations course fulfills approximately 80 percent of the Phase I, Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) requirements established by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The objectives identified as "PJE" in each session reflect these requirements. The remaining 20 percent of the JPME requirements are fulfilled in the National Security Decision Making (NSDM) and Strategy and Policy (S&P) courses.

Students joining the class as November "phased inputs" should read ***Clausewitz and Sun Tzu Compared.*** This book, placed in the November students' mailboxes, will assist in discussing operational art and other topics with classmates who have already completed the Strategy and Policy course.

6. The Socratic Method for the Warrior.

The seminar is JMO's fundamental learning forum. Student expertise is a significant part of the learning process. For a seminar to succeed there must be open and candid sharing of ideas and experiences, tempered with decorum. You will find that even the most "off-the-wall" idea may have some merit. Successful seminars—that is, seminars whose members leave with the greatest knowledge—are those made up of members who come to each session "loaded" with questions based on thorough preparation. Most students leave the seminar with new insights, or even more thought-provoking questions. Student preparation, free and open discussion, and the open-minded consideration of other students' ideas, all contribute to a valuable seminar experience. The "one-third" rule is the keystone of the seminar approach. The first third is a well-constructed, relevant curriculum. The second third is a quality JMO faculty. Most important is the individual student. Only by thoroughly preparing for seminar sessions can you become that active catalyst that generates "positive and proactive" seminar intra-action.

7. Readings.

All JMO Course sessions are supported by readings, the purpose of which is to assist in understanding the many aspects of the topics being presented. For the most part, the readings are intended to convey to the student basic information, the mastery of which in study outside the class will facilitate the discussions to take place within the class. A thorough understanding of the following information will significantly assist the student in using the course readings to best advantage:

(a) **Categories of Readings.** Each syllabus session lists categories of readings.

(1) ***Required Readings*** are those that should be read prior to the session, usually in the sequence listed in order to best understand the session material. Often your moderators will offer additional guidance on the priority of the readings, based on the special needs of the individual seminar.

(2) ***Supplementary Readings*** are those relevant to a session topic that may be useful to a student seeking more information in order to gain insight beyond that provided by the Required Readings; this would include additional background material on case studies and exercises. On occasion, faculty moderators may assign Supplementary Readings to individual students to read and provide oral synopses to the seminar in support of topic discussion.

(b) **Reading Identifiers.** Each reading that is not a complete book or publication has a cover page which provides the four-digit reading identifier (e.g., NWC 1002) in the upper right-hand corner, and the reading title found below the Naval War College crest.

(c) **Finding Specific Readings.** Readings for any specific session may be located as follows:

(1) Required Readings are annotated as (Issued) at the end of the reading entry. This means they may be found in the Banker's Box of Readings provided to each student at the beginning of the JMO trimester. The Banker's Box is internally divided into specific JMO sessions by marked tabs (e.g., OPS I-2, III-3, etc.). The Issued Readings for the session are directly behind the session tab. Bulky Issued Readings, such as books, publications, and large extracts are found either at the back of the Banker's Box or in a separate bag.

(2) Supplementary Readings are annotated as (Issued), (Seminar Reserve), or (Library Reserve) at the end of each Reading entry. If issued, the reading is in the Banker's Box. If Seminar Reserve, several copies of the reading will be located on the rolling book cart in the seminar classroom. If Library Reserve, the reading (usually three to five copies) is located in the JMO Library Reserve section for JMO student use. Websites or library call numbers may be indicated for some readings. If there is no cue listed, the student will need to research the item; these readings are, however, frequently available in the Henry E. Eccles Library. The POC for a given session will be able to guide the student experiencing difficulty in tracking down a particular reading. Additional assistance is available from the reference librarians.

(3) CNC&S 2004/2005 Reading List. This extremely useful handout is located at the front of the Banker's Box and may be the critical key to finding a reading when all else fails. It lists all NWC-numbered readings (e.g., NWC 1002) in numerical order, identifies status (Issued, Seminar Reserve, or Library Reserve), and identifies the course session to which the reading pertains. Readings are also listed by session number. The same information is also provided for books and publications. The Reading List is particularly useful for linking NWC numbered readings to their specific course sessions in situations where the readings are distributed after the Banker's Box or are otherwise separated from the Box.

(4) Readings Relevant to More Than One Session. Some NWC-numbered readings (Issued) may be listed as Required or Supplementary for more than one session. In such cases, the reading will be found with the session tab (in the Banker's Box) of the first session to which the reading has been assigned. Duplicate copies of the reading are not provided for later sessions in which the reading is listed. Therefore, if an Issued Reading is not found with a session tab in the Banker's Box, cross-reference it using the Reading List to determine if the reading has been used for a previous session. If that fails, check the back of the Banker's Box in case the reading is bulky. If the reading isn't there, advise your faculty moderator, who will determine if the reading was inadvertently not included in your Banker's Box or if there is a class-wide problem.

(5) Classified Readings. The few classified readings used in the JMO Course will not be issued until near the date required for a specific session. Sufficiently in advance of the session, students will be advised when and where to draw the classified readings. Normally, arrangements are made for students to obtain the classified reading from PUBS (located in the basement of Conolly Hall).

IMPORTANT NOTE: Students are cautioned that classified readings and documents must be read on the premises of the Naval War College. Ensure such materials are properly safeguarded at all times. Do not leave the materials unattended, even in your cubicle area. Students are not provided with classified material storage containers (safes); it is therefore necessary to check out and return classified material on a daily basis. Faculty moderators will provide additional information as required during the JMO trimester.

Management of Reading Load. The amount of preparatory reading required for each session depends on a variety of factors, including topic complexity and session objectives. ***Recommend you review session reading requirements at least a week ahead of time in order to accurately plan preparation time and ensure that all necessary readings are in hand.***

8. Operations Research Paper.

The Operations Research Paper presents the opportunity to study a theater-strategic or operational-level issue, conduct research and analysis, and prepare a paper that advances the literature. It is a chance for students to address a topic that they personally feel is of value. It requires independent thought and graduate-level writing, since the final product must be a 14–17 page paper suitable for publication in a professional journal. The amount and depth of research should be adequate to support the student's approach, and sufficiently justify the conclusions and recommendations. Another use of the paper may be to provide a source of innovative thinking to the Service and joint staffs involved with the many issues bearing on employment of forces.

Numerous combatant and headquarters commands actively solicit papers and monographs on topics of current interest to them. The Naval War College is frequently canvassed for papers on particular subjects, and requested to generate interest in specific areas for research and writing to support requesting commands. Quality papers are provided to the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) via the Naval War College's Eccles Library, where qualified users can access them for use in a variety of applications.

Students are encouraged to submit their research papers for the War College Prize Competition as described in the Naval War College Standard Organization and

Regulations Manual (SORM), NWC Instruction Annexes, which is included in the "Student Handbook." Amplifying information and guidance on the selection and execution of a successful Operations Research Paper project is provided in NWC 2062N. Your moderators will answer questions and otherwise assist you in this most important intellectual undertaking during the Introductory Seminar (OPS I-2), the Operations Research Paper-Review session (OPS I-6), and student tutorials in December.

9. Plagiarism and Misrepresentation.

While occurrences of plagiarism and misrepresentation are exceedingly rare, the consequences of such acts are so serious as to warrant some specific mention here, and will also be reviewed in seminar by the moderator team at the beginning of the trimester. Your attention is directed to the Naval War College SORM, which discusses the academic honor code and specifically prohibits cheating, plagiarism, and misrepresentation. For the military officer accustomed to the legitimate staff practice of adopting verbatim the language of orders and directives produced by other commands, the academic prohibition of using the words of other writers without proper attribution must be reviewed and emphasized. The following definitions clarify this important issue:

Plagiarism is the duplication of an author's words without both quotation marks and accurate references or footnotes. It is also the paraphrased use of an author's ideas without accurate references or footnotes.

Misrepresentation is defined as reusing a single paper for more than one purpose without permission or acknowledgment. It may include the following:

- Submitting a single paper or substantially the same paper for more than one course at the Naval War College without advance permission of the moderators.

- Submitting a paper or substantially the same paper previously prepared for some other purpose outside the Naval War College without acknowledging that it is an earlier work.

10. Cases.

Like games, case method discussions generate good student involvement and are designed to develop student abilities to solve problems using the knowledge, concepts, and skills honed during the JMO trimester. Some of our cases and problems stress individual effort and planning, while other cases will require a team or staff approach. Cases may consist of historical events, analyzed for operational and strategic lessons, or postulated crisis situations demonstrating the application of concepts such as presence, deterrence, international law, rules of engagement, and self-defense. Case problems sometimes will be narrowly focused to demonstrate a specific force and its capabilities and limitations or to highlight specific concepts involving an aspect of warfare. Seminars are often split into small groups or teams to prepare solutions and responses.

11. Lectures by Senior Military Leaders.

Enrichment lectures by senior military leaders occur periodically during the course. Most of these presentations feature the Chiefs of Service or regional and functional combatant commanders. These speakers are invited to discuss views and ideas from their perspective as operational commanders, Service Chiefs, or as senior staff officers.

The lectures are normally scheduled for Monday or Tuesday afternoons from 1330–1500. The busy schedules of senior officers, however, often make a departure from this schedule unavoidable. The weekly yellow schedule will specify the final date and time of each enrichment lecture. Last minute changes will be disseminated by seminar moderators. In order to gain the most benefit from these sessions, it is critical that students be prepared to ask penetrating questions of the guest lecturer.

Note: *The substance of the lectures and the ensuing question and answer period are "Not for Attribution" and must not be referenced or identified outside the War College confines, or in any written work, including the Operations Research Paper, without the express permission of the speaker. Care should be taken not to quote an earlier speaker when posing questions to a subsequent speaker.*

12. Requirements.

Students are expected to prepare fully for each seminar and to participate in classroom discussions and exercises. A tough-minded, questioning attitude and a willingness to enter into rigorous but disciplined discussion are central to the success of the course.

(a) **Workload.** Some peaks in the workload will occur. Advance planning and careful allocation of time will help mitigate these peaks. This is particularly true of the Operations Research Paper. Student experience indicates that the total course requirements will involve a weekly average workload of about 10–15 hours of in-class and 30–35 hours of out-of-class work.

(b) **Oral and Written Requirements.** Each section of the course has oral and written requirements that provide the opportunity for the student to demonstrate prowess and progress. In addition, these requirements serve as a means for feedback and interaction between the faculty and members of the class. Not all requirements are graded, but each provides the student some measure of how he or she is doing at that point in the course. The following is a composite listing of these course requirements, type of activity, relative weights, and the key dates of graded events:

Requirement	*Type Effort*	*Weight*	*Date*
Operations Research Paper Proposal	Written/Individual meeting with moderators		6 December (Proposal due) 5–11 December (Tutorials)
Operational Art Exam	Written/Individual	15%	8–10 December
Graded Practical Exercise	Written/Individual	10%	25 January
Operations Research Paper	Written/Individual	35%	14 February
Seminar Contribution	Assessment by moderators	25%	Daily
JFC/JTF HQ Exercise Contribution	Assessment by cell moderators	15%	18 February-4 March

13. JMO Department Grading Criteria.

The overall guidance for grading students at the Naval War College is contained in Naval War College SORM. The most salient points in this instruction are:

- Based on the analysis of past grade achievements, a grade distribution of 35%–45% "A's" and 55%–65% "B's" and "C's" combined can be expected. While variations from this norm might occur from seminar to seminar and subject to subject, it would

be unusual to reach an overall "A" to "B/C" ratio greater than an even 50/50 distribution.

- Numerical averages will not be rounded up (i.e., 89.95 is a B+ and will not be rounded up to an A-).

- Any assigned grade may be appealed in writing within seven calendar days after receiving the grade. Grades will be appealed first to the senior moderator and then to the Department Chairman, using forms available in Room C-203. If deemed necessary, the Chairman may assign an additional grader who will review the assignment and provide an independent grade. Note that the review ***may sustain, lower, or raise the grade.***

Grade appeals may ultimately be taken to the Dean of Academics, whose decision will be final. The academic coordinator, Ms. Carol Stewart, in Room C-203, can assist in preparing an appeal.

A course average grade of B- or higher is required for successful completion of master's degree requirements. A minimum grade of C- is required for successful completion of the JMO course and receipt of JPME Phase I certification.

Three sets of general grading criteria help in the determination of the letter grades that will be assigned during the Joint Maritime Operations trimester. The inclusion of these criteria here in the syllabus offers the student a suggestion of the kinds of standards and requirements for which grading faculty look. The first set covers the Operations Research Paper, the second covers the examinations, and the third covers individual contribution grades.

Using the Naval War College Standard Organization and Regulations Manual (SORM) as basic guidance, the procedures below amplify the criteria as established within the Joint Military Operations Department.

a. Grading criteria for the Operations Research Paper:

The Operations Research Paper must have a thesis; provide sufficient background research to analyze the thesis; consider arguments and counter-arguments for the thesis and compare conflicting points of view; present logical conclusions drawn from the material presented; and provide recommendations or lessons learned based on the conclusions. In addition to the examples of substantive criteria specified below, the paper must be editorially correct (spelling, punctuation, grammar, format, etc.).

A+ (98) Offers a genuinely new understanding of the subject. Especially deserving of distribution to appropriate authorities and submission for prize competition. Thesis is definitive, research is extensive, subject is treated completely, and the conclusions and recommendations are logical and justified.

A (95) Work of superior quality that demonstrates a high degree of original thought. Suitable for distribution and submission for prize competition. Thesis is clearly articulated and focused, research is significant, arguments and counter-arguments are comprehensive, and conclusions and recommendations are supported.

A- (92) Above the average expected of graduate work. Contains original thought. Should be retained in the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC). Thesis is clearly defined, research is purposeful, arguments and counter-arguments are presented, conclusions and recommendations are valid.

B+ (88) A solid paper. Above the average of graduate work. Thesis is articulated, research has strong points, subject is well-presented and constructed, and conclusions and recommendations are substantiated by the material.

B (85) Average graduate-level performance. Thesis is presented, research is appropriate for the majority of the subject, analysis of the subject is valid with minor omissions, and conclusions and recommendations are presented with few inconsistencies.

B- (82) Below the average graduate-level performance. Thesis is presented, but the research does not fully support it; the analysis, conclusions, and recommendations are not fully developed. The paper may not be balanced and the logic may be flawed.

C+ (78) Below the standards required of graduate work. Portions of the criteria are lacking or missing, the thesis may be unclear, research may be inadequate, analysis may be incomplete, and the conclusions and recommendations may be lacking or not supported by the material.

C (75) Fails to meet the standards of graduate work. Thesis is present, but support, analysis, conclusions, and recommendations are either missing or illogically presented. Paper has significant flaws in construction and development.

C- (72) Well below standards. Thesis poorly stated with minimal evidence of research and/or several missing requirements. Subject is presented in an incoherent manner that does not warrant serious consideration.

F (65) Paper has no thesis, or does not support the thesis. Paper has significant flaws in respect to structure, grammar, logic. An apparent lack of effort to achieve the course requirements for the paper.

b. Grading criteria for the exams and graded practical exercises:

A+ (98) Organized, coherent and well-written response. Completely addresses the question. Covers all applicable major and key minor points. Demonstrates total grasp and comprehension of the topic.

A (95) Demonstrates an excellent grasp of the topic, addressing all major issues and key minor points. Organized, coherent, and well-written.

A- (92) Above the average expected of graduate work. Demonstrates a very good grasp of the topic. Addresses all major and at least some minor points in a clear, coherent manner.

B+ (88) Well-crafted answer that discusses all relevant important concepts with supporting rationale for analysis.

B (85) Average graduate performance. A successful consideration of the topic overall, but either lacking depth or containing statements for which the supporting rationale is not sufficiently argued.

B- (82) Addresses the question and demonstrates a fair understanding of the topic, but does not address all key concepts and is weak in rationale and clarity.

C+ (78) Demonstrates some grasp of topic, but provides insufficient rationale for response and misses major elements or concepts. Does not merit graduate credit.

C (75) Demonstrates poor understanding of the topic. Provides marginal support for response. Misses major elements or concepts.

C- (72) Addresses the question, but does not provide sufficient discussion to demonstrate adequate understanding of the topic.

F (65) Fails to address the question.

c. Grading criteria for seminar contributions:

The seminar contribution grade is determined by moderator evaluation of the quality of a student's contributions to seminar discussions, projects, and exercises.

All students are expected to contribute to each seminar session, and to listen and respond respectfully when seminar-mates or moderators offer their ideas. This overall expectation underlies all criteria described below. Interruptive, discourteous, disrespectful, or unprofessional conduct or attitude detracts from the overall learning experience for the seminar and will negatively affect the contribution grade.

A+ (98) Peerless demonstration of wholly thorough preparation for individual seminar sessions. Consistently contributes original and highly insightful thought. Exceptional team player and leader.

A (95) Superior demonstration of complete preparation for individual sessions. Frequently offers original and well thought-out insights. Routinely takes the lead to accomplish team projects.

A- (92) Excellent demonstration of preparation for individual sessions. Contributes original, well-developed insights in the majority of seminar sessions. Often takes the lead to accomplish team projects.

B+ (88) Above-average graduate level preparation for seminar sessions. Occasionally contributes original and well-developed insights. Obvious team player who sometimes takes the lead for team projects.

B (85) Average graduate level preparation for individual sessions. Occasionally contributes original and insightful thought. Acceptable team player; takes effective lead on team projects when assigned.

B- (82) Minimally acceptable graduate level preparation for individual sessions. Infrequently contributes well-developed insights; may sometimes speak out without having thought through an issue. Requires prodding to take lead on team projects.

C+ (78) Generally prepared, but not to minimum acceptable graduate level. Requires encouragement to contribute to discussions; contributions do not include original thinking or insights. Routinely allows others to take the lead in team projects.

C (75) Preparation for individual sessions is only displayed when student is called upon to contribute. Elicited contributions reflect at best a basic understanding of session material. Consistently requires encouragement or prodding to take on fair share of team project workload. Only occasionally engages in seminar dialogue with peers and moderators.

C- (72) Barely acceptable preparation. Contributions are extremely limited, rarely voluntary, and reflect minimal grasp of session material. Displays little interest in contributing to team projects.

F (65) Unacceptable preparation. Contributions are rare and reflect below-minimum acceptable understanding of session material. Displays no interest in contributing to team projects; cannot be relied on to accomplish assigned project work.

d. Grading criteria for JFC/JTF HQ Exercise contributions:

The JTF/JTF HQ Exercise contribution grade is determined by cell moderator evaluation of the student's contributions to exercise preparation, planning, and execution play. It is recognized that many students will role play in areas where they have no prior expertise. Additionally, some billets have greater visibility. Consequently, each student will be evaluated on his/her preparation and contribution in each given role, taking into consideration the above factors.

All students are expected to contribute during the exercise, and to listen and respond respectfully when exercise role players or moderators offer their ideas. Interruptive, discourteous, disrespectful, lackadaisical, or unprofessional conduct or attitude detracts from the overall learning experience for all students during the exercise and will negatively affect the contribution grade.

A+ (98) Peerless demonstration of wholly thorough preparation for exercise role. Consistently contributes original and highly insightful thought. Exceptional team player and leader.

A (95) Superior demonstration of complete preparation for exercise role. Frequently offers original and well-thought-out insights. Routinely takes the lead to accomplish team projects.

A- (92) Excellent demonstration of preparation for exercise role. Contributes original, well-developed insights in the majority of exercise sessions. Often takes the lead to accomplish team projects.

B+ (88) Above-average graduate level preparation for exercise role. Occasionally contributes original and well-developed insights. Obvious team player who sometimes takes the lead for team projects.

B (85) Average graduate level preparation for exercise role. Occasionally contributes original and insightful thought. Acceptable team player; takes effective lead on team projects when assigned.

B- (82) Minimally acceptable graduate level preparation for exercise role. Infrequently contributes well-developed insights; may sometimes speak out without having thought through an issue. Requires prodding to take lead on team projects.

C+ (78) Generally prepared, but not to minimum acceptable graduate level. Requires encouragement to contribute to discussions; contributions do not include original thinking or insights. Routinely allows others to take the lead in team projects.

C (75) Preparation for exercise role is only displayed when student is called upon to contribute. Elicited contributions reflect at best a basic understanding of session material. Consistently requires encouragement or prodding to take on fair share of team project workload. Only occasionally engages in seminar dialogue with peers and moderators.

C- (72) Barely acceptable preparation. Contributions are extremely limited, rarely voluntary, and reflect minimal grasp of session material. Displays little interest in contributing to team projects.

F (65) Unacceptable preparation. Contributions are rare and reflect below-minimum acceptable understanding of session material. Displays no interest in contributing to team projects; cannot be relied on to accomplish assigned project work.

14. Seminar Assignments.

The principal criterion in assigning students to a seminar is a balanced distribution among Services and agencies, as well as student and moderator specialties and operational expertise. Two faculty members are assigned to each seminar. Student seminar, classroom, and faculty assignments are published separately.

15. Schedule.

Seminars usually meet in the morning. Depending on the work assigned, you may all meet for scheduled periods in seminar as a group, in smaller teams depending on tasking, or to conduct individual study and research. Please pay close attention to the start times for each event since they vary throughout the trimester. Classes normally are scheduled for 0830–1145. Moderators may adjust these times to facilitate the learning objectives for each segment of instruction. A course-planning schedule containing meeting dates and times is provided in the Addenda to this syllabus. The weekly schedule (printed on yellow paper) reflects revisions and supersedes the schedule contained in the syllabus. Late changes will be announced by memo delivered to student mailboxes or by the moderators in class.

16. Key Personnel.

If you require additional information on the course, or if problems develop that cannot be resolved with your moderators, you may contact the Chairman via his Executive Assistant. The key departmental personnel are:

Chairman of the Department	CAPT A. J. Ruoti, USN Room C-203, 841-3556
Executive Assistant	CAPT F. B. Horne Room C-203, 841-6458
Academic Coordinator	Ms. C. A. Stewart Room C-203, 841-4120
Head, Block One Course Foundations and Operational Art	COL R. J. Findlay, USMC Room C-425, 841-4146
Head, Block Two Planning	PROF P. C. Sweeney Room C-424, 841-6480
Head, Block Three Contemporary Operations and Environments	PROF D. W. Chisholm Room C-422, 841-2328
Head, Block Four JFC/JTF HQ Exercise	CAPT M. D. Seaman, USN Room C-423, 841-6477
Head, Intelligence (CI) Division	CAPT S. R. Neville, USN Room SE-117, 841-6485
Head, International Law Division (IL)	CDR P. A. Dutton, JAGC, USN Room C-424, 841-6473

17. Faculty Assistance.

Faculty members are available to assist students with course material, to review a student's progress, and to provide counseling as required. Students with individual concerns are encouraged to discuss them as early as possible so that moderators can render assistance in a timely manner. Students are urged to make use of this non-classroom time with the faculty. During Tutorials, scheduled in conjunction with Operations Research Paper, moderators may take the opportunity to discuss student progress as well as to solicit student input on the course to date. Faculty room numbers and telephone extensions are listed on pages 171–72 of this syllabus. The majority of the faculty are located on the fourth deck of Conolly Hall, except where noted. SP denotes Spruance Hall; SE denotes Sims Hall; M denotes Mahan Hall; and L denotes Luce Hall.

18. Student Critiques.

We strive continually to improve this course. To assist us in this goal students are provided an End-of-Course Questionnaire for completion. We have also provided "Course Session Critique Notes" to allow students to record information as they go along. Both the Critique and the note pages are provided in the Addendum, starting on page 158.

The note pages will enable you to record your insights on matters you may otherwise forget by the time you fill out the End of Course Questionnaire (e.g., which readings were particularly helpful, and which ones missed the mark.) The End-of-Course Questionnaire is required and will be submitted electronically. ***The Questionnaire must be submitted and receipt acknowledged not later than 1630 on Thursday, 3 March***. Your constructive comments will help ensure that the course remains relevant and vital in the years to come.

19. Faculty Biographies.

CAPTAIN ANTHONY J. RUOTI, JR., USN, reported to the Joint Military Operations Department as chairman in August 2002, following a tour as Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (N3) for Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces Europe. Captain Ruoti graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1975 and the Naval War College in 1993, receiving a master's degree in National Security and Strategic Studies. His shore tours include Training Squadron THIRTY-ONE, NAS Corpus Christi, Texas, Commander Patrol Wing ELEVEN, Executive Officer of the West Coast's P-3 Fleet Replacement Squadron, Patrol Squadron THIRTY-ONE, The Joint Staff, Command, Control, Communications, and Computers Directorate (J6), Architecture and Integration Division. Following this Washington tour he reported to Commander Patrol Wings Atlantic/Commander Task Force EIGHTY-FOUR as operations officer and subsequently as Chief of Staff. Captain Ruoti's sea tours were Patrol Squadron FIVE (VP-5), NAS Jacksonville serving as Aircraft Division Officer, Training Officer, and Pilot NATOPS Officer holding P-3 "Orion" Patrol Plane Commander, Mission Commander, and Instructor Pilot designations, deploying to NAS Bermuda and NAS Sigonella, with detachments to Iceland, Crete, Spain, the Azores, Puerto Rico and Senegal, working closely with allied naval forces throughout the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean, USS ***Forrestal*** as Communications Officer, deploying to the Mediterranean, Patrol Squadron NINETEEN as Assistant Operations Officer and Maintenance Officer, deploying to Diego Garcia, BIOT detaching to Daharan, Saudi Arabia, Djibouti, Oman, Okinawa, and Misawa, Japan. He commanded Patrol Squadron NINE, during this tour his squadron was awarded the Battle "E", deploying to Misawa, Japan and detaching to Adak, Alaska and Panama. Captain Ruoti assumed command of Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing FIVE, preparing, training and certifying Patrol and Special Project Squadrons for forward deployed operations.

COMMANDER LAYNE M. K. ARAKI, USN, joined the Naval War College faculty in August 2004 after completing a tour as Command Duty Officer and Senior Watch Officer in the Pacific Fleet Command Center. Commander Araki served as Executive Officer in USS ***Crommelin*** (FFG 37), Main Propulsion Assistant in USS ***Carl Vinson*** (CVN 70), Combat Systems Officer in USS ***Reid*** (FFG 30), and Auxiliaries and Reactor Controls Division Officer in USS ***Long Beach*** (CGN 9). His shore tours include Academic Director of Surface Warfare Officers School Division Officer Course and Chemistry, Materials, and Radiological Fundamentals Division Director at Naval Nuclear Power School. He has earned a Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College and a Bachelor of Science in Chemical Engineering from the University of Texas in Austin.

COMMANDER FRANK BAKER, USN, reported to the Naval War College faculty in August 2004, serving as the Matthew Fontaine Maury Military Chair of Oceanography. A 1983 graduate of Penn State with a B.A. in English, he earned an M.S. in Meteorology and Physical Oceanography from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in 1991, and an M.A. from the Naval War College in 2004. In his initial sea tour on USS ***Connole*** (FF-1056), Commander Baker served as the Anti-Submarine Warfare Officer and was designated a Surface Warfare Officer. After a lateral transfer to the meteorology and oceanography (METOC) community, he served as METOC Officer on USS ***Wasp*** (LHD-1). His shore duty tours have included the Staff of the Oceanographer of the Navy (CNO-N096) in Washington D.C., Navy Warfare Development Command, and Fleet Numerical METOC Center, in Monterey, California.

PROFESSOR JOHN R. BALLARD joined the Naval War College faculty in August 2000, having taught for six years the National Defense University. He came to Newport directly from a tour as visiting Professor of Defence and Strategic Studies at Massey University, in Palmerston North, New Zealand. Previously his National Defense University duties were at the Joint Forces Staff College, where he served as Professor of Military History and Strategy and the Director of Curriculum. Professor Ballard's career has included broad experience in teaching operational planning, command and control, interagency coordination, and military history. His research has focused on Joint Task Forces and Peace Operations, and he is writing a book on Operation STABILISE, the multinational operation in East Timor. He is currently deployed to Iraq as Commander, 4th Civil Affairs Group (USMC). Professor Ballard's past writing efforts have included prize-winning articles in numerous military and professional publications; his first book, published in 1998, was ***Upholding Democracy, the United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994–1997.*** His active duty in the U.S. Marine Corps included tours at 2nd, 3rd and 4th Marine Divisions, Headquarters Marine Corps and the staff of U.S. Atlantic Command. A Colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve, he was recently mobilized in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, serving as the Assistant Chief of Staff, G5 at Marine Forces Pacific and is currently deployed to Iraq as Commander, 4th Civil Affairs Group. Professor Ballard's degrees include a bachelor's degree from the U.S. Naval Academy, a Master of Arts in history from California State University, and a doctorate from the Catholic University of America.

PROFESSOR JEFFREY L. BARKER, returned to the Naval War College faculty in August 1999, serving as the Matthew Fontaine Maury Military Chair of Oceanography until his retirement in November 2004, at which time he joined the faculty as an Associate Professor. A 1976 graduate of the Georgia Institute of Technology, with a B.S. in Physics, he earned an M.S. in Oceanography and Meteorology from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in 1987, and also earned an M.A. from the Naval War College in 1994. In his initial sea tour in USS ***Kalamazoo*** (AOR-6) Professor Barker was designated a Surface Warfare Officer. After assignment at the U.S. Naval Academy, he was redesignated as a Meteorology and Oceanography Officer and reported to Fleet Numerical Oceanography Center in Monterey, California. In addition to his initial Naval War College faculty tour, Meteorology and Oceanography assignments have included: A sea tour in USS ***Wisconsin*** (BB-64), and overseas tours as the Executive Officer of the

Naval Oceanography Command Facility in Yokosuka, Japan, and as the Staff METOC Officer in the London headquarters of Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Force Europe.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAUL G. BELL, USAF, joined the Joint Military Operations Department faculty in January 2004 following the completion of Senior Service School in Santiago, Chile. Prior to reporting to Santiago, Lt Col Bell was the Commander of the 20th Bombardment Squadron (B-52s) at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, and also Commander of the 20th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron during combat in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Other assignments include a tour at the Pentagon in the Air Force Office of Legislative Liaison and as a Legislative Fellow on Capitol Hill. Additionally, he was a USAF Weapons School Instructor, Chief of Standardization/ Evaluation and a Training Flight Instructor Pilot. Lt Col Bell earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Political Science from the USAF Academy and was awarded a Master of Aerospace Science and Technology from Embry Riddle University in 1995.

PROFESSOR ALBION A. BERGSTROM rejoined the Joint Military Operations faculty in Autumn 2003. He retired from the Army with over thirty years active duty in December 1999, having completed his career on the JMO faculty as a Professor of Operations and Chief of Block IV, Regional Contingency Planning and Warfighting. Prior military assignments include duty as an Agency Deputy Commander, Division Chief in the Pentagon, Armor (M1A1) battalion command and various command and staff jobs. An Armor officer by trade he had Cavalry, Armor, and Infantry experience in Southeast Asia, Europe, and CONUS. He holds a B.A. in Political Science/International Relations from Colorado State University, an M.A. in Personnel Management from Central Michigan University and an M.A. from the Naval War College. He is a graduate of the Army's Command and General Staff College and the Army War College Strategist course. He is also a graduate of the Senior Officials in National Security Course at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and was a National Security Fellow at Harvard.

COLONEL JOHN C. BURNS, USA, rejoined the Naval War College faculty in August 2004 following a tour as the Chief of Operations for the Coalition Force Land Component Commander (CFLCC) in the US Central Command area of responsibility. As the Chief of Operations, COL Burns was responsible for coordinating and directing combat and support operations for all joint and coalition land forces as part of our nation's Global War on Terrorism. COL Burns previously taught Strategy and Force Planning in the Naval War College's Department of National Security Decision Making from 2001–2003. A 1980 graduate of Washington and Jefferson College, he earned masters degrees in Strategic Studies from the Army War College and Military Studies from Marine Corps University. A master Army aviator, COL Burns commanded the first Aviation Task Force in Kosovo in 1999 as part of Operation JOINT GUARDIAN peacekeeping efforts. Other major aviation operational assignments include tours in attack and assault helicopter units in the 82d Airborne Division and 25th Infantry Division. Major staff assignments include consecutive tours in the Pentagon working Army force development issues and joint readiness issues as part of the CJCS Exercise Evaluation Program. Additionally, COL Burns served as a contingency plans officer during Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAVID R. BYRN SR., USA joined the Naval War College, Joint Military Operations department faculty in July 2004 following completion of the U.S. Army War College. LTC Byrn was commissioned as a Field Artillery Officer. His most recent assignments include Battalion Commander, 1-5 FA, 1st BDE, 1st INF Division, and Chief of Targets and Battle Damage Assessment at USCENTCOM. Campaign credits include Operation INFINITE RESOLVE, Operation DESERT FOX, Operation DESERT THUNDER, and Operation DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. LTC Byrn has served in a variety of command and staff positions including the 5th ID (M) Fort Polk, LA, 2d ID Republic of Korea, 18th FA BDE Fort Bragg, NC, Ops Group, Fort Irwin CA, and the 1st ID (M) Fort Riley Kansas. His schools include the Artillery Officer Basic Course, Chemical and Nuclear Target Analysis Course, Infantry Officer Advanced Course, Air Ground Operations School, Command and General Staff College, Armed Forces Staff College, and the U.S. Army War College. He holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from Virginia Tech, a Master of Science in Public Administration from Central Michigan University, and a Master of Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College.

PROFESSOR JAMES P. BUTLER returned to the Naval War College in November 2003 after having served as the Northrop Grumman Reserve Component Joint Professional Military Education Project Manager, converting JPME Phase II core curriculum lessons into a distance learning course for the Joint Forces Staff College. A retired naval aviator with thirty years of extensive search and rescue, flying, and command experience, he served as the Air Boss aboard USS ***Guadalcanal*** during DESERT STORM (1991 war in Iraq) and PROVIDE COMFORT (humanitarian relief for Kurdish refugees); commanded the Naval Air Technical Training Center; served as executive assistant and professor of Strategy and Policy at the Naval War College; and was Dean, Joint and Combined Warfighting School, at the Joint Forces Staff College. Professor Butler graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy with a B.S. in Analytical Management, has an M.S. in Material Management from the Naval Postgraduate School, an M.A. in Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College, an M.S. in National Resource Strategy from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and is pursuing a Ph.D. at Salve Regina University.

PROFESSOR DAVID R. CARRINGTON rejoined the Naval War College faculty in September 2004 after completing thirty-one years of commissioned service with the U.S. Navy. Among his tours of duty, he served as special assistant to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, as the N2 aboard the USS ***Forrestal***, as the N2 with COMSECONDFLT, as the N2 with CINCUSNAVEUR, as the J2 for Joint Task Force PROVIDE PROMISE in Bosnia, as the Director of Intelligence for SACLANT, and as the Director of Intelligence for JIATF East. A former member of the Naval War College Faculty, Professor Carrington was also the Edwin T. Layton Chair of Military Intelligence from May 1994 to October 1997. Professor Carrington has a Bachelor of Science from Western Washington State University and a Master of Arts in Business Management from Central Michigan University.

PROFESSOR DONALD W. CHISHOLM joined the Naval War College in 2000. Before coming to the Naval War College, he taught at several universities, including the University of Illinois at Chicago and the University of California, Los Angeles, where he

was a founding member of the School of Public Policy and Social Research. Professor Chisholm earned his A.B., M.A., and Ph.D. in political science at the University of California, Berkeley. His chief fields of interest include military history, organization theory, administrative behavior, policy analysis, and American political institutions. His research has examined the planning and execution of joint military operations; cognitive and organizational limits on rationality; organizational adaptation and innovation; organizational failure and reliability, particularly in high-risk technologies; and privatization of public activities. He is the author of ***Coordination Without Hierarchy: Informal Structures in Multi-organizational Systems*** (University of California Press, 1989) and ***Waiting for Dead Men's Shoes: Origins and Development of the U.S. Navy's Officer Personnel System, 1793–1941*** (Stanford University Press, 2001), for which he received the 2001 RADM Samuel Eliot Morison Award for Distinguished Contribution to Naval Literature. He has also published a number of articles in professional journals, including ***Joint Force Quarterly***, ***Parameters***, and the ***Naval War College Review***.

COLONEL SCOTT G. CILUFFO, USA joined the Naval War College, Joint Military Operations department faculty in July 2003. Originally commissioned as a Regular Army (RA) Signal Corps Officer in 1982, this Rochester, New York, native began his career as a Special Staff officer for the Deputy and Commanding Generals of Fort Gordon, Georgia, until his branch transfer to Army Aviation in 1984. As a Senior Army Aviator rated in the UH-60A/L, AH-1F, UH-1H, and OH-58A/C, Colonel Ciluffo has served in Command, Staff, and Instructor Pilot positions from Platoon through Division at a variety of locations including Korea (52nd Avn Bn), Alabama, Alaska (6th ID (L)), Colorado (4/3 ACR), and Honduras (CDR, 1-228th Avn Regt). He has also completed two separate tours in the Pentagon, serving on both the Army (DAMO-OD, AOC) and Joint Staffs (OJCS, J-34), assisting in the coordination of operations in Haiti, Somalia, Northern Iraq, Rwanda, and Kosovo. His schools include the Signal Officer Basic Course (1982), Aviation Officer Advanced Course (1986), Command & General Staff College (1996), and the U.S. Army War College (2003). He holds a Bachelor of Arts in Mass Communications from St. Bonaventure University in Olean, New York, and a Masters in Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College.

CAPTAIN MICHAEL R. CRITZ, USN, reported to the Naval War College, Joint Military Operations faculty in September, 2001 following a three year tour as the Professor of Naval Science at the Naval ROTC Unit, University of Arizona. An HC and HSL helicopter pilot, he has served aboard numerous carriers, destroyers, and auxiliaries, most recently completing a tour as Air Officer aboard the USS ***Inchon*** (LPH / MCS -12). He has also served as the LAMPS MK I helicopter Assistant Program Manager for Systems and Engineering at the Naval Air Systems Command, Commanding Officer of Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron (Light) Thirty-Three (HSL-33), and was previously a member of the NWC JMO faculty. He holds a B.S. in Electrical Engineering from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, an M.S. in Electrical Engineering from the Naval Postgraduate School, an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the College of Naval Command and Staff and has completed the JPME Phase II course at the Armed Forces Staff College.

COLONEL DAVID A. DELLAVOLPE, USAF, rejoined the Naval War College faculty in August 2004, after having served a three-year tour as the Professor of Aerospace Studies at Boston University. He was previously assigned to the Joint Military Operations faculty from 1995 through 1998. Colonel DellaVolpe is an F-15E and F-4 Weapon Systems Officer who has had eight different operational and training assignments in the United States, Europe, and Pacific. He has served as the 20th Fighter Squadron Commander, Holloman AFB, New Mexico and the 4th Support Group Commander and 4th Fighter Wing Vice Commander, Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina. He has also served a tour as a staff officer at the Headquarters, United States Air Forces in Europe, Ramstein AB, Germany. He graduated from the Air Command and Staff College in 1988 and the Naval War College in 1995. He holds a B.S. in Biology from Fairfield University, an M.A. in Military History from the University of Alabama, and an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College.

CAPTAIN DAVID A. DUFFIÉ, USN, holds the Charles A. Lockwood Military Chair of Submarine Warfare and reported to the Joint Military Operations Department in September 2003 following a tour as Chief of Staff for Commander Submarine Group Eight in Naples, Italy. Captain Duffié has spent his entire career as a submariner serving on a variety of fast attack and Fleet Ballistic Missile submarines. Captain Duffié's first command was USS ***Helena*** (SSN 725), from August 1990 to July 1992. During his command tour, ***Helena*** received the CINCPACFLT Silver Anchor Award, the Engineering "E", and the ASW "T." Additionally, he personally received the 1992 Naval Submarine League Admiral Darby Award for command excellence. Following command, he reported to the COMSUBPAC staff as the Prospective Commanding Officer (PCO) Instructor from July 1992 to July 1994. He served as Chief of Actions on the Joint Staff from July 1995 to June 1997. He assumed command of the Submarine Tender, USS ***Simon Lake*** (AS 33) in LaMaddalena, Italy. During his command tour, the ship received the Battle Efficiency "E" for 1997 and 1998, two Navy Unit and two Meritorious Unit Commendations. In July 1999, he was assigned as the Navy Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He served at Pacific Command in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, as the Chief of Requirements and Force Structure Division (J-55) from July 2000 to July 2001. Captain Duffié holds a Bachelor of Science in Systems Engineering from the U.S. Naval Academy, an MBA from Cameron University, and a Master of Science degree in National Security Strategy from the National War College at the National Defense University.

COMMANDER PETER A. DUTTON, JAGC, USN, holds the Howard S. Levie Military Chair of Operational Law. Before becoming a JAG, CDR Dutton was a Naval Flight Officer assigned to VAQ-33 in Key West, Florida. He flew electronic warfare missions in Europe, the Caribbean, Central Atlantic, and the Pacific. He was then assigned as Operational Test Coordinator for the Navy's Aviation Electronic Warfare Programs at the Operational Test and Evaluation Force in Norfolk, Virginia. In May 1990, CDR Dutton transitioned from aviation into the Judge Advocate General's Corps and served for 9 years as a prosecutor at Norfolk Naval Base, the Washington Navy Yard and a XO of the Naval Legal Service Office at the New London, Connecticut Submarine Base. He was then selected to be an instructor of military law at the Naval Justice School, where CDR

Dutton also served as a faculty member of the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies, participating on country teams including Argentina, Colombia, and Chad. CDR Dutton attended the Naval War College. Upon graduation he served as the Legal Advisor to Commander, Carrier Group Six (John F. Kennedy Battle Group) where he provided all aspects of legal advice to a battle group that comprised 19 ships and more than 15,000 personnel. Key missions included enforcement of the Southern Iraq No Fly Zone and maritime interdiction operations throughout the CENTCOM AOR. CDR Dutton was then assigned as the Staff Attorney for the President of the Naval War College and Professor of International Law. He joined the JMO faculty as the Levie Chair in July 2004.

COMMANDER BEN FALK, Royal Navy, joined the Joint Military Operations Department Faculty in September 2004, following a two-year appointment to the Joint Staff of the British Embassy in Washington. Graduating from Britannia Royal Naval College in 1982 as a Warfare Officer, he served in a variety of surface combatants specialising as a Principal Warfare Officer in Above Water Warfare. He has served in a number of operational and staff positions under Naval and Joint commands, including as a member of the Joint Force Headquarters and as Executive Officer in the Destroyer HMS ***Glasgow***. He attended the Joint Command and Staff College (ACSC), where he gained an M.A. in Defence Studies, and graduated in 2002.

COLONEL RICHARD FINDLAY, USMC, reported to the Joint Military Operations Department in August 2002, following an eleven month assignment as a Fellow on CNO's Strategic Studies Group XXI. He received his commission in June 1978 from the U.S. Naval Academy and designated as a Naval Flight Officer in 1979. After completing VMA (AW)-202 he served as Maintenance Materiel Control Officer, Flight Line Officer and Avionics Officer in VMA (AW)-533 with deployments to MCAS Iwakuni and to the Mediterranean on board USS ***Saratoga***. From 1985–1986 he served as an instructor at the Staff Non-Commissioned Officer Academy. In 1987 he returned to VMA (AW)-533 and served as Quality Assurance Officer, Assistant and Aviation Maintenance Officer and completed deployments to the Mediterranean on board USS ***J. F. Kennedy***, to Iwakuni Japan and to DESERT STORM. Upon return he transitioned to the F/A-18 and during the stand-ups of VMFA(AW)-225 and VMFA(AW)-533 served as the Intelligence Officer, Administration and Operations Officer between 1993 and 1995 and deployed to Aviano Italy in support of Operations PROVIDE PROMISE and DENY FLIGHT. He served as Commanding Officer VMFA (AW)-332 between 1996 and 1998; as Section Head Aviation Officer Assignments between 1999 and 2001. He holds a B.S. degree in Oceanography from USNA (1978), and a M.A. degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. He is a 1987 graduate of the Amphibious Warfare School, a 1996 graduate of Air Command and Staff College, and a 1999 graduate of the Naval War College.

PROFESSOR THEODORE L. GATCHEL rejoined the Joint Military Operations faculty in July 1998, having taught in the department twice while on active duty. He retired from the Marine Corps in 1991 as a colonel after a thirty-year career that included a wide variety of both staff and command assignments and two combat tours in Vietnam. He holds a B.S. in Geological Engineering from the University of Oklahoma and an M.S. in Management from the Naval Postgraduate School. He is also a graduate of the Naval

War College, the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and the U.S. Army's Infantry Officers Advanced Course. He is the author of ***At the Water's Edge: Defending Against the Modern Amphibious Assault*** (Naval Institute Press, 1996) and ***Eagles and Alligators: An Examination of the Command Relationships That Have Existed Between Aircraft Carrier and Amphibious Forces During Amphibious Operations*** (Naval War College Press, 1997), in addition to numerous magazine and journal articles and a monthly newspaper column on military affairs.

COLONEL THOMAS J. GIBBONS, USA, reported to the U.S. Naval War College as the Army Advisor in July 2003, following a tour as the Director of Manpower, Personnel and Administration (J1) for the U.S. Pacific Command at Camp Smith, Hawaii. Colonel Gibbons graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1979. He was commissioned as a Field Artillery Officer and served in field artillery batteries in the 2d Infantry Division in Korea and the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. COL Gibbons attended flight training at Fort Rucker, Alabama, in 1982 and was assigned to the 101st Airborne Division (AASLT) at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. He flew with the 229th Attack Helicopter Battalion and commanded the Division Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC). He reported to the U.S. Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) in 1986 and worked as an Aviation Assignment Officer. COL Gibbons transitioned to the OH58D (Kiowa Warrior) helicopter and was subsequently assigned to Task Force 118 at Fort Bragg as the Operations Officer (S3). He worked as the U.S. Army Liaison to the NAVCENT Commander during Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM flying from U.S. Navy ships in the Persian Gulf region. COL Gibbons was assigned to the Army Staff at the Pentagon in 1993 and worked as the White House Liaison Officer for the Director of the Army Staff. In 1995, COL Gibbons was assigned to the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, New York, as the 10th Aviation Brigade Executive Officer. He commanded of the 1st Battalion, 10th Aviation Regiment (ATTACK) at Fort Drum and deployed to support Joint Task Force 6 along the southern borders of the United States. COL Gibbons has had a variety of command and staff assignments in cavalry and attack helicopter battalions. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. COL Gibbons holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Economics from the U.S. Military Academy, a Masters degree in Engineering Administration from The George Washington University, and a Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DERRILL T. GOLDIZEN, USAF, joined the Naval War College faculty in the fall of 2002 following an assignment as Director of Weather Operations, 18th Air Support Operations Group, Pope AFB, North Carolina. He completed Air Force Officer Training School as First Honor Graduate and was commissioned in 1984. His operational assignments include tours as Staff Weather Officer to the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado and the Combined Field Army (ROK/US), Camp Red Cloud, Republic of Korea. He has also served as an intelligence analyst at the National Air Intelligence Center and taught graduate space physics at the Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. In his most recent assignment, he deployed to Southwest Asia to provide airpower expertise to the Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Coalition/Joint Forces Land Component

Commander. His degrees include Bachelor of Arts in Natural Sciences from the University of South Florida (1984), Master of Science in Meteorology from the Pennsylvania State University (1991), and Doctor of Science in Meteorology from the Pennsylvania State University (1995).

COLONEL BILL HARTIG, USMC, reported to the Joint Military Operations Department in July 2004, following a tour as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 for the I Marine Expeditionary Force. Colonel Hartig graduated from Saint Johns University in 1978 with a Bachelor of Science in Management and was commissioned the same year as a Marine Infantry Officer. His initial fleet assignment was to 3d Battalion, 1st Marines where he served as a platoon commander and executive officer, deploying twice to the Western Pacific. In 1982, Lieutenant Hartig was transferred to II Marine Expeditionary Force in Norfolk, Virginia, where he served in a variety of billets until 1985. After graduation from Amphibious Warfare School in 1986, Captain Hartig served as the Operations Office and Assistant Operations Officer for the 7th Marine Regiment. In 1987, he assumed command of Weapons Company, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines and again deployed to the Western Pacific. Upon return from deployment, Captain Hartig assumed duties as Commanding Officer, Alfa Company, School of Infantry from 1989 to 1990, when he assumed the position of Operations Officer. He was transferred to language training in 1991. On graduation from the Defense Language Institute, Monterrey California, in 1991 Major Hartig was assigned as Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Security Force Company, Rota, Spain from 1991 until 1994. Major Hartig then transferred to Okinawa, Japan where he served as Operations Officer, Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force Somalia, Executive Officer, Special Purpose Marine Ground Task Force Belleau Wood, Commanding Officer, Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force CARAT and Executive Officer, 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) from 1994 until 1997. Lieutenant Colonel Hartig served as the Inspector-Instructor for 2d Battalion, 23d Marines from 1997 until his selection for attendance at the Naval War College in 1999. Graduating from the War College in 2000, Lieutenant Colonel Hartig was assigned as the Ground Lieutenant Colonels monitor, responsible for assigning Marine Officers. Promoted to Colonel in 2001, he was assigned as the Senior Advisor to the Commander, Saudi Marine Forces and Naval Special Forces during 2001 and 2002. Colonel Hartig was then assigned to the staff at the I Marine Expeditionary Force in August 2002 until his assignment to the War College in 2004.

PROFESSOR DOUGLAS N. HIME first joined the Naval War College faculty in 1992, after having served as Chief, International Negotiations, U.S. Delegation to the NATO Military Committee. Following a tour as a member of the faculty at the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy, Professor Hime retired from the Air Force in September 1998 and rejoined the Naval War College faculty in October 1998. His previous assignments include several operational flying tours in B-52s and staff assignments as Chief of Crisis Action Planning and Deputy Director of Bomber Operations at Headquarters, Strategic Air Command. He has commanded avionics and field maintenance squadrons in addition to a B-52 squadron. His military schooling includes Air Command and Staff College, Air War College, and the NATO Defense College. He holds a B.S.E. from Emporia State University, an M.S. from the University of Southern California, and a Ph.D. from Salve Regina University.

CAPTAIN FRED B. HORNE, USN, joined the Joint Military Operations faculty in August 2003 after serving two years as the Director of the Naval Staff College. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1976 with a B.S. degree in Oceanography and designated a Naval Flight Officer in January 1978. He has served in a variety of operational and staff positions in the Maritime Patrol Aviation community including commanding officer Patrol Squadron FIFTY and Chief of Staff, Fleet Air Keflavik in Iceland. He is a 1988 graduate of the Naval War College (CNC&S), a 1999 graduate of the Air War College, and holds a M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL THOMAS HUIZENGA, USAF, earned a Bachelor of Science Degree in Mechanical Engineering and his commission from the AFROTC at Loyola Marymount University in 1985. He is a Command Pilot with over 3200 flight hours in the T-37, T-38, EC-130H and AC-130U "Spooky" Gunship. His operational experience includes assignments as an Instructor Pilot, Flight Commander, Assistant Squadron Director of Operations, and Wing Chief of Safety. He has served in various staff positions on the Air Force Secretariat in International Affairs, and at the Combined Air Operations Center in Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Prior to his current assignment, he was a student at the USAF Air War College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Lt Col Huizenga graduated "with Highest Distinction" from the College of Naval Command and Staff in 1998.

CAPTAIN STEVEN D. KORNATZ, USN, reported to the Joint Military Operations Department in January 2002 following assignment as Air Boss in USS ***Essex*** (LHD2) homeported in Sasebo, Japan. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1980 with a B.S. in Mathematics and was designated a Naval Aviator in 1981. An HSL pilot, his sea duty assignments entailed flying SH-2F and SH-60B aircraft with both East and West Coast squadrons. Additionally, he commanded VC-8, a composite squadron of SH-3H and A-4 aircraft based at Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico. Ashore, he was assigned to VX-1 at NAS Patuxent River, Maryland, as SH-60B Operational Test Director from 1986–1989; was a contingency planning officer and Director, President's Emergency Operations Center with the White House Military Office from 1992–1994; attended the Naval War College, graduating in 1995; and was an Anti-Submarine Warfare planning officer on CINCPACFLT staff from 1995–1997. CAPT Kornatz recently returned from a 6-month deployment to Iraq, where he served as a member of the Coalition Provisional Authority, supervising the reestablishment of various Iraqi government ministries. He holds an M.S. degree in Systems Management from the University of Southern California and an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College.

CAPTAIN IVAN LUKE, USCG, joined the JMO faculty in 2003 following four years in command of the U.S. Coast Guard Barque ***Eagle*** (WIX-327), the Service's seagoing sail training vessel, also known as "America's Tall Ship." Captain Luke is a 1976 graduate of the United States Coast Guard Academy in New London, Connecticut. His initial assignment was Deck Watch Officer aboard the Medium Endurance Cutter USCGC ***Dependable*** homeported in Panama City, Florida. Subsequent afloat assignments were Operations Officer of the High Endurance Cutter USCGC ***Taney*** in Portsmouth, Virginia as an O-3; Commanding Officer of the Medium Endurance Cutter USCGC ***Evergreen*** in

New London, Connecticut as an O-4; and Executive Officer of the Medium Endurance Cutter USCGC ***Seneca*** in Boston, Massachusetts also as an O-4. Captain Luke's O-5 command was the Medium Endurance Cutter USCGC ***Valiant*** in Miami, Florida. In addition to these PCS assignments, Captain Luke served in a temporary capacity aboard a number of Coast Guard and Navy vessels including participation in Operation ABLE MANNER (Haiti-1993), UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti-1994) and ABLE VIGIL (Cuba 1994). Captain Luke's assignments ashore included: Instructor of Nautical Science at the Coast Guard Academy; School Chief of the Coast Guard's Prospective Commanding Officer (PCO) School; Assistant Law Enforcement Branch Chief at the Seventh Coast Guard District in Miami, Florida; and service as a fellow in the Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering from the U.S. Coast Guard Academy and a Master of Arts degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. Captain Luke holds a merchant mariner's license in the grade of Unlimited Ocean Master, Steam, Motor, or Sail.

PROFESSOR HUGH F. LYNCH rejoined the Joint Military Operations faculty in February 2001, having taught in the department twice before. He served on active duty in the Navy for 26 years, commanding an attack squadron, a carrier air wing and an amphibious ship. Ashore he had two tours in Washington: the first at the Bureau of Naval Personnel and later as Director, Air Weapons Systems Analysis Staff, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. During the Vietnam War, he made three combat deployments while flying A-4 and A-7 aircraft on over 300 missions. In the course of 22 years in the cockpit, he flew from the decks of 18 carriers and piloted 18 types of aircraft, from A-1s to F-14s. He holds an M.S. degree in International Affairs from George Washington University and a B.S. in Economics from Holy Cross College. He is a distinguished graduate of the Naval War College. Professor Lynch has written many studies on naval matters, several of which centered on the Greater Middle East, including a book-length classified study, ***Iran, The United States, and The Employment of Navies.***

PROFESSOR RICHARD J. MARTIN, JR., a 1972 graduate of the University of Maine, joined the Naval War College faculty in August 1994 as an active duty Marine Lieutenant Colonel until his retirement from active duty in 1998. His Marine Corps career included assignments in various operational air command and control billets in all three Marine aircraft wings as well as various staff assignments. He also served as Executive Officer and ultimately Commanding Officer of Marine Air Support Squadron-1 in the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing. During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, he was the air support detachment commander for Marine Forces Afloat aboard the USS ***Nassau*** (LHA-4). He graduated from the USMC Command and Staff College in 1987 and the Air War College in 1994. He holds a Master of Arts degree in International Relations from Salve Regina University. After his retirement in September 1998, Professor Martin joined the civilian faculty of the Joint Military Operations Department in the College of Distance Education.

CAPTAIN SANTIAGO R. NEVILLE, USN, joined the JMO faculty in 2004. A career Naval Intelligence Officer, his operational tours include duty as Intelligence Officer for ASW Operating Centers at Adak and Diego Garcia, Multi-Sensor Interpretation and Supplemental Plot Officer in the Intelligence Center aboard USS ***Carl Vinson*** (CVN-70),

Special Collections Staff aboard USS ***Spruance*** (DD-963), and N2 on the Amphibious Squadron FOUR and Amphibious Group TWO staffs. While aboard SPRUANCE, he was intelligence officer for Operation JITTERY PROP off Central America. Aboard PHIBRON FOUR, he participated in Operation SHARP EDGE, the Non-Combatant Evacuation of Liberia. He was lead political/military intelligence analyst for Lebanon and Libya at CINCUSNAVEUR during the U.S. Navy's operations in both those countries. He served on the staff of the Director of Naval Intelligence in the Pentagon, working airborne reconnaissance and Expeditionary Intelligence issues, in addition to working in Colombia for a year as Naval Intelligence liaison to the Colombian Navy. His joint tours included service as Senior Watch Officer and Production Manager at Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific, and Head of Intelligence Analysis at Atlantic Intelligence Command. His most recent tour was in Yokosuka, Japan, as N2, managing the intelligence relationship between the U.S. Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. He holds a B.S. in Biology and History from the University of Texas—Pan American, an M.S. in National Security Affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School, and an M.A. in Strategic Studies from the Army War College.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL BRYAN T. NEWKIRK, USA, joined the Joint Military Operations Department faculty in July 2004 following his completion of the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Lieutenant Colonel Newkirk is a native of Hampton, Virginia and a 1983 graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. Upon graduating from West Point, he was commissioned in the Infantry. As an Infantry officer, he served as a platoon leader, company executive officer, and company commander in a number of Infantry units in Germany and at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He later served as the Ground Liaison Officer for the 363d Tactical Fighter Wing at Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina. In 1990 Lieutenant Colonel Newkirk branch transferred from the Infantry to the Quartermaster Corps. As a Quartermaster officer, he has held logistics positions in the 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, the 101st Air Assault Division, the 23d Quartermaster Brigade, the 49th Quartermaster (Petroleum) Group, and on the Army Staff in the Pentagon. His schools include the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the Supply/Services Management Officers Course, Command and General Staff College, and the Air War College. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the United States Military Academy and a Master of Arts degree in Strategic Studies from the Air War College.

COMMANDER PAUL A. POVLOCK, USN, joined the Joint Military Operations Department faculty in 2004 following command of USS ***San Francisco*** (SSN 711). He was graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1984 with a B.S. degree in Marine Engineering. His sea tours include duty on USS ***Lafayette*** (SSBN 616) (GOLD), USS ***Richard B. Russell*** (SSN 687), USS ***Albuquerque*** (SSN 706) and USS ***Philadelphia*** (SSN 690). Significant shore tours include duty on the Joint Staff as the Navy Branch Chief of the Reconnaissance Operations Division (J38) and as an Instructor at the U.S. Naval Academy. Commander Povlock also holds an M.S. in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Maryland and an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College.

PROFESSOR NICHOLAS E. REYNOLDS, CIA FACULTY REPRESENTATIVE of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), is a newcomer to the Naval War College, arriving in late August 2004. He holds the George Herbert Walker Bush Chair of National Intelligence. During his career, Dr. Reynolds has served three tours overseas in Latin America and the Middle East, and was most recently Deputy Director of a center for resettlement operations in Washington, D.C., work which involved a number of interagency and current intelligence issues. He has been a member of the Marine Corps Reserve since 1975, serving in various active duty and reserve billets, now holding the rank of Colonel. For the last 18 months, he has been on active duty, both overseas and in Washington, as Officer in Charge of Field History for the Marine Corps. He is Editor of the ***Journal of America's Military Past*** for the non-profit Council on America's Military Past, with a focus on military history and historic preservation, and is the author of three monographs on Marine Corps history as well as articles on decision-making and a book on the German General Staff in the inter-war period. Dr. Reynolds has a Ph.D. in History from the University of Oxford (England) and a B.A. from Swarthmore College in Pennsylvania.

CAPTAIN WALTER J. RICHARDSON, JR., USN, joined the Joint Military Operations faculty in August 2002 following completion of the Air War College course at Maxwell AFB. He graduated from Louisiana Tech University with a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering in May 1979, was commissioned via the AVROC Program in November 1979, and subsequently earned his wings as a Naval Aviator in May 1981. Five squadron tours ensued from August 1981 to January 1994, including VC-1, NAS Barbers Point, Hawaii where he served as Assistant Operations Officer and Material Control Officer; VT-21, NAS Kingsville as an Instructor Pilot, A-4 Model Manager and Safety Officer; VF-24, NAS Miramar deploying with CVW-9 in USS ***Nimitz*** as Maintenance Training Officer and Pilot Training Officer; VF-124, NAS Miramar as Instructor Pilot, Safety Officer and Tactics Phase Leader; and VF-21, NAF Atsugi, Japan, forward-deployed with CVW-5 in USS ***Independence*** as Operations, Safety and Maintenance Officers. In March 1994, he attended Naval War College, graduating in March 1995 with a Master of Arts degree in National Security and Strategic Studies. From April 1995 to March 1996, he served in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (N889) as Requirements Officer for Navy Fighter Weapons School (TOPGUN), Strike U and TACTS Ranges. He reported to NAS Meridian, Mississippi, in April 1996 where he served as Executive Officer and Commanding Officer of VT-7 and as Air Wing Standardization Officer of CTW-1. Following his Command tour, he reported to USS ***Enterprise*** in August 1999, assuming duties as Air Boss in March 2000. He departed ***Enterprise*** in July 2001 and reported to the Air War College at Maxwell AFB, graduating with a Masters of International Strategic Studies in June 2002. CAPT Richardson is a graduate of the Navy Fighter Weapons School and has accumulated over 4,950 flight hours and over 500 carrier arrested landings.

PROFESSOR JOHN D. ROBERTS, rejoined the Joint Military Operations faculty in May 2002, having taught in the department for two years while on active duty. He retired from the Navy in 2001 following a 30-year career centered around maritime patrol aviation and technology development. He had five tours flying the P-3 Orion, including command of Patrol Squadron TEN and Patrol Wing FIVE. His shore assignments

included duty on the Joint Staff as Chief of Detection and Monitoring for Counternarcotics, and Special Assistant to the Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Professor Roberts holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the State University of New York at Oswego, a Master of Science from Salve Regina University, and a Master of Arts from the Naval War College.

PROFESSOR PAUL A. ROMANSKI, a 1968 graduate of the NROTC Program at the University of Notre Dame, joined the Naval War College faculty in August 1994 as an active duty Navy captain and held the Arleigh Burke Chair of Surface Warfare until his retirement from active duty in 1998. His Navy career included destroyer escort and Combat Logistics Force duty, junk force riverine operations in Vietnam, and shore assignments on the CNO's staff, at the Bureau of Naval Personnel, and Military Sealift Command. Professor Romanski's career included tours in command of USS ***Pyro*** (AE-24), USS ***Wichita*** (AOR 1), and the composite Task Force 63—Naval Surface Group Mediterranean—Task Force 505 (NATO). He holds Master of Arts degrees from the University of Illinois and the Naval War College, and is pursuing a Ph.D. at Salve Regina University. After his retirement in July 1998, Professor Romanski joined the civilian faculty of the Joint Military Operations Department.

PROFESSOR ANGUS K. ROSS, a 1975 graduate from Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, joined the Naval War College Faculty in September 1996, as an active duty Commander in the Royal Navy, teaching on the Joint Military Operations Faculty until his retirement in February 2000, after 25 years service. A Seaman Officer and ASW Specialist, his naval career included worldwide service in all types of RN surface vessels, from minesweepers to aircraft carriers, staff tours with Squadron and Admiral's staffs (afloat), and a number of seagoing tours with NATO, including COMSTRKFLTLANT. Professor Ross holds a B.S. degree (Honors) in Marine Zoology and Oceanography from Exeter University in the UK, a Master of Arts (highest distinction) from the Naval War College (CNW 98), and is pursuing a further M.A. degree in European History at Providence College, as well as an eventual Ph.D. in History. After his retirement from active duty, Professor Ross joined the civilian faculty of the College of Distance Education where he continues to teach Joint Military Operations.

CAPTAIN MARK SEAMAN, USN, joined the Joint Military Operations faculty in September 2001 following an assignment as Chief, Naval Plans and Exercises for Joint Headquarters North, Stavanger, Norway. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in May 1979 and was designated a Naval Aviator in August 1981. His sea tours include Fighter Squadron 32 (1984–1987), deploying aboard both the USS ***Independence*** (CV-62) and USS ***John F. Kennedy*** (CV-67); and Fighter Squadron 143 (1989–1992) deploying aboard the USS ***Dwight D.Eisenhower*** (CVN-69). His major shore tours include Fighter Squadron 101 (1987–1989); a joint tour with Headquarters North, Kolsas, Norway (1992–1995); and Navy Recruiting District, Portland, Oregon as Commanding Officer (1996–1998). Captain Seaman holds a B.S. in Naval Science from the U.S. Naval Academy and an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College. He is also a graduate of the Navy Fighter Weapons School.

CAPT JOE STAFFORD, USN, joined the Joint Military Operations faculty in July 2003 following an assignment as Professor of Naval Science, Tulane University. He graduated from North Carolina 1974 and received his commission from OCS. His sea tours include assignments onboard USS ***Francis Marion*** (LPA-249) where he was a Division Officer and made deployments to the Mediterranean. He completed department head tours as Chief Engineer onboard USS ***Comte de Grasse*** (DD-974) and Operations Officer onboard USS ***Milwaukee*** (AOE-2). During his department head tours, he made deployments to the North Atlantic and Mediterranean in support of the multi-national peace keeping force in Lebanon. In August of 1986 he reported as Executive Officer onboard USS ***Flint*** (AE-32) where he deployed to the Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf. Captain Stafford commanded USS ***Shasta*** (AE-33) from October 1992 to October 1994 and USS SUPPLY (AOE-6) from March 1998 until April 2000. During his command tours he made deployments to the Mediterranean, Adriatic and Arabian Gulf in support of Kosovo and DESERT STORM. Captain Stafford served ashore as an instructor at Surface Warfare School Command (Basic), CINCLANTFLT PEB engineering inspector (gas turbine and steam ships), Joint Staff duty at USCINCSOC Macdill AFB in J-5 as Southwest Asia Planner and the Chief of Naval Operations staff as Maintenance and Modernization Division (N432) branch head and director of the navy equal opportunity program (Pers 61). He holds Master of Arts degrees from the Naval War College in National Security and Strategic Studies and in Public Administration from Golden Gate University with academic honors.

PROFESSOR PAUL J. ST. LAURENT joined the Joint Military Operations Department faculty in 1988 where he held the Frederick J. Horne Chair of Military Logistics. After retiring from the Army in 1991 he joined the JMO faculty in the College of Distance Education. While on active duty Professor St. Laurent served in the Army Corps of Engineers and in the Quartermaster Corps. He has held various command and staff positions in units in Germany, Vietnam, Turkey, and Iceland. He served on the staff of the Army Quartermaster School; as Logistics Support Manager, U.S. Army Troop Support Agency; as Chief, Supply and Services Branch on the Army Staff; and as Assistant Chief of Staff J-4, Iceland Defense Force. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Naval War College. He holds a B.S. from the University of Massachusetts and Masters in European History from Providence College and in Education from Boston University.

PROFESSOR PATRICK C. SWEENEY joined the Joint Military Operations Department faculty in 1999 as a colonel in the U.S. Army, having completed a tour in NATO as the Chief of Contingency Plans for Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH). He was commissioned in the Army as a Field Artillery Officer through the ROTC program at The Citadel in 1973. His tours of duty include a variety of artillery assignments in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Division G3 Ops with the 2d Infantry Division in Korea, a Fire Support Instructor at the U.S. Army Infantry School, command of a Pershing 2 Battery in Germany, Corps Plans Officer and artillery battalion executive officer in XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, followed by an assignment as the XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery G3 during DESERT SHIELD/STORM. He commanded an artillery battalion at the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, NY,

and participated in Hurricane Andrew relief operations as well as operations in Somalia and Haiti. His most recent assignment at AFSOUTH focused primarily as the Deputy CJ5 for the IFOR mission in Bosnia and as a NATO planner for Kosovo operations. Professor Sweeney is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advance Military Studies, and the Army War College. He holds a bachelor of science degree in Business Administration from The Citadel and Master's degrees in Public Administration from Western Kentucky University and Military Arts and Science from the School of Advance Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth. Professor Sweeney retired from active duty in June 2002, as a colonel, and remained on the faculty.

PROFESSOR MARK VAUGHN joined the JMO staff in September 2004. He holds a BS in Business Administration from the Citadel (1986), an M.A. in History from Providence College (1993) and a Ph.D. from the University of Reading, United Kingdom (1999). Previously he has taught graduate and undergraduate courses in Political Science and History at the University of Rhode Island, Roger Williams University and Providence College. Originally commissioned as an infantry platoon leader, he has also served in logistics and civil affairs positions. As a US Army Reservist he has been activated and deployed to Bosnia for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR (1995–96), Kosovo for Operation JOINT GUARDIAN (1999, 2002) and most recently to Iraq for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

PROFESSOR MILAN N. VEGO was an instructor at the Defense Intelligence College (1985–91) and an adjunct instructor at the War Gaming and Simulations Center, National Defense University (1989–91) before joining the Naval War College faculty in August 1991. He was a Senior Fellow at the Center for Naval Analyses (1985–87) and in the Foreign Military Studies Office (formerly Soviet Army Studies Office), Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas (1987–89). Professor Vego is a native of Capljina, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Professor Vego holds a B.A. in Modern History and an M.A. in U.S. History, Belgrade University, and a Ph.D. in European History from George Washington University. He also has held a Master Mariner's license since 1973. Professor Vego's book, ***Soviet Navy Today,*** was published by Arms and Armour Press (London) in 1986; ***Soviet Naval Tactics*** was published by the Naval Institute Press in 1992; and ***The Austro-Hungarian Naval Policy 1904–1914*** was published by Frank Cass Publishers (London) in September 1996. Professor Vego's most recent book, ***Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas***, was published by Frank Cass Publishers in 1999 (2nd ed., in 2003). He is also the author of the textbook ***Operational Warfare***, published by the Naval War College in 2001. Prof. Vego is a frequent contributor to many professional journals and magazines.

COMMANDER ALAN R. WALL, USN, joined the Naval War College faculty in July 2002 following a three-year assignment at the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific (JICPAC) in Pearl Harbor where he served as a Senior Watch Officer, USCINCPAC J2 Liaison Officer, and the South Asia Department Head. He earned his commission through the Navy ROTC program at Ohio State University in 1985. His sea duty assignments include tours on USS ***Blakely*** (FF-1072) as Gunnery Officer and Electrical Officer, where he qualified as a Surface Warfare Officer, USS ***John F. Kennedy*** (CV-67) as Assistant Deck Officer, and USS ***Abraham Lincoln*** (CVN-72) as Strike Intelligence and

Intelligence Systems Officer. Ashore he served at the Navy & Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center (NMITC) as an intelligence instructor, and as the Intelligence Assistant to the Director of Surface Warfare (OPNAV N86) on the Chief of Naval Operations staff. He graduated with distinction from the Naval War College's College of Naval Command and Staff in 1999, earning an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies. He also holds a B.S. in Aerospace Engineering from Ohio State University and an M.S. in Engineering Management (Information Systems) from George Washington University.

BLOCK ONE
FOUNDATIONS and OPERATIONAL ART

INTRODUCTION TO FOUNDATIONS and OPERATIONAL ART

A. Focus:

JMO's Block I sessions prepare students by introducing main themes and concepts that permeate the entire course. The bulk of the block is the study of Operational Art—the way the joint force commander's strategy is translated into operational design and ultimately tactical action.

B. Background:

It is recognized that students entering the JMO course of instruction come from various Service/Agency backgrounds, possess different experience levels, and may be embarking on their first trimester at the Naval War College. Therefore, prior to studying Operational Art, a week of introductory sessions are designed to provide a common intellectual framework for all students by addressing three main areas of focus:

1. OPS I-1, I-2, and I-6: explain the intellectual linkage between the JMO trimester and the Strategy and Policy and National Security Decision Making educational disciplines; provide the student with an overview of what the JMO syllabus will entail as it proceeds through the main educational building blocks; and explain in detail what is required of the student to complete the course successfully. Specifically, OPS I-6 fully describes the requirement for the Operations Research Paper and its purpose in partially fulfilling the requirements for completion of the NWC master's degree, as well as its utility in furthering the critical intellectual literature on current and future operational warfare issues.
2. OPS I-3 and I-5 are designed to start the student thinking about the differences among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare—first in OPS I-3 by describing historically why the American military approaches warfare the way it does, and then in OPS I-5 by focusing the discussion more precisely on the naval officer's perspective.
3. OPS I-4, I-7, and I-8 complete the preliminary structure for the JMO course by examining the necessary and continuing relationship among political, diplomatic, economic, informational, and military actions. This is accomplished in: OPS I-4 by directing student attention firmly to the strategic objective as the centerpiece of all military planning and execution; in OPS I-7 by discussing the issues that arise in warfare caused by the civil/military tensions inherent in our national military organization; and in OPS I-8 by discussing the relationship between diplomacy and military force for the complex world in which the President, SECDEF, CJCS, and the combatant commanders must operate.

The operational art sessions of this block are the framework for understanding operational concepts discussed throughout the course. The study of operational art, fundamental elements of warfare and basic operational/campaign planning is essential to the understanding and comprehension of the operation level of war. The most important aspect is a thorough understanding of the terms related to operational art.

The course material offered in the operational art portion of this block may be more familiar to some students than to others, depending upon a student's branch of service, operational experience, and education. No matter what a student's background, there is a wealth of invaluable material to be gained from the assigned readings. Preparation and participation are essential; students need to come to class prepared to participate in lively discussions with colleagues from other services and other agencies. By the end of the operational art sessions, every student should be comfortable with the terminology and concepts of operational art.

The Operational Art sessions have been designed using the Leyte Gulf case study as an illustrative example. After the OPS-I-9 introductory session, the strategic setting of the Leyte Gulf Operation in the larger WWII context is provided as a lecture. The next nine sessions are designed to introduce the student to some of the terminology, elements, principles, and concepts of operational art. To help ensure assimilation of Operational Art, students will analyze the Falklands/Malvinas case study using those same terms, elements, principles, and concepts discussed during the first two weeks.

Administered immediately after the Falklands/Malvinas case study, the graded Operational Art examination will test each student's understanding of the subject. This block of instruction concludes with a survey of operational law and rules of engagement considerations.

The Foundations and Operational Art block of instruction addresses the most important components of operational art; it is not intended to be a comprehensive manual. Every Naval War College graduate should understand the basic concepts of operational art and its importance. In the profession of arms, the study of operational art will likely never stop; this block is designed simply to be an introduction.

COURSE OVERVIEW (Lecture)

Extraordinary as it may appear, the naval officer whose principal business is to fight is not taught the higher branches of his profession. The U.S. is not singular in this respect. The defect is common to nearly all navies and is an inheritance of a past and less enlightened age. But with the recent revolution in naval warfare comes a demand for a higher order of talent in the conduct of naval operations.

—Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, 8 August 1877
Founder and First President of the Naval War College

A. Focus:

The Chairman of the Joint Military Operations Department will overview the Joint Maritime Operations course.

B. Objectives:

Understand the objectives of the Joint Maritime Operations Course.

C. Background:

For the century ahead, the use of military and naval power and their interrelationships with the political, diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power will remain a key challenge. During this course, we will study how to wield the military instrument of power, in peace and war, to achieve the national policy goals. We will examine the power relationships at two levels, strategic and operational, which incorporate the varying perspectives of the Congress and the Executive Branch (President, Cabinet members, Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, joint task force commanders and their naval component commanders). Our focus remains joint operations at the theater and task force level; however, national level strategy formulation, implementation, and campaigning are discussed. This course is designed to develop students' abilities to craft regional strategies and translate them into naval, joint, interagency, and multinational operations.

We will review current theory of operational art, compare it to the doctrinal basis for contemporary application of military power, and begin to distill the next generation of doctrine for our armed forces. Today's operational art theory and the doctrinal basis for the U.S. armed forces reflect the zenith of our wisdom and knowledge of Industrial Age warfare and nation-state relationships. The advent of the Information Age creates an additional challenge in the creation of the next generation of doctrine because some of our theoretical, fundamental beliefs may change. The joint community and each of the military Services are exploring this issue. The U.S. Navy advocates Sea Power 21 as its conceptual basis for twenty-first century war fighting. Through this prism, we will examine our nation's near term challenges and the tenets of twenty-first century warfare.

The point of contact for this session is Captain A. J. Ruoti, USN, C-203.

D. Questions:

None.

E. Required Readings:

U.S. Naval War College, Joint Maritime Operations Syllabus and Study Guide for Joint Maritime Operations 2003–2004, Course Description. Read vi–xvii, 21, 76, 116, 152–154.

F. Supplementary Readings:

Hattendorf, John B., B. Mitchell Simpson II, and John R. Wadleigh. ***Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the U. S. Naval War College.*** Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1984.

The Constitution of the United States. Article 1, Sections 8 & 9; Article 2, Section 2; Article 3, Sections 2 & 3. (Issued).

INTRODUCTORY SEMINAR

A. Focus:

This session is devoted to the introduction of seminar faculty and student members, a review of the administrative requirements and procedures for the trimester, an introductory discussion of the Operations Research Paper, and the general "ground rules" of seminar conduct.

B. Objectives:

- Identify the background and expertise of the faculty and student members of the seminar.
- Establish seminar guidelines for conduct and evaluations.
- Identify linkage of JMO to National Security Decision Making and Strategy & Policy.
- Explain course requirements, including exams and the Operations Research Paper requirement.
- Discuss social and administrative matters.

C. Background:

The introductory seminar provides the opportunity for the moderators to identify faculty and student background and expertise, and for moderators and students to discuss relevant social and administrative matters pertaining to the conduct of the seminar. The Operations Research Paper, discussed in more detail in a later session, is introduced.

In preparation for the seminar, students are asked to complete a short, one-page questionnaire, which was distributed to student mailboxes and will be collected at the beginning of the session.

The point of contact for this session is Colonel Richard J. Findlay, USMC, C-425.

D. Required Reading:

Operations Paper: Guidance for Students, Newport, R.I., October 2004. (**NWC 2062N**), (Issued).

E. Supplementary Readings:

None.

THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR (Lecture)

A. Focus:

The JMO course addresses the theater-strategic and operational levels of war across the spectrum of conflict, including conventional military operations and operations other than war (MOOTW). Throughout this course of study, it is important to understand the historical context and resulting American mindset for the use of military force. This lecture traces American approaches to war and examines the relationships among conventional and unconventional warfare, professional versus citizen soldiers, and preparedness versus unpreparedness—issues that have characterized our American way of war.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination, as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns, and major operations.
- Analyze American perceptions about war.

C. Background:

Every nation has a predisposition for how it fights wars as the result of its own culture and experience. For the United States, many would say there is a strong dependence on mobilization, a penchant for technology, a tendency toward rapid action once engaged, a willingness to use a high level of violence, and an acceptance of precipitous demobilization and rapid return to "normal" peacetime activities.

Ours is a uniquely American approach to national defense, based in part upon a pioneer spirit, aggressive action, and a prejudice against standing armies and long-term conflicts. From the early years of the Republic to the mid-twentieth century, there was a disconnect between U.S. military doctrine and education and the missions our armed forces were actually called upon to accomplish—a gap that often led to problems in the conduct of military operations, particularly when dealing with "small wars." We have also oscillated between splendid isolation and pernicious engagement around the globe. Americans say they fight as a team, yet all too often we have intervened unilaterally as well.

These military characteristics have helped to foster a distinctly American cultural heritage. Examining our historic approach to war helps us understand our political, social, and cultural evolution, and the way we may fight in the future.

The point of contact for this session is Colonel R. J. Findlay, USMC, C-425.

D. Questions:

What are the key characteristics of the "American way of war?"

How does our heritage affect the conduct of campaigns and military operations?

E. Required Readings:

Joint Pub 3-0, ***Doctrine For Joint Operations***, 10 Sep 2001 (Issued). Read Preface, Chapters 1 and 5.

Joint Pub 3-07, ***Joint Doctrine For Military Operations Other Than War***, 16 June 1995 (Issued). Read Glossary definitions.

F. Supplementary Readings:

Cunliffe, Marcus. ***Soldiers and Civilians: The Martial Spirit in America 1775–1865***. Boston & New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1968.

Millett, Alan R. and Peter Maslowski. ***For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America***. New York: The Free Press, 1994.

Weigley, Russell F. ***The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy***. The Macmillan Wars of the United States, ed. Louis Morton. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1973.

OPERATIONS RESEARCH PAPER (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This seminar amplifies Operations Research Paper requirements addressed briefly during the Introductory Seminar (OPS Session I-2), detailing requirements, guidance, due dates, grading criteria, and suggested topics. The Paper constitutes an objective method for students to demonstrate competence at the Master's degree level. Further, it is an essential part of the JMO curriculum, affording opportunity to address a topic relevant to any of the syllabus sessions. Thus, the Paper is consistent with the mission specified for U.S. Intermediate Level Colleges, reflected as the Paper PJE Objective in the paragraph below.

B. Objectives:

The Operations Research Paper achieves the following purposes:

- **PJE**—Demonstrate student understanding of joint and multinational force employment at the operational level of war.
- Production of formal, written work dealing with the theater-strategic or operational level of war, operational art, or a topic of current interest to a theater-strategic or operational level commander.
- Development & refinement of original ideas in military strategy and operations through research and analysis.
- Advanced operational and strategic thinking.
- Timely address of topics that reflect current and future operational issues of interest to Service and joint staffs, and operational level commanders.
- Candidate work for publication in professional journals and military periodicals.
- Competition for prizes and awards offered by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Naval War College, and other sources.

C. Background:

The Operations Research Paper provides the opportunity to study a theater-strategic or operational-level issue, conduct research and analysis, and prepare a paper that advances the literature in the selected area. It is a chance for students to address topics that they feel are of value. It requires independent thought and competent writing because the final product should be suitable for publication in a professional journal. The amount and depth of research should be adequate to support the student's approach and justify sufficiently the conclusions and recommendations or lessons learned. Another use of the paper may be to contribute innovative thinking to Service component and joint force staffs involved with the many complex issues associated with military force employment.

Combatant commanders, operating forces, and headquarters staffs solicit papers and monographs on topics of current interest to support initiatives, develop concepts, and provide fresh looks at the methods of accomplishing missions. The Naval War College is canvassed frequently for papers on particular subjects, and requested to stimulate

interest in specific areas for research and writing to support requesting commands. A recent example was a project dealing with innovation in the application of naval force—how to accomplish the goal of fighting ***smarter*** rather than fighting with ***more***. While some aspects of this project fall outside the parameters of the Operations Research Paper requirement, many of the issues therein are JMO-applicable. These especially include doing the right things and doing them "right"—the result of integrating effectiveness and efficiency. Many student papers are provided to the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), where qualified users can access them to meet a variety of needs.

1. ***Requirements.*** The Operations Research Paper requires the following:

   a. A thesis—a definitive position that the paper will aim to defend, support, or justify.

   b. Sufficient research to analyze the thesis properly.

   c. Arguments and counter-arguments that allow thorough contrast of conflicting points of view.

   d. Logical conclusions drawn from the material presented within the paper.

   e. Recommendations or lessons learned, as appropriate, demonstrating the paper's relevance to the modern operational commander.

2. ***Topics.*** Topics should be taken from one of the following areas:

   a. A current issue at the operational or theater-strategic level of war.

   b. Operational art, or the use of operational art to examine or analyze a case.

   c. An option in support of a military strategy or a new doctrinal concept.

   d. An issue dealing with planning, execution, tasks, or functions at the operational level of war.

   e. Innovation such as the application of naval force at the operational level of war.

   f. A topic that applies to current, near-term, or future major operations or campaigns.

   g. A topic of value to an operational level commander.

NOTE: The Operations Research Paper should not be an examination of tactics, technology, force structure, or future force planning concepts. Also, it should not be a library search and recitation of published material. The paper should not contain proposals or recommendations regarding numbers and types of weapon platforms, nor modifications to platforms, weapons, sensors, or force structure (i.e., it must not be an NSDM-type force planning paper). Moderators will answer any questions on specific issues relating to topic selection.

Required reading **NWC 2062N** contains the JMO Chairman's guidance for selecting a suitable topic and crafting a research question. It also contains candidate topical areas from requesting commands, a list of topics dealing with the operational level of war, extracts on the awards program, and instructions for submission of papers to professional journals. **NWC 2062N** is an excellent resource for developing ideas and selecting a topic.

3. ***Paper Proposal.*** In the format of enclosure (1) to **NWC 2062N**, a paper proposal must be provided to the moderators. The proposal will state the student's thesis,

approach, relevance, and methodology so that the moderators can determine if the paper will satisfy the requirements of the course. Once the moderator team accepts a proposal, this constitutes an understanding between the student and the moderator grading team. An accepted proposal means that both the student and the moderator team understand in common the depth of research, extent of analysis, and quality of writing expected of the student, in addition to the requirements that are discussed in paragraph 1 of this section.

4. ***Research and Writing.*** Research and writing shall meet graduate-level standards. ***The Naval War College Writing Guide*** offers suggestions and additional references on writing skills.

5. ***Format.*** Turabian's ***A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations*** (6th ed.) is the standard for unclassified written work. Format and style for classified papers are contained in the ***Naval War College Style Manual and Classification Guide.***

6. ***Report Document Page.*** In final version submitted to the moderators, the paper requires a Standard Form (SF) 298 as the Report Document Page. The SF-298 format is available either from the seminar academic representative (floppy disk) or on the student computers.

7. ***Length.*** The text of the Operations Research Paper should be 14 to 17 double-spaced pages in ***Times New Roman*** font size 12 to meet standard format for publication and award submissions. Your moderators may accept longer papers depending on the paper purpose and topic, but this acceptance must be obtained prior to paper submission.

8. ***Faculty Advisor.*** A paper advisor may help a student define the scope of the research effort; keep research, analysis, and writing on track; and review outlines and drafts. While students are not required to have advisors, one is strongly recommended. Faculty and staff members are quite willing to act as advisors. Your seminar moderators may suggest appropriate advisors depending on topic, or serve as your paper advisor subject to workload.

9. ***Grading.*** The Operations Research Paper represents a substantial portion of the JMO Course grade. The paper will be evaluated for both substance and writing quality. Grades will be based on the criteria specified in the Course Description section of the JMO Syllabus.

10. ***Prizes and Awards.*** Operations Research Papers may compete for the prizes and awards bestowed annually during the June graduation ceremony. Students are encouraged to prepare their Operations Papers with the additional purpose of competing for one or more of these honors. Details are included in reading **NWC 2062N**.

11. ***Schedule:***

6 December: submit paper proposal to seminar moderators.

9–16 December: conduct individual tutorials per schedule arranged with moderators; moderators and student agree on research topic and course of action.

7 January: suggested date to terminate research, commence analysis, and writing.

4 February: suggested latest date for submission of ***final*** draft to faculty advisor.

14 February (22 February —NSC): deliver paper to seminar moderators.

The point of contact for this session is Professor P. A. Romanski, C-217.

D. Questions:

None.

E. Required Readings:

Operations Paper: Guidance for Students. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, October 2004. (**NWC 2062N**), (Issued. Also available online at http://www.nwc.navy.mil/jmo/research/.)

Turabian, Kate L., ***A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations.*** 6th ed., revised by John Grossman and Alice Bennett. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996. (Issued), (Scan; use for reference).

Naval War College Writing Guide. Newport, R.I., August 2000. (Issued. Also available online at http://www.nwc.navy.mil/jmo/research/.)

Naval War College Style and Classification Guide. Newport, R.I., August 2000. (Issued. Also available online at http://www.nwc.navy.mil/jmo/research/.)

F. Supplementary Readings:

Research in the Library, Autumn 2004. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Library, 2004. (Issued).

Strunk, William, Jr. ***The Elements of Style,*** 4th ed. With revisions, an introduction, and a chapter on writing by E. B. White. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1999.

THE NAVAL WAY OF WAR (Lecture)

Do not refer to the captain by name. He is The Captain.

—Recruit's Handbook, ***U.S.S. West Virginia*** (1935)

A. Focus:

This lecture explains how and why the present-day U.S. Navy acts as it does. It examines the historical context within which the Navy has developed its way of "doing business" and illustrates how and why Naval warfare is uniquely different from other types of warfare. The objective is to enhance student understanding of the naval culture and specifically naval traditions of planning and conducting operations, especially as they affect joint operations**. This lecture also provides a foundation for understanding Navy capabilities and limitations addressed in Session II-3.**

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the organizational framework within which joint forces are employed.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the interrelationship between Service doctrine and joint doctrine.
- Understand the Navy's organizational culture, its origins, and its consequences for current and future joint operations.

C. Background:

In its two centuries of existence, the Navy has developed unique ways of defining, planning, and conducting its operations, distinct from those of the other military services. These experiences are codified in its organization, doctrine, and operating procedures, as well as in less obvious informal usages and patterns of assumptions and beliefs. These include deeply held beliefs about: (1) how decisions should be made; (2) the place of the naval services in the implementation of national policy; (3) command relations and the importance of discretion for subordinates; (4) the relationship of plans to operations; (5) the relationship of technology to naval warfare; and (6) the appropriate relationship of the naval services to the other military services in the conduct of joint operations. These patterns are reinforced by professional training programs, career patterns, and day-to-day operations; and, although subject to change, they tend to lag changes in immediate circumstances.

The peculiarly American naval way of war has been and continues to be conditioned by: (1) the fundamental characteristics of naval warfare; (2) the historical era during which the Navy was created and formed; (3) U.S. national policy; (4) the technologies of naval warfare; (5) developments in thinking about naval warfare; (6) operational experience, especially pivotal points of success and failure; and (7) relations with the other military services.

The point of contact for this session is Professor D. W. Chisholm, C-412.

D. Questions:

None.

E. Required Readings:

JP 5-00.1, ***Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning***, 25 January 2002. Chapter II.

F. Supplementary Readings:

Baer, George. ***One Hundred Years of Seapower: The U.S. Navy, 1890–1990***. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994.

Barlow, Jeffrey. ***The Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945–1950***. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995.

Chisholm, Donald. ***Waiting for Dead Men's Shoes: Origins and Development of the U.S Navy's Officer Personnel System, 1793–1941***. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000.

Clark, Vern. "Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities." ***U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*** 128 (October 2002): 32–41.

Coletta, Paolo E. ***The United States Navy and Defense Unification, 1947–1953***. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1981.

Davis, Vincent A. ***Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy, 1943–1946***. Chapel Hill, N.C: University of North Carolina Press, 1966.

Herrick, Walter R., Jr. ***The American Naval Revolution***. Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1966.

Huntington, Samuel P. "National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy." ***Naval War College Review***, May 1954: 483–493.

Karsten, Peter. ***The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern American Navalism***. New York: The Free Press, 1972.

McKee, Christopher. ***A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession: The Creation of the U.S. Navy Officer Corps, 1795–1815***. Annapolis, Md: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1991.

Spector, Ronald. ***Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession***. Newport, R.I: Naval War College Press, 1977.

Sprout, Harold and Margaret Sprout. ***The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776–1918***. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1946.

Sprout, Harold and Margaret Sprout. ***Toward a New Order of Sea Power: American Naval Policy and the World Scene, 1918–1922***. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1943.

Uhlig, Frank, Jr. ***How Navies Fight: The U.S. Navy and Its Allies***. Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1994.

U.S. Navy. ***Forward . . . From the Sea: the Navy Operational Concept.*** Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997.

Vlahos, Michael. ***The Blue Sword: The Naval War College and the American Mission, 1919–1941***. Newport, R.I: Naval War College Press, 1980.

Wylie, Joseph C., Jr. "Why a Sailor Thinks Like a Sailor." ***U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*** 83 (1957): 811–817.

THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This session will focus upon the direct relationship between national strategic objectives and operational objectives. The central concept to be discussed is how ***regressive planning***, in conjunction with clearly articulated strategic and operational objectives, can lead to the ***desired end state.***

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination, as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns, and major operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among all elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) and the importance of interagency and multinational coordination in these elements, including homeland security and defense.
- Comprehend how national policy is turned into executable military strategies.
- Analyze how the constituent elements of government and American society exert influence on the national strategy process.
- Comprehend how the elements of the ***National Security Strategy*** and ***National Military Strategy*** relate to the operational level of war.
- Introduce the concept of regressive planning which is key to grasping the perspective and operational-level planning that is the focus of the course.
- Introduce the "Five Questions" and analyze how they can help the operational commander apply assets in the pursuit of strategic objectives.
- Examine the interrelationship among the four elements of national power (political, military, economic, and "informational") and how the ***strategic objective*** relates to the ***desired end state.***

C. Background:

As a starting point, the seminar discussion will include a look at the primary policy documents that provide strategic direction to the military: the ***National Security Strategy*** (NSS) and the ***National Military Strategy*** (NMS). The ***National Military Strategy*** supports the aims of the President's ***National Security Strategy***.

The NSS provides a broad strategic context for employing military capabilities in concert with other elements of national power. The NMS derives objectives, missions, and capability requirements from an analysis of the NSS. The seminar will examine the interrelationship among the four main elements of national power (diplomatic, military, economic, and informational) as they relate to the operational commander.

The NMS provides focus for military activities by defining a set of interrelated military objectives and joint operating concepts from which the Service Chiefs and combatant commanders identify desired capabilities and against which the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff assesses risks**.** A tool that will assist military commanders is a set of five questions found in Joint Doctrine:

1. What **military** (or related political and social) **conditions** must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal? (Ends)
2. What **sequence of actions** is most likely to produce that condition? (Ways)
3. How should the **resources** of the joint force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means)
4. What is the likely **cost or risk** to the joint force in performing that sequence of actions?
5. What resources must be committed or actions performed to successfully execute the JFC's **exit strategy**?

The operational commander must ensure his response to the "five questions" (the essence of his plan) remains in line with strategic guidance. While some situations allow for clear military answers to these questions, in other cases there may be no military condition which will contribute to the stated or implied strategic objective. Often, the appropriate action may be diplomatic or economic, with the military in a supporting role. When military conflict appears necessary, the operational commander must also anticipate and plan for war termination and post-conflict activities (which will include both military and civilian elements). Without considering these aspects from the outset of planning, there is little chance that even the best-planned military operation can achieve the desired end state.

The point of contact for this session is Professor J. L. Barker, C-420.

D. Questions:

How does the NMS help operational commanders translate strategy into operational plans?

How can the "Five Questions" help an operational commander respond to strategic guidance?

What is the connection between planning for conflict and planning for post-conflict operations? Why does it matter when you do this planning?

Who determines the term and conditions for conflict termination?

E. Required Readings:

Joint Pub 3-0, ***Doctrine for Joint Operations***. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 10 September 2001, pp. I-1 to I-12, II-1 to II-3. (Issued).

Joint Pub 5-00.1, ***Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning***. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 25 January 2002, Executive Summary, vi–xiii, Chapter 1.

National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004: A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow, Washington, D.C.: 2004. (Issued). [Scan]

The White House, ***The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,*** September 2002. (Issued).

Vego, Milan. ***Policy, Strategy and Operations***. Edited by B. A. Lee and K. F. Walling. ***Strategic Logic and Political Rationality***. London: Frank Cass, 2003. (**NWC 1033**), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Iklé, Fred C. ***Every War Must End.*** New York: Columbia University Press, 1991, 1–16 (Seminar Reserve).

Reed, James W. "Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination . . . ," ***Parameters*** 32, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 41–51. (**NWC 2171**), (Issued).

U.S. NATIONAL MILITARY ORGANIZATION (Seminar)

Where there is no vision, the people perish.

—Prov. 29:18

. . . Our National Security. This is the most basic commitment of America's government, and the greatest responsibility of an American President. Our nation's ideals inspire the world, but our nation's ships and planes and armies must defend these ideals and sustain our allies and friends.

—President George W. Bush, February 2001

A. Focus:

This session focuses on the organization and roles of the Department of Defense (DoD) and its components, and the methods and doctrine employed to achieve unity of effort, if not unity of command. To begin this seminar, we will analyze the role of DoD and the Joint Chiefs of Staff—with particular emphasis on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commanders, the Services, and the Reserve components. We will also examine the current plan for the organization of U.S. military forces throughout the world, and the authority that a commander can exercise over joint forces.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**— Comprehend the purpose, roles, functions, and relationships of the President and the Secretary of Defense, National Security Council (NSC), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, joint force commanders (JFCs), service component commanders, and combat support organizations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how the U.S. military is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for joint, interagency, and multinational operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces.
- **PJE**—Comprehend current joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the factors and emerging concepts influencing joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among all elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) and the importance of interagency and multinational coordination in these elements, including homeland security and defense.

C. Background:

The goal of this session is to expose the student to the history behind the military as it is structured today, and to comprehend and understand how joint doctrine factors shape the structure. Furthermore, it is our goal that students are conversant with the National Military Organization, especially with respect to recent term changes and the Unified Command Plan (UCP) restructuring. As students prepare to fill higher level operational billets, it is important for them to understand the civilian-military interface within DOD and with other organizations such as the Department of Homeland Security.

The National Security Act of 1947 was the first legislative attempt to achieve unity of military effort in U.S. history. This Act provided for a Secretary of National Defense and established the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) as a permanent agency. The Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 had extensive impact on DoD. Two of the principal aims of this legislation were to reduce the effects of service parochialism on defense policy and to improve unity of effort by increasing the authority of the Unified Combatant Commanders. The UCP provides guidance to the DoD to carry out the provisions of legislative action. Just as the National Security Act of 1947 has been amended several times, the UCP is reviewed and amended as the political and military climate changes, in an effort to optimize warfighting and support command structure. The most current UCP established USNORTHCOM as a geographic Combatant Commander and reshaped the responsibilities of USJFCOM. In January 2003, the Department of Homeland Security was established linking together previously disparate organizations. With cabinet-level leadership, this reorganization was the largest change to the executive branch since the National Security Act of 1947. The relationships that USNORTHCOM and DoD maintain with the Department of Homeland Security are still in the formative stages.

Direction of U.S. military forces is currently accomplished through a single chain of command with two distinct branches. The operational (and strategic) direction of combatant forces is accomplished through the operational chain of command, which runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders, with communications running through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For matters not involving strategic and operational direction of combatant forces, guidance is issued through the administrative branch of the chain of command from the President to the Secretary of Defense to Service secretaries and chiefs to commanders of Service forces. Preparing forces for the combatant commander is the role of this "administrative" branch of the chain of command, which is separate and distinct from the operational branch.

Various command relationships may exist among active duty and reserve component organizations involved in joint operations. How much authority a commander can exercise over a supporting or subordinate organization depends upon the specifically delineated command relationship that exists with that organization. A thorough understanding of command relationship alternatives is essential in joint operations. Some important command relationship alternatives to be cognizant of are:

- Combatant Command (COCOM)
- Operational Control (OPCON)
- Tactical Control (TACON)
- Administrative Control (ADCON)
- Coordinating Authority (COORDAUTH)

Point of contact for this session is Colonel R. J. Findlay, USMC, C-425.

D. Questions:

The 2002 UCP assigns USJFCOM'S entire AOR to USEUCOM and USNORTHCOM. USJFCOM's functional responsibility is now joint tactics, techniques, and procedures and doctrine publications, joint force training, and being the force provider to the

geographical combatant commanders. Do you agree with this decision or do you think USJFCOM must control an AOR to publish joint doctrine credibly? Additionally, will this shift in responsibility help the Services abide by the Goldwater-Nichols Act better by assigning a combatant command primarily to focus on developing Joint Doctrine?

In addition to USNORTHCOM's assignment of an AOR, as specified by the 30 April 2002 UCP, it assumes the following tasks: providing military assistance and/or technical assistance to U.S. civilian authorities in consequence management operations in response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE) incidents; providing military assistance to civil disturbances; and overseeing planning of bi-national land and maritime defense for the Canada-U.S. region and Deputy Commander NORAD. For a new Command, is its plate too full?

U.S. Northern Command plans, organizes, and executes homeland defense and civil support missions, but has few permanently assigned forces. The command will be assigned forces whenever necessary to execute missions as ordered by the President. With the responsibility for homeland defense, do you think it is prudent for this command not to have permanently assigned forces? What would work better in your mind? Why?

The 17 April 2002 establishment of USNORTHCOM has been called the most sweeping change of the UCP since the system was set-up in 1946. In your opinion, are we shaping our combatant commands in the right direction for future threats to America, or are we focusing too much military attention on internal defense?

As highlighted in the readings, the CJCS exercises control over no forces, nor can he deploy forces. What are the pluses and minuses of that arrangement for the U.S. military in its relationship with its civilian overseers and with allied/coalition partners?

In almost any envisioned conflict, the combatant commander with primary responsibility for employment of forces will require support from other combatant commanders. Does the "in support of" relationship between supporting and supported commanders provide sufficient authority to the supported combatant commander to ensure unity of effort?

Though National Guard units are designed for federal missions overseas, the National Guard has a long-established state and federal dual role and will have the closest troops to any incident within our borders (There are more Guard bases than active duty bases in the CONUS). Should the new Deputy Commander of NORTHCOM be an Air or Army National Guard Officer?

E. Required Readings:

Joint Force & Operational Warfighting SMARTbook, Introduction–1, 2-1 to 2-36, 3-3 to 3-6, 4-35, 6-9 to 6-11.

National Strategy For Homeland Security, Read Executive Summary and Introduction.

Scan the next two required readings. These are the source documents from which the above SMARTbook reading is derived.

Unclassified extract of the ***Unified Command Plan***, 30 April 2002. (**NWC 2021B**), (Issued).

Joint Pub 0-2. ***Unified Action Armed Forces*** (UNAAF), 10 July 2001. Focus on the following areas: vii–xviii, (I-1 to I-12), (III-1 to III-13), and (V-5 to V-11). (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Joint Forces Staff College, ***Joint Staff Officers' Guide***, JFSC PUB 1, 2000, 1-2 to 1-57. (Issued).

Grossman, Larry. "A Joint Venture," ***Government Executive***, July 1991, 14–18. (**NWC 4101**), (Seminar Reserve).

Chiarelli, Peter W. "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols," ***Joint Force Quarterly***, No. 2 (Autumn 1993): 71–81. (**NWC 4055**), (Seminar Reserve).

White, John P. "Meeting the Needs of the Secretary of Defense," ***The Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act: A Ten-Year Perspective***, November 1999, 51–63. (**NWC 2112**), (Seminar Reserve).

Shalikashvili, John M. "Goldwater-Nichols Ten Years from Now, ***The Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act: A Ten-Year Perspective***, November 1999, 65–75. (**NWC 2113**), (Seminar Reserve).

"Summary of Major Provisions of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986," (**NWC 4022**), (Seminar Reserve).

DIPLOMACY AND MILITARY FORCE (Seminar)

The military are . . . most comfortable when the objectives are clear and precise. Institutionally, the military are solution oriented . . . . On the other hand . . . diplomacy is often the art of managing the insoluble.

—General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, 16 November 1994

A. Focus:

A common American view of foreign policy holds that power politics and old-fashioned diplomacy are bad, powerful standing militaries are to be mistrusted, peacetime international commitments are dangerous entanglements to be avoided, and military force should only be employed when vital national interests are at stake and objectives are clearly defined. Nonetheless, the United States regularly employs military assets in support of political objectives across the entire spectrum of conflict—from deterrence through war.

This session examines the particular ways that leaders, civilian (political/diplomatic) and military, orchestrate military actions in the pursuit of national objectives. In so doing, it builds on themes considered in the Strategy and Policy course. Military forces, used in various ways under differing circumstances, can influence the actions of other governments or non-state actors. Successful conflict termination and transition to post-hostilities require diplomacy.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination, as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns, and major operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among all elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) and the importance of interagency and multinational coordination in these elements, including homeland security and defense.
- Explain the link between national strategic objectives and supporting military objectives.
- Comprehend the link between diplomacy and military force in pursuing the National Security Strategy and the derivative National Military Strategy (NSS/NMS).
- Understand the resources that diplomacy can provide the operational commander for achieving his objectives.

C. Background:

Diplomacy among nations largely entails negotiation and bargaining, which may be polite or harsh, involving threats as well as offers. Military force can be used effectively in concert with the other instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, and informational) to deter, compel, support, or coerce other actors. Military actions can also support political or diplomatic goals in achieving national objectives, without going to war.

"Flexible Deterrent Options" (FDOs) illustrate how these instruments of national power can be mutually supporting. What military force the combatant commander selects and how it is used must be matched to the stated national objectives, in concert with political, diplomatic, and economic actions, and appropriate to the level of national commitment. Overseas presence is customarily a factor in the selection of military force in a crisis; however, developing technologies and increasing international economic ties suggest the potential for reduction in our dependence on traditional presence missions. At the same time, military leaders cannot accomplish their objectives absent the expertise and assistance provided by the diplomatic community.

Since the Vietnam War, military and civilian leaders have struggled to establish appropriate criteria to govern when to employ military force, and the military has sought clarity and certainty while its civilian masters have sought flexibility. Initial efforts by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and General Colin Powell to devise such criteria were modified in light of U.S. experience in the Balkans and again by the George W. Bush administration. It is unlikely that an enduring set of criteria will be agreed upon, especially in light of continuing demands for the United States to conduct a wide range of military operations other than war.

The point of contact for this session is Professor T. L. Gatchel, C-413.

D. Questions:

General Anthony Zinni has argued, "If you read the Weinberger Doctrine and adhere to every one of its tenets, you will be able to fight no war other than World War II." Is the Weinberger Doctrine a realistic guide to the employment of military force in a world characterized primarily by military operations other than war?

Recently, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld set new rules for entering conflicts. How do these rules differ from those embodied in the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine?

In his reading, Carl Bildt gives what might be called an international view of the relationship between force and diplomacy. How does that view differ from that of Secretary Rumsfeld?

Diplomacy is based upon state-to-state relations; is it still useful when confronting a non-state foe such as Al-Qaeda? If so, how?

E. Required Readings:

Weinberger, Caspar W. "The Uses of Military Power," Remarks prepared for delivery to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 28 November 1984. (**NWC 1013**), (Issued).

Rumsfeld, Donald. "Guidelines to Be Considered When Committing U.S. Forces." Department of Defense, 14 October 2002. (As published by the ***New York Times***). (**NWC 1000**), (Issued).

"Flexible Planning Guidance," Extracts from ***Instructional Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 2002.*** (**NWC 1030**), (Issued).

Bildt, Carl. "Force and Diplomacy." ***Survival*** (Spring 2002): 141–148. (**NWC 1009**), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Joint Forces Staff College. ***Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*** (JFSC Pub 5). (Seminar Reserve).

Arnold, Edwin J., Jr. "The Use of Military Power in Pursuit of National Objectives." ***Parameters*** (Spring, 1994): 4–12.

Craig, Gordon A., and Alexander L. George. "Coercive Diplomacy," 189–204 in ***Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time***, 2nd edition**.** New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.

Cable, James. ***Gunboat Diplomacy*** 1919–1979: ***Political Applications of Limited Naval Force.*** New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982. (Seminar Reserve).

Iklé, Fred Charles. ***Every War Must End.*** New York: Columbia University Press, 1971. (Seminar Reserve).

Owens, William A. "Naval Voyage to an Uncharted World," United States Naval Institute ***Proceedings*** 120 (1994): 30–34.

Tangredi, Sam. "Are We Firing Tomahawks Too Easily?" United States Naval Institute ***Proceedings*** 122 (1996): 8–9.

White, Donald. "Mutable Destiny: The End of the American Century?" ***Harvard International Security Review***, (Winter 1997–1998): 42–47.

INTRODUCTION TO OPERATIONAL ART (Seminar)

The truth is that the mistrust of theory arises from a misconception of what it is that theory claims to do. It does not pretend to give the power of conduct in the field; it claims no more than to increase the effective power of conduct.

—Sir Julian Corbett

A. Focus:

This session will introduce operational art. As an introduction, this session is designed to discuss the historical roots of operational art, the linkage between ***operational art*** and ***strategy*** and ***tactics***, and the relationship between ***operational art*** and the ***operational level*** of warfare.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination, as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns, and major operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how increased reliance on information technology throughout the range of military operations creates opportunities and vulnerabilities.
- Understand the importance of applying sound ***operational art*** concepts to military planning and force employment.

C. Background:

Operational art, in its essence, deals with the study, theory, and practice of planning, preparing, conducting, and sustaining major operations and campaigns designed to accomplish operational or strategic objectives in a given theater. Operational art is one of the three components of military art, along with strategy and tactics. All of the components of military art are inextricably linked. Operational art is applied across the three ***levels*** of warfare, strategic, operational, and tactical, and across the ***range*** of military ***conflict***, that is, from military operations other than war (MOOTW) to war.

As will be seen during the discussion of this lesson, the ***conduct*** of warfare at the operational level preceded the emergence of formal operational art. The operational ***level*** of warfare emerged as a result of various deliberate national policy decisions and the explosion of military technology. The search by military professionals for effective methods of conducting war at the operational level led to the emergence and evolution of operational ***art***. This interaction among study, theory and practice continues to this day.

Operational art is *not* doctrine. Effective doctrine is a *derivative* of sound operational art. In that regard, the combat employment of ground, naval, air, and space forces manifests some functional commonalities, but there are also clear differences in practice, due primarily to differences in the "medium" (land, sea, air, and space) in which these forces operate and the weapon systems each Service employs in these media. Therefore, as a result of these and other influences, each Service develops

and practices its own adaptation of operational art and related doctrine, while the joint employment of forces is guided by joint operational art and derivative joint doctrine. It is relevant to note that, in a modern context, no employment of combat forces at the operational or theater-strategic level has taken place without some involvement of two or more Services.

Operational art is also ***not*** strategy. Strategy is normally developed and implemented at the national level, while operational art is applied across the spectrum of the strategic, operational and tactical levels of warfare in order to develop the operational level concepts and plans which will integrate national strategic objectives with battlefield tactical actions, defined by tactics, through effective theater and joint task force level operations. Operational art is thus the enabling function for theater/task force operations. In addition, operational art and the operational level of warfare are ***not*** synonymous. Operational art is a cognitive, analytical ***process***, while the operational level of war is a ***category*** of military operations and a doctrinal perspective.

The point of contact for this session is Colonel R. J. Findlay, USMC, C-425.

D. Questions:

What is the operational level of warfare? How/why did it develop? When did this happen?

What is operational art? How/why did it emerge? When?

How was operational art discovered? Or, was it invented?

What is the relationship of operational art to the operational level of warfare?

What is the relationship of operational art to strategy and tactics?

Since the operational ***level*** of warfare emerged as a result of various deliberate national policy decisions and the explosion of military technology, what then will be the impact of new and emerging technology on the operational level of war?

To what extent will new technology change the importance of operational art? If so, how?

Why study and learn operational art?

What is its utility for you as future joint operations and staff officers?

E. Required Readings:

Matheny, Michael R. "The Roots of Modern American Operational Art." (**NWC 2031**), (Issued).

Schneider, James J. "The Loose Marble-and the Origins of Operational Art." (**NWC 4004**), (Issued).

Vego, Milan. "On Operational Art," ***Operational Warfare,*** Part I: Fundamentals; 1–25. (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Vego, Milan. Glossary of Operational Terms; ***Operational Warfare.*** (Issued).

Goerlitz, Walter. ***The German General Staff, 1657–1945***; New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1961.

Stoecker, S. W. ***Forging Stalin's Army—Marshal Tukachevsky and the Politics of Military Innovation***. Oxford: Westview Press, 1998.

Orenstein, Harold S. (Trans.) ***The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art—The Documentary Basis, 1927–1991***. 2 vols. Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 1995.

Corum, James S. ***The Roots of Blitzkrieg—Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform***. Lawrence, Kans.: University of Kansas Press, 1992.

Corum, James S. ***The Luftwaffe—Creating the Operational Air War, 1918–1940***. Lawrence, Kans.: University of Kansas Press, 1997.

OPERATIONAL ART AND DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLES OF WAR (Seminar)

I think it is fair to say that while good theory will not guarantee good generalship, bad theory will certainly guarantee the reverse. . . It seems to me there was a profound decline in the quality of strategic thought. The decline finally took the form of a search for axioms which were simple and easy to grasp, something Clausewitz had scrupulously avoided . . . . Clausewitz insists that there are no principles of war; that there is no system of rules which, if pursued, will guarantee success . . . I consider it to his great credit rather than a ground for criticism. . . .

—Dr. Bernard Brodie

Under the glass top of Nimitz' desk were several cards bearing military slogans, and in a central position one small card with a list: "Objective, Offensive, Surprise, Superiority of Force at Point of Contact, Simplicity, Security, Movement, Economy of Force, Cooperation." Some people call such lists "principles of war," but Nimitz thought of his merely as reminders, a check-off list of things to be considered before launching an operation. . .

—E. B. Potter***, Nimitz***

The principles of war guide warfighting at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. They are the enduring bedrock of US military doctrine.

—Joint Publication 1

A. Focus:

This session will examine the relationship between operational art and current joint doctrine. Included is how the ***principles of war*** (as listed in current joint doctrine) apply to operational art.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**— Comprehend the factors and emerging concepts influencing joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the interrelationship between Service doctrine and joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how theory and principles of war pertain to the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend current joint doctrine.
- Understand the relationship of ***doctrine*** to ***operational art.***
- Understand how ***operational art*** developed in the United States.
- Understand current joint doctrine regarding the principles of war and how that perspective is evolving.

C. Background:

In a perfect world, both Service doctrine and joint doctrine would evolve along with the factors that influence them. However, modern history is replete with failed rulers and defeated nations whose doctrine failed to change (***inflexibility***) or changed in the wrong direction (***lack of vision***). There are many reasons for inflexibility and lack of vision, but generally, doctrinal failures can be attributed to some misinterpretation of influencing factors, ignorance of operational concepts, or even hubris. Doctrine involves the specific

application of general insights regarding "how to fight" and is a function of relevant cultural, political, and military perspectives; economic considerations; geography; weapon systems; technology; etc. Ultimately, there is a strong argument that effective doctrine is a ***derivative*** of sound operational art.

Historians and military leaders have studied past wars in hopes of uncovering the underlying principles that might explain the foundation of victory or the root cause of defeat. Once discovered, those underlying principles then serve as a framework for conducting future operations. However, blind adherence to such principles when developing doctrine can be problematic. The principles of war should be reexamined after the introduction of new technology or new cultural influences. In other words, they should evolve. Therefore, principles of war are not intended to be recipes, but rather guides, that when appropriately applied in time and space can enhance the probability of success.

The challenge for the United States, its allies, and its coalition partners is being able to discern what doctrine and principles are worth keeping and what needs updating. Understanding the historical, theoretical and practical underpinnings of doctrine and operational art is vital for the development of sound future doctrine.

The point of contact for this session is Professor J. L. Barker, C-420.

D. Questions:

What is the relationship of ***operational art*** to ***doctrine?***

What is the rationale for ***doctrine***? What factors influence ***doctrine***?

To what extent are Carl Builder's assertions about s***ervice culture*** still relevant?

How does a nation's culture affect ***doctrine***?

How does specific service doctrine relate to ***joint*** doctrine***?***

To what extent are current service perspectives on ***operational art*** distinct? Why might each service have a different view of ***operational art?***

To what extent is the ***joint*** perspective on ***operational art*** comprehensive? Should it be?

Does our current ***joint doctrinal development system*** effectively account for significant influencing factors that safeguard against, for example, "change for its own sake"? How do we know if we are charting the right course for developing doctrine?

The three quotes offered in the syllabus at the beginning of this session seem to be contradictory. Are there fundamental truths governing warfare or not?

Some historians have criticized Admiral Halsey's actions as the Third Fleet Commander during the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Yet, Halsey, until his death, believed that his actions were correct in view of the information he had and his interpretation of his mission. To what extent do you think Admiral Halsey acted properly in carrying out the tasks of operational protection and support of the Leyte operation (***King II***)? Defend your position in terms of the ***principles of war***.

What insights does the Leyte Gulf case study provide into the ***principles of war?***

Admiral Mahan wrote that ***principles*** are, ***"fundamental truths correctly formulated. They are nothing more than the proper conclusions from the observation of a large***

number of naval campaigns in the past." He also said ***"historical examples are more valuable than principles, because by being narrative of the past events they are a story of practical experience."*** What do you think he meant? Are his suggestions still valid?

Although the ***principles*** vary in name, number, and definition from nation to nation, each country finds that it is important for military officers to know that certain ***principles*** exist. Why do the armed forces of most nations accept the general validity of certain fundamental ***principles of war*** and teach them to each new generation of officers? What can you learn about a nation's culture from its principles of war?

E. Required Readings:

Brodie, Bernard. "The Worth of Principles of War." (**NWC 1057**), (Issued).

Builder, Carl H. ***Masks of War.*** Baltimore: The Rand Corporation/Johns Hopkins Press, 1991, 1–44. (Issued).

Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer, 10 Sep 2001. "The Joint Doctrine Story," 91–94. Issued.

Joint Pub 3-0. ***Doctrine for Joint Operations,*** 10 Sep 2001. II-1, III-9 to III-24, and Appendix A. (Issued).

"An Evolving Joint Perspective: U.S. Joint Warfare and Crisis Resolution in the 21st Century." (**NWC 2029**), 1–15 & Encl 2, 45–58. (Issued).

Fadok, David S. "John Boyd and John Warden: Airpower's Quest for Strategic Paralysis," In ***The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower***, ed. Phillip Meilenger, 363–70, Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997. **(NWC 1053)**, Issued

F. Supplementary Readings:

Brown, C. R. "The Principles of War." (**NWC 1025**), (Seminar Reserve).

Glenn, Russell W. ''No More Principles of War?'' ***Parameters*** 28 (Spring 1998): 48–66.

Hughes, Wayne P., Jr., Capt, USN (Ret). "The Power in Doctrine." ***Naval War College Review***, Summer 1995. (**NWC 1018**), (Issued).

Murdock, Paul. "Principles of War on the Network-Centric Battlefield: Mass and Economy of Force." ***Parameter***s 32 (Spring 2002): 86–95.

Nelson, Bradford K. "Applying the Principles of War in Information Operations.'' ***Military Review*** 78 (September–October–November 1998): 31–35.

Toffler, Alvin and Heidi Toffler. "AirLand Battle," Chapter 7, 44–56 in ***War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century.*** (**NWC 1019**), (Issued).

Tritten, James J. "Naval Perspectives on Military Doctrine." ***Naval War College Review***, Spring 1995. (**NWC 1064**), (Issued).

Waghelstein, John D. "Preparing the U.S. Army for the Wrong War, Educational and Doctrinal Failure, 1865–91"; ***Small Wars and Insurgencies*** 10, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 1–33.

LEYTE OPERATION: STRATEGIC SETTING (Lecture)

A. Focus:

This session introduces the historical case study for Operational Art. It provides the strategic and operational background for the October 1944 Allied invasion of the Philippines and the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the effect of time, coordination, policy changes, and political development on the planning process.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how increased reliance on information technology throughout the range of military operations creates opportunities and vulnerabilities.
- Understand the concept and execution of operations associated with the invasion (and defense) of Leyte from both Allied and Japanese perspectives.

C. Background:

The Battle of Leyte Gulf was the largest and most complex sea-air battle (four separate battles over two days, actually) in history. As the final showdown between the U.S. and Japanese fleets, it involved enormous naval and air forces engaging in huge areas and over vast distances, all working in support of a major combined amphibious operation. As such, the battle provides superior illustrations of virtually all aspects of operational art covered in Block I and remains directly relevant to joint operations in the littorals today.

The point of contact for this session is Professor D. W. Chisholm, C-412.

D. Required Readings:

Cannon, M. Hanlin, ***Leyte: The Return to the Philippines, United States Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific***. Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, United States Army, 1954. Ch. 1 "The Strategic Plan," 1–9; Ch. 2, "The Nature of the Target," 10–14; Ch. 3, "Plans Are Made and Forces Are Readied," 15–32, Appendix A. (**NWC 2032**), (Issued).

Field, James A. ***The Japanese at Leyte Gulf***. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1947. Ch. 1, "The October Situation," 1–14. (**NWC 2033**), Issued.

Potter, E. B. ***Sea Power,*** Chapter 31, "The Battle of Leyte Gulf," 777–795. (**NWC 2035**), (Issued).

E. Supplementary Readings:

Cutler, Thomas J. ***The Battle of Leyte Gulf, 23–26 October 1944***. (New York: Harper Collins, 1994.

Morison, Samuel Eliot. ***History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume XII, Leyte, June 1944–January 1945***. Boston: Little, Brown, 1960.

Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet. COMINCH P-008, ***Amphibious Operations: Invasion of the Philippines, October 1944 to January 1945***. Washington, D.C.: Navy Department, 1945**.**

Barbey, Daniel E. ***MacArthur's Amphibious Navy: Seventh Amphibious Force Operations, 1943–1945***. Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1977.

OPERATIONAL FACTORS (Seminar)

It is only when we have reached agreement on the names and concepts that we can hope to progress with clearness and ease in the examination of the topic, and be assured of finding ourselves on the same platform with our readers. . . .

—Carl von Clausewitz

Those who do not know the conditions of mountains and forests, hazardous defiles, marshes, and swamps, cannot conduct the march of an army. . . .

—Sun Tzu

A. Focus:

This session addresses one of the key aspects of operational art—the factors of space, time, and force. Examples from the Battle of Leyte Gulf are used throughout the session to illustrate the application of operational art to the maritime theater.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination, as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns, and major operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the effect of time, coordination, policy changes, and political development on the planning process.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how increased reliance on information technology throughout the range of military operations creates opportunities and vulnerabilities.
- Understand the operational factors of space, time, and force; their interrelationships; and the need for the operational commander to balance these factors against each other in order to obtain freedom of action.

C. Background:

Webster's Dictionary defines ***war*** as a "period of open or armed conflict between opposing forces to achieve a particular end." When viewed through the lexicon of factors ***space, time*** and ***force,*** warfare conducted at any level, especially operational and strategic, is a monumental undertaking. The enemy's factors of space, time, and force are fully considered and evaluated in determining one's own military objective. The next step in the process is to evaluate one's own factors of space, time and force both individually and then collectively. The last step is to balance or harmonize these factors with the assigned operational or strategic objective. The key for success is to balance disadvantages in one factor with the surplus or advantage in another. This is a difficult, complicated, and time-consuming process. It is also more an art than a science. Most of the past's successful military leaders possessed an uncanny ability to assess and then balance the factors of space, time and force versus the assigned operational or strategic objectives. Operational

commanders and their staffs may or may not be able to choose the ***space*** in which they will be forced to wage war, but their ability to shape the battlespace is essential. The gain or loss of ***space*** in itself is not inherently an advantage or disadvantage; what matters most is the relationship between ***space*** and military ***forces*** available to influence the enemy's ability react. The size, shape, and nature of a ***space*** will affect the quantity and type of ***forces*** employed, as well as the ***time*** required to conduct a successful military operation. While ***space*** or geography alone cannot determine the success of a military effort, the relationship between ***space*** and ***forces*** can be decisive.

Time and ***space*** have distinct reciprocal effects upon one another. For an attacker, the goal, historically, is to gain the most space in the least amount of ***time***. Obviously, the less ***time*** it takes the attacker to mobilize, deploy, and concentrate forces, the less prepared the defender will be. Rapidly seizing the initiative in order to gain control of the objective area further places the defender at a disadvantage, by reducing his area of operations, subsequently limiting his freedom of maneuver. Ideally, the defender wants to increase ***time*** expended by the attacker in order to better control ***space***. Therefore, delay generally gives the defender the advantage, primarily because the attacker is forced to increase his efforts, thus depleting his combat power over ***time***.

The third factor in this trilogy is ***force***. ***Time*** and ***space*** are relatively insignificant factors if the commander lacks the ***forces*** to exploit enemy weaknesses. The quantities and types of ***forces*** a commander is able or willing to commit directly affects the ***time*** required for a military operation and the size of the ***space*** in which to use them. Counterintuitively, however, smaller ***forces*** can require more ***time*** and dictate a smaller ***space*** for achievement of objectives, while larger ***forces*** may allow faster action in a larger ***space***.

Note: Recently, some theorists have argued that ***information*** and ***law*** are also key operational factors; however, until consensus is reached, it is reasonable to consider them as increasingly affecting the factors of ***space, time*** and ***force***.

Point of contact for this session is Professor M. Vego, M-11.

D. Questions:

What are the key features of the factor space? Explain the advantages and disadvantages of operating in a large space.

Explain the main aspects of the factor of time. Discuss the relationship between the factor of time and the factors of space and force.

What is the difference between combat potential and combat power? Is it possible to precisely assess tangible factor of force? Are smaller forces the trend in the future and why?

What is the relationship between the factors of forces and the factors of space?

Are the operational factors still critical for success in planning and executing major operations and campaigns in the information age?

What is the effect of information on the factors of space?

Leyte Case Study:

How did the Allies view the operational factors of ***space***, ***time***, and ***force*** at the Battle of Leyte Gulf? How did the Japanese?

How did ***forces*** available affect Japanese plans for Leyte Gulf? To what extent were these plans executable?

Which side used ***time*** and ***space*** most effectively at Leyte Gulf?

E. Required Readings:

Vego, Milan. ***Operational Warfare***, "Operational Factors," "The Factor of Space," "The Factor of Time," "The Factor of Force," "The Factors of Space, Time, and Force," "Information and Operational Factors," 26–105. (Issued).

"The Battle for Leyte Gulf." Naval War College Interactive CD-ROM, (**NWC 2040**), (Issued).

Review previous required reading (**NWC 2032**) from Session OPS I-11. Focus on Chapter 2, "The Nature of the Target," 10–14.

F. Supplementary Readings:

None.

LEVELS OF COMMAND (WAR) AND THE THEATER (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This session will explain the concept of the levels of war and its relationship to the respective levels of command. It will also explain the natural and artificial features of the theater. Examples from the Battle of Leyte Gulf are used to illustrate the importance of understanding the levels of command (war) and the key elements of a theater.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the organizational framework within which joint forces are employed.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how theory and principles of war pertain to the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Analyze a plan for employment of joint forces at the operational level.
- Understand the distinctions between the ***strategic***, ***operational***, and ***tactical*** levels of war, and how operational art is applied at the different levels.
- Comprehend how peacetime and wartime "theaters" are designed, including the key elements of a maritime theater.
- Understand the meaning and importance of the key elements of a theater (interior vs. exterior positions, base of operations, physical objectives, decisive points, lines of operations, and lines of communications).

C. Background:

There are three principal levels of command (war): strategic, operational, and tactical. In the United States, the national-strategic and theater-strategic sub-levels are differentiated. In addition, the operational-tactical level serves as a link between the tactical and operational level of command (war).

Generally, each level of war corresponds to a specific command echelon. In practice, command echelons are established based on the objectives to be accomplished, whereas levels of war are based on the methods of combat force employment aimed at accomplishing tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. Levels of war cannot be easily delineated, because actions at any level often considerably affect the outcome at other levels of war. Knowledge and understanding of the levels of war is critical for one's understanding of the elements of operational art.

After the military objectives and methods of combat forces employment are determined, the next step is determining the size of the physical space required for basing, deployment, combat employment, and logistical support and sustainment of the forces assigned to accomplish respective military objectives. This is one of the first and most important organizational decisions to be made by the higher commander. In generic terms, the size of physical space ranges from combat zones/sectors and areas of operations to theaters of operations and theaters of war.

In U.S. terms, the geographic combatant commander's area of responsibility (AOR) encompasses a theater. In the case of two or more regional conflicts, the commander's AOR might be declared a theater of war. In the case of a major regional conflict (e.g., the Gulf War of 1990–1991 or Operation IRAQI FREEDOM of 2003), a part of the combatant commander's AOR can be delineated and formally (or informally) declared a theater of operations. It is there where the operational level of command is established and the operational level of war is conducted. A single campaign is conducted in a respective theater of operations. A major operation is normally conducted in an area of operations, while tactical actions take place in a given combat sector/zone. The new term, "battlespace" (or battle space) is used in referring to the combat sector/zone or an area of operations and its corresponding cyberspace.

Any theater contains a large number of seemingly random natural and artificial features that significantly affect the planning and execution of military action at any level of war. They are arbitrarily called "theater elements" or "theater geometry." The main elements of any theater are positions, distances, bases of operations, physical objectives, decisive points, lines of operations, lines of retreat, and lines of communications—any of which may have tactical, operational, or even strategic significance. A key to evaluating the military importance of these features is not only their number and characteristics, but also their relative position and distance from each other—the geometry of the situation. Therefore, it is critically important that operational commanders and their staffs know and understand the advantages and disadvantages of these elements to ensure the most effective employment of friendly forces.

The point of contact for this session is Professor M. Vego, M-11.

D. Questions:

What are the distinctions between levels of command and levels of war? How important are they, and why?

Why it is important to know and understand the differences among respective levels of war?

What is the basis for establishing the theater structure?

To what extent is the concept of the theater of operations outdated in the information age? How proper is it to exclusively focus on the concept of battlespace vs. traditional concepts of the theater of operations and areas of operations?

What are the distinctions among tactical, operational, and strategic physical objectives?

Explain the concept of "decisive point." Are "decisive points" synonymous or identical with the concept of "decision point"?

Discuss the concept of "line of operations." Is this concept still valid in the information age?

Leyte Case Study:

Was General MacArthur a strategic or operational-level commander during the King II Operation? How about Admirals Nimitz and Halsey? Why?

Explain the key features of the Japanese command organization. Was Admiral Soemu Toyoda an operational or theater-strategic commander? Why?

What were the theater-strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war in the Leyte Operation?

Why was the Allied Pacific Theater during World War II divided into several areas? Why was it divided up the way it was? What effect did these divisions have on the planning and execution of the Leyte Gulf operation?

What were advantages and disadvantages of the geostrategic position for the Japanese forces on land, at sea, and in the air in their defense of the Philippines in October 1944?

Identify and discuss Allied tactical and operational objectives on land in the Operation King II. What were Allied operational objectives at sea and in the air in that operation?

What were tactical and operational "decisive points" for the respective Allied and Japanese naval commanders in the Leyte Operation?

Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the lines of operations used by the Japanese naval forces and land-based air in their defense of the Philippines in October 1944.

E. Required Readings:

Vego, Milan. ***Operational Warfare***, "Levels of Command and Levels of War," 17–25. (Issued).

Ibid., "Theater Organization and Structure," and "Theater Geometry," 109–122 and 151–182. (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-0. ***Doctrine for Joint Operations***, II-1 to II-3 and II-19 to II-22. (Issued).

JMO Department. "UJTL Excerpts." CJCSM 3500.04C, B-A-1 to B-A-6. (**NWC 1040**), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Vego, Milan. ***Operational Warfare***, "Theater Physical Features," 123–149. (Issued).

MCDP 1, ***Warfighting***. "Levels of War," 28–32. (**NWC 2006**), (Issued).

METHODS OF COMBAT FORCE EMPLOYMENT (Seminar)

The beginnings of wisdom is to call things their right name.

—Confucius

A. Focus:

The focus of this session is to explain and analyze the principal methods of combat force employment to accomplish operational or strategic objectives in a theater.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination, as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns, and major operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the fundamentals of campaign planning.
- Know and understand the principal methods of combat force employment in general.
- Understand the proper definition and meaning of the term "major operation" and its importance in planning as a part of a campaign.
- Describe the differences between tactical actions, major operations, and campaigns, and how they relate to the levels of war.
- Understand theater command and control relationships, with special emphasis on the functions and employment of a JTF.

C. Background:

Methods of combat force employment are an important component of operational art. While battles and campaigns have received great attention in U.S. doctrinal publications, the same cannot be said about ***major operations.*** This lack of interest has been compounded by differences in terminology. Each Service, although using the same or similar terms, defines methods of combat force employment differently (even differently than joint doctrine). The full extent of Service differences is such that some of the terms used are not recognized by other Services, while other terms have no generally accepted definition or are not defined at all. More often than not, terms are used loosely and without regard to their real meaning or commonly accepted definitions.

Modern methods of combat force employment are the result of a long evolution of warfare. In the nineteenth century, "decisive" battles and the practice of ***tactics*** were the area of study**,** while ***strategy*** was concerned with the conduct of campaigns. While a single Service primarily conducted campaigns, there are examples nevertheless where the navies took part as well (the American War of Independence, the Peninsular War, the Crimean War, the American Civil War, etc.).

The principal methods of combat force employment today are ***tactical actions, major operations,*** and ***campaigns.*** These terms are differentiated by the ***military objectives*** they are intended to accomplish and the corresponding command echelon responsible for their planning, preparation, and execution.

Tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes, attacks, etc.) are aimed at accomplishing major or minor tactical objectives in a given combat zone or sector and, in some cases, can encompass an area of operations. They are usually an integral part of major operations. When conducted over time and in a certain sea or ocean area or airspace, tactical actions can cumulatively accomplish operational objective(s). Tactical actions can be either defensive or offensive in nature and are differentiated by the physical environment (land, sea, or airspace) in which they occur.

In the U.S. military, "major operation" is not a widely understood or accepted term. The more generic "operation" is used so often and interchangeably that it has lost its true meaning. Joint Pub 3-0, ***Doctrine for Joint Operations,*** defines a major operation as "a series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by various combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to accomplish operational and, sometimes, strategic objectives in an operational area."

In generic terms, a ***major operation*** consists of series of ***related*** battles, engagements, and strikes and other tactical actions ***sequenced and synchronized*** in terms of time and space to accomplish an operational objective. Major operations are normally an integral part of a campaign. Sometimes, a major operation may be planned to accomplish a strategic objective in a situation short of war, and usually in an undeveloped theater. Examples of such major operations are the U.S. invasion of Grenada in October 1983 (Operation URGENT FURY), the U.S. invasion of Panama in December 1989 (Operation JUST CAUSE), and NATO's actions in the Kosovo Conflict of 1999 (Operation ALLIED FORCE).

In contrast to tactical actions, major operations are invariably planned. With respect to their purpose, they can be offensive or defensive. Ground (or land), naval (or maritime), and air major operations are differentiated with regard to the physical environment in which the preponderance of the major operation is conducted. With respect to the degree of Service participation, ***independent, joint*** (multi-Service), and ***combined*** (multi-national) major operations are differentiated.

Independent major operations are usually conducted by the combat arms of a single Service. A ***joint major operation*** is conducted by forces of two or more services, while a ***combined major operation*** is conducted with two or more services of allied countries or coalition member states. A major operation can be both joint and combined (as was the case during the Coalition's air offensive against Iraq in the Gulf War of 1990–1991, and NATO's action against Serbia in 1999). When only a single-type force is used, a major operation can be combined without necessarily being joint (e.g., the combat employment of multi-national naval forces or air forces).

The term ***campaign*** is used interchangeably by the U.S. military for describing a wide range of military actions. The Department of Defense and the Services differ in their understanding of what constitutes a campaign. Joint Pub 3-0, however, defines a campaign as a "series of related major operations that arrange tactical, operational, and strategic actions to accomplish strategic and operational objectives."

In generic terms, a ***campaign*** consists of a series of ***related major operations*** (land, air/space, naval, special forces) ***sequenced and synchronized*** in terms of time and space and aimed to accomplish a ***military strategic*** or ***theater-strategic objective*** in a given (declared or undeclared) theater of operations. These operations are executed simultaneously or sequentially and are conducted according to a common plan, controlled by a theater commander. The main purpose of a campaign may be either offensive or defensive. ***Land campaigns*** and ***maritime campaigns*** are differentiated according to the physical environment in which major operations predominantly take place. Because airspace is an inseparable part of a maritime or land theater, air forces are almost always employed jointly with other Services.

In contrast, a campaign in "military operations other than war" (MOOTW), such as counterinsurgency or counter-terrorism, consists of a series of related minor or sometimes major tactical actions rather than major operations. These actions are coordinated in time and place to accomplish strategic objectives within a given part of the theater commander's area of responsibility. Some campaigns in MOOTW, specifically, counter-drug or counter-terrorism campaigns, are not limited to a specific theater, but are conducted in several theaters that might or might not be adjacent to each other.

As in the past, new technological advances will considerably affect the methods of combat force employment in the future. Battles and engagements will probably be less important than strikes. Major joint/combined operations will most likely emerge as the principal method of accomplishing strategic objectives in a theater, while campaigns could become rare, except in the case of a major regional conflict.

The point of contact for this session is Professor M. Vego, M-11.

D. Questions:

Why is it important to know and understand the true meanings of the key terms dealing with the methods of combat force employment?

Explain the principal methods for accomplishing major and minor tactical objectives. What are the differences between a battle and an engagement, and between a strike and an attack?

What is the true meaning of the term "major operation?"

Explain what constitutes a "campaign." Is there such a thing as an "air campaign?" Why or why not?

How has modern technology blurred the differences between tactical actions and major operations? Why?

Will the planning of tactical actions in the future become the purview of the operational commander? Why or why not? What problems might that pose?

Leyte Case Study:

1. Was the Allied amphibious landing at Leyte aimed to accomplish an operational or strategic objective?
2. Identify the types of major naval, ground, and air operations in terms of their main purpose (offensive vs. defensive, fleet vs. fleet, fleet vs. shore, air vs. ground, etc.) and sequence (main, supporting, preliminary, initial, etc.) conducted by the

Allied and Japanese forces in the Philippines and the adjacent sea/airspace between 17 and 26 October 1944.

3. What naval battles and engagements constitute what is popularly known as the "Battle of Leyte Gulf"? Were all battles or engagements planned, or are they seen in retrospect as having been battles/engagements?
4. Identify the key elements of the major naval and air operations conducted by the Japanese forces in defense of the Philippines in October 1944.

E. Required Readings:

Joint Pub 5-00.1. ***Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning***, 25 January 2002, vii to xiii, I-1 to I-8, and GL-8, "major operation," GL-3 "campaign and campaign planning." (Issued).

Vego, Milan. ***Operational Warfare,*** "Methods of Combat Force Employment," "Major Naval Operations," Part VI: Methods of Combat Force Employment, 373–409. (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

None.

ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL WARFARE (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This session continues to examine the theoretical framework and fundamental concepts of operational art. It focuses on the stages and elements of operational warfare: deployment/redeployment, critical factors, center of gravity, operational maneuver, and the culminating point.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the factors and emerging concepts influencing joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the interrelationship between Service doctrine and joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how theory and principles of war pertain to the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.
- Identify and examine the principal elements of warfare as applied to the operational level of war.
- Know and understand the meaning and concept of the terms "deployment," "critical factors," "culminating point," and "center of gravity."

C. Background:

This session will examine several key concepts that are essential to planning for and employing military forces to achieve operational and strategic objectives.

Initial planning must include identifying critical factors that pertain to both enemy and friendly forces. The term "critical factors" has changed somewhat in current usage. Traditionally, the critical factors have been called critical strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities. Recent joint doctrine, however, has begun to classify critical factors as critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities. The readings discuss the differences between these two approaches. Regardless of the terminology used, the purpose of identifying these critical factors and the related centers of gravity is not to conduct an academic exercise. The purpose of identifying them is to use them in planning operations and campaigns.

Successful planning and employment of combat forces hinge on the proper identification of a center of gravity (COG) for both the enemy and friendly forces. In generic terms, a center of gravity is defined as a source of massed strength—physical or moral, or a source of leverage—whose serious degradation, neutralization, or destruction will have the most decisive impact on the enemy's or one's own ability to accomplish a given military objective. The enemy's COG must be neutralized or destroyed, while one's own COG must be protected in order to accomplish the assigned military objective.

Success in combat is largely dependent on rapidly massed, superior combat power at a decisive time and place on the battlefield. A series of specific actions is required to successfully concentrate forces at a desired time and location. This series of actions includes deployment, employment, and sustainment.

Deployment is the process of moving one's own forces and assets to their planned starting positions or designated lines and areas for the commencement of actions. Time phasing of forces into the theater of operations is critical for success at the higher levels of war (operational and strategic). Errors in deployment at the operational or theater-strategic levels cannot be easily corrected, if at all, once hostilities start. Deployment precedes employment and maneuver.

Employment of military forces frequently involves maneuver. The principal aim of maneuver is to obtain a position that offers a force an advantage relative to the enemy. Forces can employ maneuver in both the offense and defense. Maneuver facilitates direct or indirect attack on the enemy's COG or strikes at the enemy's critical capabilities, such as logistical support. Maneuver is categorized as tactical, operational, or strategic, based on the nature of the desired objective (tactical, operational, strategic).

An important element of warfare, especially at the operational and strategic levels, is the concept of a culminating point (or culmination). Culmination applies to both offensive and defensive actions. In the offense, the culminating point is the point when the attacker no longer has sufficient combat power to successfully continue the attack. The attacker seeks to secure his objective before reaching his culmination point. In the defense, the culminating point is the point where the defender has inadequate combat power to defend successfully. The defender wants to draw the attacker to his culmination point and then strike when the attacker has exhausted his resources and is no longer capable of a successful defense. The ability to prevent one's own culmination while causing the enemy to reach his is one of the prerequisites to operational success. In general, the point of culmination occurs in time and space, when and where the attacker must stop and defend his gains if he wishes to avoid losing them. It is the combat power that culminates, and the operational commander must determine his combat power relative to that of the opponent.

Point of contact for this session is Professor T. L. Gatchel, C-413.

D. Questions:

What is the purpose of strategic and operational deployment? Explain and analyze operational deployment. To what extent did the Japanese and the Allies correctly assess the challenge of deployment in building their plans for the Philippines?

What is the relevance of the concept of critical factors? Explain the relationship between critical strengths and critical weaknesses and between critical capabilities and critical requirements.

What is your understanding of the concept of the center of gravity? What is the relationship between the objective and the enemy center of gravity (COG)?

To what extent did the plans of the Allies and the Japanese clearly address the operational concept of the center of gravity (or recognition of appropriate critical factors)? What critical factors did each side identify? Do you agree with them?

Explain and analyze the concept of culmination. What key factors cause culmination? Did the Japanese or Allies reach a culmination point in the Leyte operation?

E. Required Readings:

Vego, Milan. ***Operational Warfare***, Part V, "Stages and Elements of Operational Warfare," including "Force Deployment," "Critical Factors and Center of Gravity," "Operational Maneuver," and "Concept of Culminating Point," 289–370 (Issued).

Joint Pub 5-00.1 ***Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning***, 25 January 2002, II-6 through II-11 (Issued).

Echevarria, Antulio J., Jr. "'Reining in' the Center of Gravity Concept," (**NWC 1028**), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Izzo, Lawrence L. "The Center of Gravity Is Not an Achilles Heel." ***Military Review*** (January 1988): 72–77.

Mendel, William W. and Lamar Tooke. "Operational Logic: Selecting the Center of Gravity." ***Military Review*** (June 1993): 2–11.

Webb, George S. "The Razor's Edge: Identifying the Operational Culminating Point of Victory." Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Student Paper, 16 May 1995.

OPERATIONAL WARFARE AT SEA (Seminar)

Sea power has never meant merely warships. It has always meant the sum total of those weapons, installations, and geographical circumstances which enable a nation to control transportation over the seas during wartime.

—Bernard Brodie, ***Naval Strategy,*** 1965

Not only must appropriate tactics be linked via operations to the objectives of strategy, but strategy must also be linked by operations to what is tactically realistic.

—Milan Vego, ***Operational Art (addendum),*** 2002.

The unresting progress of mankind causes continual change in the weapons; and with that must come a continual change in the manner of fighting . . .

—A. T. Mahan, ***The Influence of Sea Power Upon History***, 1890

A. Focus:

This session will examine operational and strategic objectives of warfare at sea, including a discussion of the influence of physical factors upon objectives in the littorals.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination, as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns, and major operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how theory and principles of war apply at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces.
- Understand the operational characteristics of the littorals and their influence on the combat employment of naval forces.
- Comprehend and analyze the meaning and complexities of the terms "sea control," "sea denial," "choke point control," and "basing/deployment area control."
- Know and analyze the theoretical and practical implications of sea control in terms of scope (extent), duration, and degree.

C. Background:

Warfare in a littoral sea differs considerably from warfare in an open ocean. This difference is primarily due to the proximity of continental landmasses and the relatively small size of an area in which to conduct warfare. No part of the ocean is more directly affected by the geomorphologic and oceanographic features of the physical environment than is the littoral. With its highly indented coasts, numerous islands, shoals, reefs, tides, currents, channels, straits, and other features, the littoral greatly restricts the maneuverability and speed of ships, especially deep-draft combatants, prepositioned shipping, logistics ships, and submarines. In short, the littoral sea can be a difficult place to operate.

War at sea is almost never conducted in isolation; war at sea is an integral part of a country's strategic objectives in war as a whole. Therefore, war at sea is intrinsically related to war on land and in the air. Logically then, all services must cooperate in conducting war at sea, especially war in the littorals. There is no place where jointness is more important than in warfare in the littorals.

The point of contact for this session is Professor H. F. Lynch, C-421.

D. Questions:

What are the principal differences between war at sea and war on land or war in the air?

Discuss the operational impact of geography, oceanography, and weather/climate on the employment of major combat forces in the littorals. In which ways do the influence of these factors differ from those on the open ocean?

What does it mean to have command of the sea? Is that the same as sea control?

Why do we care about choke points? What does choke point control mean?

What are your thoughts on the future of war at sea?

In which constricted waters of the world must the navies of the United States and its allies be prepared to counter infringements upon the principles of freedom of the seas?

How must the U.S. Navy prepare itself to overcome the anti-access strategies of any lesser naval forces it may encounter in the future?

E. Required Readings:

Vego, Milan. ***Operational Warfare Addendum,*** September 2002. (**NWC 1001A**), (Issued). Read two chapters: "Influence of the Physical Environment," 27–42, and "Objectives of Naval Warfare," 46–60.

F. Supplementary Readings:

Corbett, Julian S. ***Some Principles of Maritime Strategy.*** Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1992. (Hewitt Library – General Collection).

Rosinski, Herbert. ***The Development of Naval Thought***. Edited by B. Mitchell Simpson III. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1977. (Hewitt Library – General Collection).

OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS (Seminar)

A skilled commander seeks victory from the situation and doesn't demand it of his subordinates.

—Sun Tzu

A. Focus:

This session is intended to further define the framework within which operational art is practiced. It deals in some detail with theater-wide or operational functions intended primarily to support the planning, preparation, conduct, and sustainment of major operations and campaigns. Operational functions are sequenced and synchronized in the employment of one's own and friendly forces across the range of military operations—from military operations other than war (MOOTW) to war.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend how theory and principles of war pertain to the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination, as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns, and major operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how increased reliance on information technology throughout the range of military creates operations opportunities and vulnerabilities.
- Understand the meaning and purpose of ***operational command and control.***
- Understand the meaning and purpose of ***operational movement and maneuver.***
- Understand the meaning and purpose of ***operational intelligence***.
- Understand the meaning and purpose of ***operational fires***.
- Understand the meaning and purpose of ***operational logistics***.
- Understand the meaning and purpose of ***operational protection***.
- Understand the meaning and purpose of ***synchronization*** of the key operational functions.

C. Background:

The second half of the JP 3-0 definition of Operational Art states, "Operational art translates the joint force commander's strategy into operational design, and, ultimately, tactical action, by integrating key activities at all levels of war." The key activities at the operational level of war consist of processes, systems or functions which must be manipulated in order to achieve desired objectives. Joint and service doctrinal publications refer to these activities as follows:

CJCSM 3500.04C ***Universal Joint Task List***—"broad functional task areas"

JP 3-31 ***Command and Control for Joint Land Operation—***"core functions"

U.S. Army FM 3-0 ***Operation***s—"Battlefield Operating Systems"

U.S. Marine Corps MCDP 1-2 ***Campaigning***—"Warfighting Functions"

The Naval War College refers to them as Operational Functions. The synchronization of these operational functions ensures and enhances the ability of operational commanders and their subordinate elements to carry out their missions in both peace and war. Basically, these functions shape thorough actions prior to and throughout the campaign or major operation.

JP 3-31 discusses the criticality of these functions for successful friendly execution of operations. Conversely, JP 3-0 points out that the disruption of these functions can result in loss of adversary balance, thereby creating vulnerabilities.

In a ***mature theater***, operational functions will normally be established nearly in their entirety. However, in an ***immature theater,*** they may exist in a rudimentary form, or not at all. Understanding the impact and interaction of these functions at the operational level of war is critically important for proper planning, preparation, employment, and support of one's own forces in attainment of their assigned objectives.

The key operational functions are: ***Operational command and control, operational movement and maneuver, operational intelligence, operational fires, operational logistics,*** and ***operational protection***. The required readings provide a brief overview of each of these functions and associated activities. You will notice slight differences in the list of functions depending on the Service or level of war. For some, you will find that you are already familiar with these functions at the tactical level.

The point of contact for this session is Colonel R. J. Findlay, USMC, C-425.

D. Questions:

What are the advantages or disadvantages of having operational functions in place during peace and war? Discuss and explain the purpose of each operational function.

What impact did the following operational functions have on the Leyte Gulf operation from the perspective of both belligerents?

Command and Control—What are some of the factors that influenced the composition of specific command structures? This particular area is cited for many of the difficulties and poor decisions that occurred throughout the operation. Identify the flaws and their associated consequences with specific command structures and guidance/orders issued to subordinates. Can you find elements of Information Operations in the Leyte Gulf operation? If so, discuss them.

Movement and Maneuver—How did the opposing forces plan and employ movement and maneuver at Leyte?

Operational Intelligence—To what extent did the Allies operate on a basis of Japanese intentions rather than capabilities? What result did this have on the eventual outcome of the battle?

Operational Fires—How were operational fires used during the Leyte Operation? To what extent were they effective? Why?

Operational Protection—To what extent did either of the opposing forces at Leyte consider and plan adequately for operational protection? Discuss examples of where

and how operational protection was provided. What is the relationship of operational protection to the more commonly used term—force protection?

Operational Logistics—How did the Allies address this area? What was the operational impact for the Allies? What impact did operational logistics have on the Japanese?

Did the Allies synchronize their operational functions? If so, what functions did they synchronize and what effect did it have on the operation?

As our armed forces become ever more information based, what are the impacts on the operational functions? Does one of the function's significance increase in relation to the others?

Are these functions still relevant? The Universal Joint Task Listing (UJTL) also includes Counter CBRNE Weapons in the JOA as an additional category. Why?

E. Required Readings:

JMO Department. "Operational Functions," extracts from Joint Pubs 3-0, 3-31 and 4-0. 30 Aug 2004 (**NWC 1050**), (Issued).

JMO Department. "Operational Functions." (**NWC 4103A**), (Issued).

Goodrich, David M. "Forgotten Mission: Land Based Air Operational Fires in Support of the Leyte Gulf Invasion." 124–138. (**NWC 2037**), (Issued).

Joint Chiefs of Staff. ***Universal Joint Task List*** (CJCSM 3500.04C), Extract, Washington: 1 July 2002. Appendix C and Enclosure D. (**NWC 1040**), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Vego, Milan. "Operational Command and Control Warfare (C2W)," and "Operational Protection," Part IV: Operational Functions, ***Operational Warfare.*** (Issued).

Bolick, Joseph A. ***The Influence and Reasons for Acceptance or Rejection of Operational Intelligence during the 1914 and 1943 Kursk Campaigns,*** Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 26 April 1988.

Handel, Michael I. "Intelligence and Military Operations," ***Intelligence and Military Operations,*** London: Frank Cass, 1990.

Hutcherson, Norman B. "Command and Control Warfare: Putting Another Tool in the War-Fighter's Data Base," Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1994. .

Porter, Laning M. ***Preconceptions, Predilections, and Experiences: Problems for Operational Level Intelligence and Decisionmaking,*** Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 12 May 1986.

Rockwell, Christopher A. "Operational Sustainment: Lines of Communication and the Conduct of Operations." Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 3 May 1987.

OPERATIONAL PLANNING (Seminar)

No plan of operations extends with certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy's main strength. Only the layman sees in the course of a campaign a consistent execution of a preconceived and highly detailed original concept pursued consistently to the end.

—Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, Sr., 1871

A. Focus:

This session will focus on the fundamentals of operational planning, and selected elements of operational design in planning campaigns.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Analyze a plan for employment of joint forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the organizational framework within which joint forces are employed.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination, as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns, and major operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.
- **PJE**—Explain the purpose, roles, functions, and relationships of the President and Secretary of Defense, National Security Council (NSC), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, joint force commanders (JFCs), service component commanders, and combat support organizations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how increased reliance on information technology throughout the range of military operations creates opportunities and vulnerabilities.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how IO are integrated to support national and military strategies.
- Know and understand the fundamentals of operational planning.
- Understand the meaning and the practical application of the selected elements of design for a campaign.
- Know and understand the importance and key elements of an operational idea (scheme).
- Know and understand the purpose and difference between operational sequencing, synchronization, and phasing, and the important contribution these elements of operational scheme play in the formulation and plan development of a campaign.
- Understand and appreciate the use of operational/strategic deception in the planning and the execution of campaigns.

- Translate national security and military direction into development of theater strategies, and strategies of supporting combatant commanders for use in the geographic areas of responsibility (AORs) identified in the Unified Command Plan.
- Translate national military objectives, guidance, and theater strategies into theater strategic guidance, objectives, and operational focus in theater campaign plans.
- Understand the fundamentals, considerations, and design elements of campaign planning including integration of unified, joint multinational forces into theater and subordinate campaign plans.

C. Background:

Military planning is a continuous process in preparation for assigned or future objectives/tasks. It involves a detailed and methodical evaluation of all aspects of contemplated military action. Planning makes future actions easier by allowing for quick, subsequent and coordinated actions by the staff and other elements of the command. Proper planning allows for detailed and systematic examination of all factors involved in a forthcoming military action.

A major operation or campaign contains a number of elements that collectively ensure the accomplishment of the selected or assigned military objective(s). Thus, an overall ***operational design*** should exist to ensure that one's forces are employed in a coherent manner, and focused on the assigned operational or strategic objectives in the theater. The principal elements of operational design for a major operation are: ***desired end state,*** (in case a major operation is intended to end the hostilities), ***ultimate operational*** (and sometimes ***strategic***) ***objective, interior vs. exterior lines***, ***identification of the enemy's critical factors and center of gravity, direction/axis,*** and ***operational idea*** (***scheme***).

The basic operation plan (OPLAN) normally contains only the most important elements of operational design in a rudimentary form. Many aspects of the design are elaborated in detail in the annexes to the OPLAN, and plans of subordinate component commanders. An operational idea (or scheme) represents the very heart of the design for a major operation or campaign. In its essence, it is very similar to what is commonly known today as concept of operations (CONOPS) or "scheme of maneuver" (used in the past). An operational idea should describe in broad terms the intended sequence for the employment of service or functionally based forces (in a campaign) or combat arms (in a major operation) necessary to accomplish the assigned strategic or operational objectives. Optimally, an operational idea should be novel, avoid stereotyped employment of one's forces, present the enemy with a multi-dimensional threat, provide for surprise and deception, and ensure the speed of execution. It should clearly focus on the destruction or neutralization of the enemy's strategic (in a campaign) or operational (in a major operation) center of gravity.

Operational sequencing is one of the key elements of any operational idea. A sound sequencing is also the prime prerequisite for effective synchronization. Sequencing is the arrangement of events aimed to create overwhelming combat power in the order most likely to accomplish a given objective. Normally, these events are arranged by deriving a series of tasks/objectives carried out simultaneously and/or sequentially.

Operational synchronization is the coordination of actions by diverse combat arms and/or service forces in terms of objective and time aimed to generate a synergistic effect. The effect of all the elements of force combined should exceed the sum of their individual

capabilities. Clarity of the commander's intent is the critical factor in ensuring synchronization of efforts, especially in the employment of multi-service or multi-national forces.

Operational/strategic deception is one of the principal force multipliers in a given major operation or campaign. The operational/strategic level of command allows the commander to employ multi-service and often multi-national forces and assets in planning and executing operational/strategic deception. When properly conceived and executed, operational/strategic deception can significantly enhance the effectiveness of one's forces, prevent surprise, and reduce the effectiveness of the enemy forces. To realize possible benefits, operational commanders should not only understand the concept, but also must be willing to dedicate the time and forces required for operational deception to be successful.

The point of contact for this session is Professor M. Vego, M-11.

D. Questions:

Discuss and analyze the fundamentals of operational planning.

How are the elements of operational design integrated in planning a campaign?

What is "strategic guidance"? What is its content?

Explain the process of identifying "critical factors" and "center of gravity" in designing a campaign.

Explain the concept of operational sequencing. What is the linkage between operational objective, tasks and the factor of time?

Explain the concept of operational synchronization. What is its main purpose?

What is the purpose of operational/strategic deception? Explain the relationship between tactical and operational/strategic deception.

Applying the principal elements of operational design, analyze the naval aspects of the Leyte Operation:

1. How would you assess the operational objectives determined by Admiral Toyoda? To what extent did the operational idea (scheme) employed by the Japanese provide an opportunity for success? How could they have made it more effective?
2. Explain and analyze the Japanese plan for operational deception. To what extent was the plan successful and why? To what extent did the Allies apply operational deception in executing the Leyte Operation? Provide examples to support your arguments.
3. How are sequencing and synchronization different? Give examples of each from the Japanese plans. Did Admiral Toyoda have a better option to apply operational sequencing in his plans for naval defense of the Philippines?
4. How did the Japanese plan envisage operational synchronization?

E. Required Readings:

Vego, Milan. ***Operational Warfare,*** "Campaign Design," 433–468; "Major Operation Design," 469–494; "Operational Sequencing," and "Operational Synchronization," 531–558.

Vego, Milan. "Operational Deception," Operational Warfare Addendum (**NWC 1001A**), (Issued).

Critz, Mike. "Operational Deception." (**NWC 4083**), (Issued).

Review previous required reading (**NWC 2032**) from Session OPS I-11. Focus on Chapter 3, "Plans Are Made and Forces Are Readied."

Potter, E. B. ***Nimitz,*** "Return to the Philippines," 321–345. (**NWC 2039**), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Joint Pub 3-0. ***Doctrine for Joint Operations*** (10 September 2001), III-1 through III-20. (Issued).

Joint Pub 5-00.1. ***Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*** (25 January 2002), I-1 through I-6; II-1 through II-11. (Issued).

OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP (Seminar)

During an operation decisions have usually to be made at once: there may be no time to review the situation or even to think it through . . . if the mind is to emerge unscathed from this relentless struggle with the unforeseen, two qualities are indispensable: first, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead.

—Clausewitz, ***On War***

A. Focus:

This session addresses the fundamental components of operational leadership. It contrasts the responsibilities of operational commanders, operational thinking, and operational decisions with analogous endeavors at the tactical and strategic levels.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the organizational framework within which joint forces are employed.
- **PJE—**Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination, as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns and major operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE—**Comprehend the effect of time, coordination, policy changes, and political developments on the planning process.
- Understand the major responsibilities and tasks of operational commanders.
- Understand why operational commanders and their staffs need an operational perspective.
- Develop a framework of thought through which the distinction between decisions made at the operational level of war and those made at the tactical level of war can be examined and understood.

C. Background:

In contrast with their tactical counterparts, operational commanders must focus on broad military objectives that lie beyond immediate tactical actions—ranging from destruction of enemy forces in the field, in the air, and at sea, to undermining the enemy's will to fight. Effective operational commanders need what is known as an ***operational perspective*** on all the aspects of the situation in a given area of operations or theater. Because the operational level of war ties together the strategic and tactical levels, operational commanders need to understand how actions at each level of war affect actions at the other levels. Such broad objectives also require the ability to look beyond current operations, visualizing trends in the military, political, diplomatic, economic, and other elements of the strategic or operational situation into the future—days, weeks, and months. Operational commanders also must understand joint operations and interagency coordination issues.

The broader operational level perspective also renders decision-making processes more complex and challenging than those at the tactical level. While the tactical commander focuses on fighting battles and engagements, the operational commander is most appropriately concerned with setting the stage for conducting a major operation or campaign. The operational commander must resist the strong temptation to narrow his focus to the immediate tactical level and to micro-manage his subordinate commanders.

Operational courses of action must be evaluated and decided upon, based on key assumptions and information actually available, usually in a short time and in the face of considerable uncertainty about future events. In such circumstances, a careful analysis of the situation that weighs all advantages and disadvantages of each possible course of action is often impossible, and operational commanders must decide on the basis of instinctive judgment.

Unfortunately, little opportunity exists for most future operational commanders to develop broad vision through practice; hence, it is typically acquired through professional education and/or systematic self-study of military history. Study of past wars, their major operations and campaigns in particular, has proven to be the most effective method for acquiring an operational perspective.

The point of contact for this session is Professor H. F. Lynch, C-421.

D. Questions:

Explain and analyze the main responsibilities of an operational commander. What personal traits do you think an operational commander should have to be successful?

What are the differences between tactical and operational perspectives? Explain and analyze the principal types of decisions made by operational commanders.

Where on an operational staff must the various categories of tactical expertise reside?

What were several of the most important operational decisions made by the operational commanders, Allied and Japanese, during planning, preparation, and execution of the Leyte operations?

From among the three required readings, critically analyze the differences and similarities of the three different perspectives on Operational Leadership.

E. Required Readings:

Vego, Milan. ***Operational Warfare,*** "Operational Leadership," 561–572, and "Exercising Operational Leadership," 577–589. (Issued)

Smith, Stuart W., ***Douglas Southall Freeman on Leadership,*** (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1990): 205–214. (**NWC 1047**), (Issued).

In addition, each student will be assigned one reading from the list of Supplementary Readings for this session.

F. Supplementary Readings:

Vego, Milan, ***Operational Warfare,*** "The Decisions," 603–613 (Issued).

Field, James A. ***The Japanese at Leyte Gulf.*** (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1947), Ch. 6, "The End of a Navy." (**NWC 2034**), (Issued).

Ballard, John, R. “Learning in Combat: Eisenhower and Operational Art, 1942–1944,” December 2001. (**NWC 1020**), (Issued).

Ridgway, Matthew B., and Harold H. Martin. ***Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway.*** New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956, 191–220. (**NWC 1002**), (Issued).

Goodrich, David M. “Forgotten Mission: Land-Based Air Operational Fires in Support of the Leyte Gulf Invasion.” 124–138. (**NWC 2037**), (Issued).

Vandergrift, A. A., ***Once A Marine,*** New York: Norton, 1964, 149–204. (**NWC 1041**), (Issued).

Halsey, William F., ***Admiral Halsey’s Story.*** New York: McGraw-Hill, 1947, 108–135. (**NWC 1042**), (Issued).

Slim, Sir William, “Higher Command in War,” (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1970), 1–10 (**NWC 1043**), (Issued).

THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS CONFLICT: A CASE STUDY (Seminar)

A senior officer said after the war that it had proved that 'the things we did on the basis of well-tried and proven formations worked, and the ad hoc arrangements turned out much less happily.' Joint-service liaison and staff work left much to be desired.

—Hastings and Jenkins, ***The Battle for the Falklands***

A. Focus:

This session serves as the synthesis event for the components of operational art explained and discussed in preceding Block I sessions. Emphasis is on the decisions and actions of operational-level commanders on both sides.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination, as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns, and major operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the effect of time, coordination, policy changes, and political development on the planning process.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how increased reliance on information technology throughout the range of military operations creates opportunities and vulnerabilities.
- Analyze how commanders and staffs applied operational art in a historical case study.
- Comprehend the key factors that affect the development of joint plans and assess the relative influence of these factors.
- Analyze the operational lessons valid for the employment of modern, multinational and joint forces.

C. Background:

This case study is presented in three consecutive sessions. Tuesday, 7 December, will start in Spruance Auditorium with a faculty presentation on the historical/strategic background of the war. This will be followed by a 60-minute video on the background and highlights of the conflict. Students will have the remainder of the day, Tuesday, 7 December, as well as Wednesday morning, 8 December, to study the case materials and develop student-led discussions of the assigned questions. The morning of Thursday, 9 December, is devoted to student-led discussions of the case study.

This session is designed to reinforce the aspects of operational art studied and discussed in preceding sessions. Historical examples provide an excellent opportunity for illustrating the complexities of planning, preparing, conducting, and sustaining major operations and campaigns and the reasons why certain military actions either succeeded or failed. This particular case is used because it is rich with examples of the application,

lack of application, misapplication, or inability to apply the concepts associated with operational art.

The goal of this session is to provide in-depth discussion and analysis of major aspects of the Falklands/Malvinas conflict of 1982 from an operational perspective. As the major synthesis event for the operational art portion of the syllabus, the motivations, planning, and actions of both sides in the conflict will be examined in some detail. Seminar moderators will assign specific responsibilities for student discussion of the case.

Point of contact for this session is Professor T. L. Gatchel, C-413.

D. Questions

(To be answered from both the Argentine and British perspectives):

Was the Falklands/Malvinas conflict a campaign, a major operation, a battle, or something else?

What guidance did senior military and political leaders give the operational-level commanders regarding aims, resources, constraints, and restraints? Was it adequate?

What role did ROE play in the conflict? What was the impact of the MEZ/TEZ?

What was the desired end state for the British? For the Argentines?

What was the strategic objective for each side? What did the opponent perceive it to be?

How did the operational factors of space, time, and force affect the operations of the two sides?

What were the critical factors for each side? What did the opponents perceive them to be? Did they change as time progressed?

Which aspects of the principles of war did the Argentines consider in their planning, and which aspects did they appear to overlook or disregard? What about the British?

Did either side have an operational scheme (idea)? If so, what was it?

How well did each side employ sequencing and synchronization in its operations?

What was the Argentine C2 organization? How did this affect the outcome?

What was the British C2 organization? How did this affect the outcome?

Which key operational functions had a significant impact on how each side employed its forces? For example, how did both sides employ operational fires?

How did the actions at sea impact the land operations? What was the impact of the MEZ/TEZ?

What role did airpower play in the conflict?

Did either side reach its culminating point during the conflict? What role did culmination play in war termination?

What were the operational-level lessons learned on each side?

E. Required Readings:

Thompson, Julian. Extract from ***The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflicts,*** Chapter 8, "Amphibious Logistics-Falklands 1982." (**NWC 1086**), (Issued).

Scheina, Robert L. ***Latin America: A Naval History 1810-1987,*** Chapter 14, "The Malvinas Crisis, March–April 1982" and Chapter 15, "The Malvinas War, May–June 1982." (**NWC 1138**), (Issued).

Gatchel, Theodore L. "Operational Art and Joint Task Force Operations During the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict." (**NWC 1044**), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Clapp, Michael. ***Amphibious Assault Falkland Islands: The Battle of San Carlos Water***. Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1996.

Freedman, Lawrence, and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse. ***Signals of War: The Falklands Conflict of 1982.*** Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991. (Library Reserve).

Hastings, Max, and Simon Jenkins. ***The Battle for the Falklands***. New York: W. W. Norton, 1983. (Seminar Reserve).

Middlebrook, Martin. ***Task Force: The Falklands War, 1982***. Rev. ed. London: Penguin Books, 1987. (Seminar Reserve).

Selected extracts from ***Conflicto Malvinas, Official Report of the Argentine Army***, Vol. II, (**NWC 1038**), (Seminar Reserve).

Selected extracts from ***Falkland Islands Campaign: Understanding the Issues***, Vol. 1. (**NWC 1115**), (Seminar Reserve).

Summers, Harry G., Jr. "Strategic Lessons Learned: The Falkland Islands Campaign." (**NWC 1111**), (Seminar Reserve).

Thompson, Julian. ***No Picnic: 3 Commando Brigade in the South Atlantic: 1982***. New York: Hippocrene Books, 1985.

Van der Bijl, Nick, and David Aldea. ***5th Infantry Brigade in the Falkland***s ***1982***. Barnsley, West Yorkshire, UK: Leo Cooper, 2003.

U.K., The Defence Council. "The Falklands War 1982 from the Viewpoint of Doctrine." (**NWC 4060**), (Seminar Reserve).

Woodward, Sandy. ***One Hundred Days—The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander***. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1992. (Seminar Reserve).

OPERATIONAL ART EXAMINATION

A. Focus:

This written requirement will measure a student's knowledge and understanding of operational art.

B. Objectives:

- For students: Demonstrate an understanding of operational concepts.
- For students: Demonstrate the ability to deduce operational lessons valid for the employment of modern military forces.
- For Faculty: Evaluate student understanding of the operational employment of military force in joint and combined operations.
- For Faculty: Provide feedback on student understanding of operational concepts as they translate into naval, joint, and multi-national operations.

C. Background:

The examination will be the synthesis event for Operational Art. Students will be expected to prepare complete responses to questions and problems that will be presented by the faculty. The examination will not require students to recall mundane, specific facts, but rather to integrate and apply major principles, ideas, and concepts that will have been addressed during the operational art sessions.

Procedurally, the examination will be administered as follows: The faculty will distribute a case study for the students to read and to review prior to the exam date. Students may hold review sessions or discuss the case study with classmates prior to the distribution of the examination assignment. Once the examination assignment has been distributed, each student will then work alone to develop a response to the assignment.

At a minimum, a student response should contain the following:

1. Complete, logical, and well-supported solutions to each question or problem presented.
2. Proper application of course concepts.
3. Clear and concise articulation of meaningful ideas.

Point of contact for this session is Professor J. L. Barker, C-420.

USE OF FORCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (Seminar)

At all times, commanders shall observe, and require their commands to observe, the principles of international law. Where necessary to fulfill this responsibility, a departure from other provisions of Navy Regulations is authorized.

—Article 0705, U.S. Navy Regulations (Rev. 1999)

A. Focus:

This seminar introduces the Operational Law portion of the operations curriculum. Operational Law is a combination of Law of Armed Conflict, International Law, Law of the Sea, and National Security Law, among others. Operational Law affects the planning and conduct of military operations in a number of critical ways. This session will address the sources of International and Operational law and the legal bases for the use of force by one nation against another.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the factors and emerging concepts influencing joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multi-national forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the effect of time, coordination, policy changes and political development on the planning process.
- Understand the development of international law in its historical context.
- Identify the primary sources of international law, compare the sources of international law with the sources of domestic U.S. law, and understand important provisions of the UN Charter related to a nation's use of force.
- Discuss the impact of the UN Charter on the development of international law, particularly with respect to the concept of national and collective self-defense.
- Understand how international law definitions and concepts affect the combatant and operational commander in planning and executing military operations.

C. Background:

Relations among nations necessarily involve the application of international law. International practice and agreements regulate such diverse activities as aviation safety, communications, financial transactions, nautical rules of the road, environmental protection and the use of force. While the international legal system, like its domestic counterpart, is not perfect, nations nevertheless comply with most international law most of the time.

Nations create international law by long-standing practice and by agreement—as a result, they usually regard it as fair and find it in their best interest to comply with its provisions. For example, to ensure others treat its military personnel in accordance with international law, a nation will seek to comply with those laws itself. This is known as "reciprocity." Moreover, nations usually desire to foster respect for the "rule of law" in order to promote stability and predictability in the international arena.

To many people, international law appears to lack the precision, predictability, and enforceability that are more evident in domestic law. Nevertheless, there are principles of international law that most nations believe are in their interest to follow. There are three commonly accepted sources of international law and the principles on which it is founded. The primary basis of international law is the ***customary practice of nations***, or customary law, which develop based on the widespread belief that such practices are or should be allowed or required. An example of customary law is the right of the ships of any nation to innocent passage through the territorial waters of a coastal nation. The second key source of international law is agreements among nations, usually in the form of ***treaties or conventions***. The United Nations Charter is perhaps the most significant example of treaty-based law, because decisions of its Security Council are binding on other nations and can be enforced by military power if necessary. Finally, in areas in which international law is not already settled by customary practice or international agreement, ***general principles of law*** are applied.

For millennia, international law involved only the rules of conduct between and among sovereign nations. In the last half century, however, international law has focused increasingly on the rights and responsibilities of individuals. The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are examples of humanitarian law applicable during armed conflict. Many international human rights principles are similar to U.S. constitutional guarantees.

Defining the authority of a nation to use force against another nation is the primary purpose of the UN Charter. The Charter specifies that a nation may use force either pursuant to an authorization of the Security Council or in self-defense. Recent events, such as the NATO intervention in Kosovo which was based primarily on the need to intervene in a national dispute to prevent genocide, highlight that modern customary international law may provide additional bases for the use of military force. The reading by Professor Lillich suggests that this is the case.

Violations of international law by U.S. military personnel can be detrimental to U.S. national interests and the military mission. For instance, without prejudging any individual cases, it appears that violations of international law occurred at the Abu Ghraib prison complex, which significantly impacted the goodwill of some Iraqis. Likewise, compliance with international law can also have a "force-multiplying" impact, affecting the goodwill of the local population and the decision of other nations to join in "coalitions of the willing."

A note about the law-related sessions: Sessions I-22 through I-25 provide an overview of the international law influences on the conduct of military operations. Their purpose is to create an awareness of the ways international law affects the planning and execution of all operations outside the United States. In complex cases, operational commanders should seek advice from qualified legal advisors and include them in the planning process.

Some of the issues addressed in these sessions will be illustrated in the case study during Session I-26 and in the seminars and exercises during the Blocks that follow. We will discuss how legal considerations are factored into the Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) process, and consider legal issues in the context of the JMO exercise at the end of course.

The point of contact for this session is Commander P. A. Dutton, JAGC, USN, C-424.

D. Questions:

What are the sources of international law? Why do nations care about international law? What motivates them to comply with its provisions?

What role does international law play in the President/SECDEF's policy-making process?

What role does international law play in the military planning process at the operational level?

How can the commander ensure that subordinates plan and execute operations in accordance with international law?

What are the legal bases for coalition operations in the Terror War? For the operations in Iraq?

E. Required Readings:

Robertson, H. B., Jr. "Contemporary International Law: Relevant to Today's World?" (**NWC 5002**), (Issued).

Lillich, Richard B. "Forcible Self-Help Under International Law." (**NWC 1063**), (Issued).

The Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945. (**NWC 5003**) (Relevant articles: 1, 2, 23 [1963 text], 24, 25, 27 [1963 text], 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53) (**Scan Only**) (Issued).

UN Security Council Resolution 1441 of 8 November 2002. (**NWC 5001**), (Issued).

UN Security Council Resolution 1472 of 28 March 2003. (**NWC 5004**), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Bunn, George. "International Law and the Use of Force in Peacetime: Do U.S. Ships Have to Take the First Hit?" (**NWC 1074**), (Seminar Reserve).

Zinni, A. C. "The SJA in Future Operations." (**NWC 1048**), (Seminar Reserve).

OPERATIONAL LAW AND FACTOR SPACE (Seminar)

The Department of Defense strongly supports U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. A universally respected ocean regime, with strong, unambiguous guarantees of fundamental operational rights, such as passage through foreign territorial seas, through international straits, and through the world's archipelagoes, preserves the ability of the U.S. to deter and respond to threats whenever and wherever required.

—Secretary of Defense, 2001 Annual Report to the President and the Congress

A. Focus:

This seminar focuses on the operational law that affects the operational factor of space. The right of all nations to complete control of their land and air boundaries, the right of all nations to navigation within and flight over international waters, and in the littorals the balanced rights of nations and coastal states are essential considerations in planning military operations.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multi-national forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the fundamentals of campaign planning.
- Understand the operational considerations resulting from the sovereign right of all nations to limit the entry and movement of foreign forces within their land territory and national airspace.
- Understand the operational considerations for operations in the littorals resulting from the balance of rights and responsibilities of sea-going nations and coastal nations.
- Consider the impact of operational law and factor space issues at the strategic and operational levels of war.
- Understand the traditional international legal rights of belligerent nations and neutral nations and how these rights impact military operations during armed conflict and during military operations other than armed conflict.

C. Background:

Among the operational art tools used by the operational planner are the three key operational factors of time, force and space. Factor space is heavily influenced by widely accepted international law and rules governing the establishment and meaning of land, sea and air boundaries (a key characteristic of factor space). These boundaries directly impact the freedom of movement of the operational commander. During the deterrent (or pre-hostilities) phase of a military operation, military forces must respect the sovereign rights of all nations within the boundaries of their land territory, national waters and national airspace. This means that with a few limited exceptions, military forces may not operate within another nation's boundaries without its permission.

During the hostilities phase of an operation, our movement will be conducted without regard to the sovereign rights of the enemy belligerent nation. However, the traditional sovereign rights of neutral states usually continue to be respected, and limitations on the

freedom of movement of our forces within the land, sea and air boundaries of neutral states must be factored into our operational planning. When limited navigation and over flight rights within neutral air and sea space prove insufficient, operational planners must notify the State Department of the need to obtain access and transit agreements in order to facilitate a planned operation.

Our freedom to navigate and over-fly ***international*** waters and airspace are fundamental to implementing U.S. national and military strategies. These freedoms allow access to strategic areas of the world, facilitate support and reinforcement of forward-deployed forces, enable U.S. and coalition forces to operate worldwide, and ensure uninterrupted world commerce. During this session we will discuss the rights of all nations in international waters and airspace, as well as the limited rights of coastal nations to exercise jurisdiction over some portions of the sea and airspace adjacent to their coastline.

Customary international law, as reflected in the UN Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention, provides widely accepted rules delineating the rights of nations in the various zones of the sea. These rules have as their basis internationally agreed upon air and sea boundaries, as depicted in NWC 1049. These boundaries, and the navigation and over flight rights associated with them, strongly impact the planning and conduct of military operations.

Since 1983, the United States has recognized the LOS Convention's description of the various maritime zones and boundaries and the rights and responsibilities associated with them to be accepted customary international law. Since that time, it has been presidential policy for U.S. forces to actively "exercise and assert [the United States'] navigation and over flight rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis in a manner that is consistent with the balance of interests reflected in the Convention." Moreover, presidential policy has been that the United States shall not "acquiesce in unilateral acts of other states designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of the international community in navigation and over flight and other related high seas uses."

Although the Senate never ratified the United States' participation in the Law of the Sea Convention, by an Executive Order signed by President Reagan in 1983 it is official government policy that all military operations will be conducted in accordance with the Convention's delineation of rights and responsibilities. The U.S. Navy publishes detailed guidance on the LOS regimes in Part I of ***The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations,*** NWP 1-14M. This handbook is a great resource for the operational commander and his/her staff.

The point of contact for this session is Commander P. A. Dutton, JAGC, USN, C-424.

D. Questions:

What sovereign rights does a nation have within its land territory and national airspace, and how does this affect the movement or operation of foreign military forces in them?

What are the distinctions between innocent passage, transit passage, archipelagic sea-lane passage, and high seas freedoms of navigation?

What are the rights and responsibilities of maritime and coastal nations with respect to each of these regimes?

To what extent may the military operations of a belligerent nation be conducted within the land territory, national airspace and national waters of a neutral nation?

E. Required Readings:

Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M. ***The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations***. Chapters 1 and 2, and pages 7-1 through 7-4. (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College. "Legal Regimes of Oceans and Airspace Areas." (**NWC 1049**), (Issued).

"The Proliferation Security Initiative: Counterproliferation at the Crossroads." (**NWC 1036**), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

U.S. Naval War College. "Warning Zones" (**NWC 1046**), (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. Department of Defense. ***National Security and the Convention on the Law of the Sea.*** (**NWC 1017**), (Seminar Reserve).

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. (**NWC 1003**), (Seminar Reserve).

LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (Seminar)

Those skilled in war cultivate the Tao (the way of humanity and justice) and preserve the laws and are therefore able to formulate victorious policies.

—Sun Tzu, ***The Art of War***

A. Focus:

When planning and conducting military operations, commanders and their subordinates must comply with the international law that governs the conduct of hostilities. This session is devoted to discussing the law of armed conflict for land, air, and naval warfare.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multi-national forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**— Comprehend the fundamentals of campaign planning.
- Examine the origins of and the purposes served by the law of armed conflict and comprehend the reasons that nations comply or attempt to comply with it.
- Know the basic principles of the law of armed conflict for land, air, and naval warfare.
- Apply the concepts of the law of armed conflict to the strategic and operational levels of war.

C. Background:

The law of armed conflict (LOAC) was historically referred to as the law of war. It is that part of international and domestic law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. It is based on international custom and practice, on international agreements or conventions, and on American values and policies.

There are three general principles of the law of armed conflict: military necessity, proportionality, and humanity. The principle of **military necessity** allows a belligerent to apply force to achieve legitimate military objectives, while the principle of **proportionality** means that the degree of force used must be no greater than what is necessary and proportional to the prompt realization of those legitimate military objectives. The principle of **humanity** forbids the infliction of suffering, injury, or destruction not actually necessary for the accomplishment of legitimate military purposes. These principles require, for example, that belligerents distinguish as much as reasonably possible between combatants and noncombatants when targeting. This is known as the principle of **distinction**, which is an aspect of military necessity.

The law of armed conflict is consistent with certain principles of war, such as objective, mass, and economy of force. Both the law of armed conflict and the principles of war stress the importance of directing force against critical military targets, while avoiding the waste of resources against objectives that are militarily unimportant.

Part II of the Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations presents an overview of the rights and duties of military personnel under the law of armed conflict. In DoD Directive 5100.77, the Secretary of Defense directed U.S. Armed Forces to

comply with the law of armed conflict during all armed conflicts, however characterized, and to apply the principles and spirit of the law of armed conflict during all other military operations.

The point of contact for this session is Commander P. A. Dutton, JAGC, USN, C-424.

D. Questions:

Why is it in a nation's interest to comply with the law of armed conflict? Why is it in the interest of the military commander?

To what extent does the law of armed conflict apply to non-international armed conflict and to Military Operations Other Than War?

What are the major protections afforded by the law of armed conflict to the wounded and sick, prisoners of war and civilians in occupied areas?

What are the principal international law considerations with respect to selection of targets and selection of weapons?

What are the requirements to be a lawful combatant? To be a noncombatant? What is an unlawful (or unprivileged) combatant?

What is the legal basis to hold detainees in Guantanamo Bay? In Iraq?

How has the law of armed conflict changed, if at all, during the ongoing Terror War?

What are the legal bases for Occupation Law? What legal requirements must the Occupying Power observe?

E. Required Readings:

Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M. ***The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations.*** Chapters 5 through 12. (Issued).

Iraq—Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation Number 1 of 16 May 2003. (**NWC 5007**), (Issued).

Iraq—Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 1 of 16 May 2003. (**NWC 5008**), (Issued).

Friend, Jim. "Military Occupation and the Law of Armed Conflict: Discouraging Resistance." (**NWC 5009**), (Issued).

Selected Sections from Geneva Conventions and Hague Regulations. (**NWC 5010**), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Capece, Christian M. "The Ottawa Treaty and Its Impact on U.S. Military Policy and Planning." (**NWC 1075**), (Seminar Reserve).

Shotwell, C. B. "A Look at the Aerial Rules of Engagement in the 1991 Gulf War." (**NWC 1076**), (Seminar Reserve).

Rodriguez, Cara L. "Slaying the Monster: Why the United States Should Not Support the Rome Treaty." (**NWC 1077**), (Seminar Reserve).

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (Seminar)

The determination of hostile intent is the single most difficult decision that a commander has to make in peacetime.

—Admiral Frank Kelso

A. Focus:

This session concerns rules of engagement (ROE), which define for operational forces the circumstances and extent to which they may use force. The session reviews the U.S. Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) and then discusses the foundations for and process involved in developing ROE. Finally, this session discusses how ROE are employed in declared combat and in military operations other than declared combat.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multi-national forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.
- Gain an understanding of the principles behind the SROE and the distinction between conduct-based ROE and status-based ROE.
- Examine ROE development in the planning process and understand the process by which modifications to ROE are obtained from higher authority.
- Understand the role of ROE in maintaining civilian control of the military.

C. Background:

ROE are the primary means by which the President, through the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders, exercises his Constitutional responsibility as Commander in Chief to guide U.S. military forces in the use of force to obtain national objectives. U.S. forces operate under the SROE contained in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3121.01A. The SROE provide direction and guidance regarding the inherent right of **self-defense,** which are rules based on the conduct of others and which apply at all times from peace to war. The SROE also provide a list of supplemental measures, which are generally status-based rules for the use of force and which allow operational planners to request authority to use force in order to achieve **mission accomplishment**.

The inherent right to use force, including deadly force, in self-defense has as its legal basis the right of military self-defense recognized under customary international law and the right of national self-defense recognized under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Mission accomplishment ROE are issued by senior civilian and military commanders as a means of shaping a military operation to best achieve political and military goals, and to ensure that forces comply with the law of armed conflict at all times. All ROE should be consistent with national policy, military strategy, and the missions assigned by higher authority. ROE must be framed and interpreted in conjunction with the mission and should support, not inhibit, mission accomplishment. Thus, although international law

relating to the use of force is an important consideration in drafting ROE, political guidance and operational requirements are perhaps the most significant factors that shape mission accomplishment ROE.

In operational planning, the adequacy of existing ROE is assessed during the mission analysis in the Commander's Estimate of the Situation. If additional authority to use force is required, operational planners should be prepared to brief the commander on the specific existing ROE limitations that need to be relaxed in order to facilitate mission accomplishment. Alternatively, if operational planers believe that subordinate commanders should have limitations on their authority to use force or should otherwise receive through ROE clear direction on how to use force in mission accomplishment, they should be prepared to recommend ROE for the commander to issue.

In all subsequent phases of the military decision-making process, it is vitally important that commanders and their planning staffs continue to be alert to the effect that existing ROE have on mission accomplishment, and to seek or order changes to the ROE when appropriate. The J-3 is normally responsible to the Commander for ROE development, with the assistance of other staff officers, including the staff judge advocate.

The point of contact for this session is Commander P. A. Dutton, JAGC, USN, C-424.

D. Questions:

What factors lead to the need for unit or individual self-defense?

What are the limits of actions that may be taken in self-defense?

Is preemptive action consistent with the SROE?

How can a combatant commander ensure that subordinate commanders do not misinterpret the ROE or put an undesired "spin" on the approved ROE?

What measures have to be incorporated into the SROE to transition from MOOTW to war?

What additional ROE considerations are involved in coalition warfare? In UN operations?

What is the appropriate role of the legal advisor in developing and implementing ROE?

In the Terror War and in Homeland Security, are there new considerations regarding rules of engagement?

Are the rules of engagement and use of force rules the same for all military and civilian forces participating in Homeland Security?

E. Required Readings:

Joint Pub 3-0, ***Doctrine for Joint Operations***, 10 September 2001, Chapter III, paragraph 6.n. (Page III-35). (Issued).

Joint Pub 5-00.2, ***Procedures for Forming and Operating a Joint Task Force***, 13 Jan 1999, Chapter IV, paragraph 9. (Page IV-6 to IV-8). (Issued).

Duncan, James C. "The Commander's Role in Developing the Rules of Engagement." (**NWC 1066**), (Issued).

Rose, S. "Crafting the Rules of Engagement for Haiti." (**NWC 1051**), (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College. Extracts from CJCS Instruction 3121.01A, "JCS Standing Rules of Engagement." (**NWC 1062**), (Scan), (Issued).

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, CFLCC ROE Card (unclassified) of 31 Jan 03. **(NWC 5011**), (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College. "Blue Force Standing Rules of Engagement." (**NWC 2012A**), (Scan), (Issued).

OPERATIONAL LAW CASE STUDY (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This seminar provides the opportunity to apply operational law and to discuss the effective application of ROE to specific military operations.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Apply solutions to operational problems using current joint doctrine.
- Demonstrate knowledge of the elements of the law of the sea and airspace and the law of armed conflict by applying them in a factual context involving the employment of military forces.
- Demonstrate an understanding of the various political, military, and legal considerations involved in crafting rules of engagement for a specific military operation.
- Apply the CJCS SROE in a factual context involving the employment of military forces.
- Practice using a set of supplemental ROE in a specific military operation.

C. Background:

See OPS Sessions I-22 through I-25.

The point of contact for this session is Commander P. A. Dutton, JAGC, USN, C-424.

D. Required Readings:

U.S. Naval War College. "Case Study for Operational Law, Operation UPHOLD PAPUA." (**NWC 1070A**), (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College. "Blue Force Standing Rules of Engagement." (**NWC 2012A**), (Issued).

E. Supplementary Readings:

Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M. ***The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations.*** Chapters 1-2 and 5-12. (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College. "Extracts from CJCS 3121.01A, "JCS Standing Rules of Engagement." (**NWC 1062**), (Issued).

BLOCK TWO
PLANNING

INTRODUCTION TO PLANNING

A. Focus:

Block II sessions build upon the framework and components of the previous blocks by relating them to current U.S. military organization and planning concepts. Block II sessions afford a comprehensive view of: Service cultures, doctrine, and capabilities; essential supporting systems; and the foundations of formal planning. Each student brings to the seminar unique expertise and experience in one or more of the Block II topics. The overall educational objective is to weave faculty seminar presentations, student contributions, readings, lectures, and assigned case studies into a seamless fabric of baseline, joint and operational competence. It is expected that this competence will be reflected in student understanding and application of formal planning and decision-making principles to the proper employment (selection, assignment, and tasking) of forces in joint and combined environments to accomplish assigned missions.

B. Background:

Sessions II-1 through II-9 comprise a logical sequence of essential warfare supporting systems, Service doctrine and capabilities, and joint and multinational warfare considerations, which enable the student to consider how best to deploy and employ forces and functional support systems to accomplish assigned missions.

Session II-10 provides an insight into the capabilities and limitations of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) systems and processes as well as the role of the J2 (Intelligence Officer) during planning situations. This session will use a case study from recent operations in Iraq to serve as a basis for seminar discussion.

Sessions II-11 and II-12 develop knowledge and skills for planning and directing force employment and introduce the processes of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), which deals with the development of plans and issuing orders.

Session II-13 provides an insight into the nature of Information Operations (IO) and the role that it serves in operational planning. Several students will have an opportunity to develop an IO plan during the Block IV planning exercise.

Block II concludes with Sessions II-14 and 15, a Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) case study exercise and a graded practical exercise. With operational art principles as the foundation, students will apply planning process and force employment knowledge to the development of a plan appropriate to accomplishing the mission and solving the problem. Each student will then translate their seminar's concept of operations into a directive to their subordinate commands.

By the end of Block II, students should be able to use logic and common sense in a joint planning framework to develop the correct sequence of actions that properly employ available resources to accomplish a mission.

C. Questions:

None.

D. Readings:

None.

OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS (Seminar)

. . . A sound logistics plan is the foundation upon which a war operation should be based. If the necessary minimum of logistics support cannot be given to the combatant forces involved, the operation may fail, or at best be only partially successful.

—Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, USN, Commander Fifth Fleet, 1946

A. Focus:

This session provides an overview of logistics at the operational level of war. It addresses the principles of logistics, joint boards and cells, and the geographic combatant commander's logistics responsibilities. Finally, it examines operational logistics planning considerations.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend how joint force command relationships and directive authority for logistics support joint warfighting capabilities.
- **PJE**—Comprehend current joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the factors and emerging concepts influencing joint doctrine.
- Understand the Principles of Logistics.
- Identify and describe the joint boards and offices that directive authority for logistics allows a combatant commander to routinely use or establish.
- Identify the different classes of supply.
- Comprehend logistics planning considerations.

C. Background:

The operational commander, as well as members of the commander's staff, must have a clear understanding of the capabilities and limitations of operational logistics, if he is going to successfully execute daily peacetime operations and, certainly, operations across the full spectrum of conflict. Providing logistics to our forces throughout the world is a very complicated process and requires a great deal of coordination and synchronization by both supported and supporting commands and organizations. Even though logistics is normally a Service responsibility, the combatant commander retains directive authority for logistics and must decide if and when it is appropriate to exercise that authority.

This lesson includes an overview of the principles of logistics, the geographic combatant commander's responsibilities for supply, and directive authority for logistics. Also included in the session are logistics joint boards and offices, joint and coalition logistics considerations, and the classes of supply. Additionally, considerations for logistics planning and types of servicing are also key areas for the combatant commander to understand and are discussed during this session.

Point of contact for this session is Captain W. J. Richardson, Jr., USN, C-421.

D. Questions:

How can operational logistics extend operational reach for the combatant commander?

What are the key elements of a logistics system that must be taken into account when developing a concept of logistics support?

Why should a combatant commander be concerned about exercising Directive Authority for logistics, if logistics are an individual Service responsibility?

What logistics planning considerations should be taken into account when conducting joint operations?

In a multinational operation, what logistics issues should the combatant commander consider?

What is the difference between a "push" and "pull" logistics system?

E. Required Readings:

Joint Pub 4-0, ***Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations,*** 6 April 2000. Executive Summary (v through ix); Chapter I, para 1, 2, and 3 (I-1 through I-14); Chapter II; Chapter III; Chapter IV, para 1, 2, and 3 (IV-1 through IV-6); Appendix B and Appendix C. (Issued).

Joint Vision 2020, Focused Logistics, 24–25. (Issued).

Brown, Susan Declereq, Major, USAFR and Phyllis Rhodes. "DLA: Logistics Backbone of Iraqi Freedom," ***Army Logistician,*** July–August 2003, 6–7. (**NWC 3049**), (Issued).

Wood, David. "Some of Army's Civilian Contractors Are No-Shows in Iraq," Newhouse News Service, www.newhouse.com/archive/wood080103.html, July 31, 2003. (**NWC 3051**), (Issued).

U.S. General Accounting Office. ***Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the Effectiveness of Logistics Activities during Operation Iraqi Freedom***, 18 December 2003. (**NWC 3008**), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Schrady, David. "Combatant Logistics Command and Control for the Joint Force Commander," ***Naval War College Review*** (Summer 1999): 49–75.

Department of the Navy and Headquarters, United States Marine Corps. ***NDP 4, Naval Logistics,*** 20 February 2001. http://www.nwdc.navy.mil/Library/Documents/NDPs/NDP4/NDP4.pdf. (Seminar Reserve).

Director of Logistics, The Joint Staff. ***Focused Logistics Campaign Plan***, http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/j4/projects/foclog/foclog.htm.

STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT (Seminar)

Victory is the beautiful, bright-colored flower. Transport is the stem without which it could never have blossomed.

—Winston Churchill, ***The River War*** (1899)

USTRANSCOM . . . their motto should be "try fighting without us."

—General Henry Shelton, CJCS

A. Focus:

This session emphasizes how the national strategic deployment system works. It addresses the organization and mission of the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and its component commands. Finally, it examines the United States' ability to deploy in support of global contingencies.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the organizational framework within which joint forces are employed.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how the U.S. military is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for joint, interagency, and multinational operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend current joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- Comprehend the elements of the strategic deployment triad, which focuses on transportation and sustainment by land, sea and air assets.
- Know the role of the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) in working with the regional combatant commanders on strategic mobility and sustainability.

C. Background:

The ability of the U.S. military to successfully carry out its assigned tasks per our National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy depends greatly on its capability to deploy forces, equipment, and sustainment to a theater of operations within a given period of time. While logistics includes all those supporting activities required to sustain a deployed force, strategic mobility defines that part of the logistics process which transports people, equipment, supplies, and other commodities by land, sea, and air, to enable military force projection. In fact, the operational commander must have a clear understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the strategic mobility process if he is going to successfully execute a major operation or campaign. Force selection, phasing of operations, and risk assessment are directly tied to the ability to project both forces and support from the United States to the area of responsibility, area of operation, or theater of war.

USTRANSCOM oversees the strategic deployment process. USTRANSCOM's charter is to maintain and operate a deployment system for orchestrating the transportation aspects of worldwide mobility planning, integrate deployment-related information

management systems, and provide centralized wartime traffic management. Actual movement is executed by USTRANSCOM component commands: Military Surface Deployment & Distribution Command (SDDC – Army), Military Sealift Command (MSC – Navy), and Air Mobility Command (AMC – Air Force). The Department of Transportation's Maritime Administration (MARAD) bridges MSC, U.S.-flag commercial companies, and U.S. unions for sealift procurement and operations.

The Strategic Deployment triad consists of prepositioned material, sealift, and airlift. Each triad component has distinct advantages and disadvantages in terms of response time, expense, availability of assets, and carrying capacity. Sealift and airlift have access to only limited U.S. Government-owned assets, and thus are highly reliant on commercial industry under a variety of programs, including the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) and Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA).

Point of contact for this session is Captain W. J. Richardson, Jr., USN, C-421.

D. Questions:

What are the major advantages and disadvantages of each leg of the strategic deployment triad?

How does the combatant commander or the CJTF interface with USTRANSCOM? What is the supported/supporting commander relationship?

What are the critical shortages in sealift and airlift and their root causes?

What are the major planning considerations facing operational planners in deploying a force to the theater of operations?

E. Required Readings:

Forces/Capabilities Handbook, Read Strategic Lift Chapter. (**NWC 3153I**), (Issued).

Joint Deployment Process Course (CD-ROM) August 2002. Accomplish modules on Introduction to JDP and Phases I-IV. (**NCW 2018**), (Issued). Note: The references that this CD-ROM draws upon are: Joint Pub 3-35, ***Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations***; Joint Pub 4-01, ***Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System***; and the ***Joint Task Force (JTF) Deployment and Redeployment Handbook***, U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center.

Service Capabilities Vignette, July 2004. (**NWC 2041**), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Snyder, Thomas J., and Stella T. Smith, "The War in the Persian Gulf." ***Air Force Journal of Logistics*** (Summer 1998): 16–28.

USTRANSCOM Handbook 24-2, ***Understanding the Defense Transportation System,*** 3d Edition, Scott AFB , IL: 1 September 2000, 1–17.

Joint Pub 4-01, ***Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System***. (JEL, CD-ROM).

Joint Pub 3-17, ***Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Air Mobility Operations***. Read Chapter VII. (JEL, CD-ROM).

U.S. NAVY CAPABILITIES AND EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS (Seminar)

He who commands the sea has command of everything.

—Themistocles (528–462 B.C.)

The seas are no longer a self contained battlefield. Today they are a medium from which warfare is conducted. The oceans of the world are the base of operations from which navies project power onto land areas and targets. . . The mission of protecting sea-lanes continues in being, but the Navy's central missions have become to maximize its ability to project power from the sea over the land and to prevent the enemy from doing the same.

—Timothy Shea, ***Project Poseidon,*** February 1961

A. Focus:

Our three maritime Services—Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard—conduct operations in the world's oceans and littoral regions. With such capable naval forces, we view the oceans not as an obstacle, but as our base of operations and our maneuver space, which we either can control or deny to an opponent. Whenever we face an adversary without a blue-water fleet, the oceans serve as barriers for our defense. The oceans provide the United States avenues of world trade and military lines of communication with allies and friends—when they are protected by our strong naval forces. To appreciate operations in the maritime environment, it is necessary to understand the distinctive character of naval forces.

—Naval Doctrinal Publication 1, ***Naval Warfare***, 6.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing U.S. Navy forces as part of a joint and multinational force at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. Navy forces and how other Services can capitalize upon the capabilities and offset the limitations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the interrelationship between U.S. Navy doctrine and joint doctrine.

C. Background:

The United States depends upon transoceanic links, commercial and military, to allies, friends, and its strategic interests. The nation's maritime strength has enabled it to endure more than two centuries of global crisis and confrontation that have reflected the world's unending religious, ethnic, economic, political, and ideological strife. Whenever these crises have threatened U.S. national interests, U.S. leaders traditionally have responded with naval forces. Naval forces alone, however, were never intended to have every military capability needed to handle every threat or crisis that the nation may face. Just as using complementary capabilities within the naval forces compounds overall strength, combining the capabilities and resources of the other Services and other nations in joint and multinational operations can produce overwhelming military power. In future conflicts, the nation will answer with joint forces in most cases.

The U.S. Navy's approach to war fighting and military operations short of war is guided by the roles specified in law by Congress and by specific service functions prescribed by the President and Secretary of Defense, as codified in DoD Directive 5100.1. Specifically, these functions are ". . . conduct of prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea, including operations of sea-based aircraft and land-based naval air components—specifically, forces to seek out and destroy enemy naval forces and to suppress enemy sea commerce, to gain and maintain general naval supremacy, to control vital sea areas and to protect vital sea lines of communication, to establish and maintain local superiority (including air) in an area of naval operations, to seize and defend advanced naval bases, and to conduct such land, air, and space operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign."

Navy roles and functions remained relatively stable from post–World War II through the 1980s; however, the capability to perform functions varied depending on national security strategy and resource decisions of the time. Disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the end of the Cold War led to the articulation of a new national security strategy in August 1990 that shifted focus from a global foe to regional contingencies. The Navy developed and articulated its vision of the part it would play in this new strategy in a September 1992 White Paper . . . ***From The Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century.*** This was followed in September 1994 by an additional White Paper, ***Forward . . . From The Sea***, which reflected two years' hard operational experience with forward presence and contingency response. In March 1997 ***Forward . . . From the Sea: The Navy Operational Concept*** was released, promulgating guidance on operational primacy—the ability to carry out swiftly and effectively any naval, joint, or multinational mission and to prevail decisively over any foe across the spectrum of conflict. In October 2002 the Chief of Naval Operations promulgated the concept of ***Sea Power 21: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities,*** where ". . . we will continue the evolution of U.S. naval power from the blue-water, war-at-sea focus of the ***Maritime Strategy*** (1986), through the littoral emphasis of ***. . . From the Sea*** (1992) and ***Forward . . . from the Sea*** (1994), to a broadened strategy in which naval forces are fully integrated into global joint operations against regional and transnational dangers."

As one of the major initiatives precipitated by ***. . . From The Sea***, the U.S. Naval Doctrine Command (NDC) was established in February 1993 in Norfolk, VA. The first major NDC task was to synthesize and promulgate naval doctrine in six major parts: Warfare, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, Planning, and Command and Control. The first of these capstone documents is Naval Doctrine Publication 1 (NDP-1), ***Naval Warfare***, published in 1994. In July 1998, the Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) was established at Newport, R.I. Its responsibilities include the formulation and personalization of naval doctrine.

The Navy is in a period of transition. Hence, there are elements of both the old and the new in current Naval operations. This session looks at both old and new with an emphasis on the new. The key capabilities for the Navy are discussed in Admiral Clark's article in ***Sea Power 21: A Collection of Readings,*** (**NWC 3040**). While all Navy ships are designed and organized to operate independently to various degrees, their individual capabilities are complementary, leading to the formation of composite groups/forces to accomplish core Naval Service tasks. Vice Admiral Mullen's article in ***Sea Power 21: A Collection of Readings*** (**NWC 3040**) discusses the employment of Naval assets.

A brief description of organization, capabilities, and operational concepts is contained in the ***Forces/Capabilities Handbook*** (**NWC 3153I**), while ***Sea Power 21: A Collection of Readings*** (**NWC 3040**) provides a more detailed discussion of the Navy's transitional goals. Individual ship descriptions are available in the Almanac of Sea Power.

The point of contact for this session is Captain J. N. Stafford, USN, C-412.

D. Questions:

What capabilities and options do U.S. Navy forces bring to a joint force commander, and how can these be integrated into joint operations? What are the strengths and weaknesses?

What are the implications and operational challenges of expeditionary and littoral warfare concepts for the U.S. maritime component commander and the joint force commander?

What are the issues associated with integration into the joint force?

Using the ***Service Capabilities Vignette*** (**NWC 2041**), consider the range of employment options that Navy forces could offer.

E. Required Readings:

Sea Power 21: A Collection of Readings. (**NWC 3040**), (Issued).

Service Capabilities and Employment Considerations, U.S. Navy Briefing, CD-ROM, 2004 (**NWC 2002C**), (Issued).

Forces/Capabilities Handbook. Review U.S. Navy section, Appendix C and Appendix E. (**NWC 3153I**), (Issued).

Service Capabilities Vignette, July 2004. (**NWC 2041**), (Issued).

Navy League of the United States. ***The Almanac of Sea Power 2003***. Arlington, VA: January 2003. (Scan) (Seminar Reserve).

Joint Publication Operational Command and Control Compendium, 30 July 2004, Read JFMCC TACMEMO 3-32-03 (Extract) section, 1–6. (**NWC 2024**), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

JFMCC TACMEMO 3-32-03, June 2004. (Seminar Reserve)

U.S. Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C. Naval Doctrine Publication 1, NDP-1, ***Naval Warfare***. Norfolk, VA: U.S. Naval Doctrine Command, March 1994. (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C. Naval Doctrine Publication 2, NDP-2, ***Naval Intelligence***. Norfolk, VA: U.S. Naval Doctrine Command, September 1994. (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C. Naval Doctrine Publication 4, NDP-4, ***Naval Logistics***. Norfolk, VA: U.S. Naval Doctrine Command, 20 February 2001. (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C. Naval Doctrine Publication 5, NDP-5, ***Naval Planning***. Norfolk, VA: U.S. Naval Doctrine Command, January 1996. (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C. Naval Doctrine Publication 6, NDP-6, ***Naval Command and Control***. Norfolk, VA: U.S. Naval Doctrine Command, May 1996. (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. COAST GUARD CAPABILITIES AND EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS (Seminar)

The Coast Guard provides . . . a unique instrument in the nation's national security tool bag.

—General Colin Powell

The Coast Guard has a 200-plus-year history of both maritime and military service and I think they would be difficult to replace. If you didn't have a Coast Guard, you'd probably look to create one. . . . I'm very proud to be their Secretary. . . . When the need arises, they can surge to fill that need and then go back to their more traditional missions.

—Secretary Tom Ridge

A. Focus:

The multi-mission Coast Guard is the country's fifth and smallest Armed Service with non-redundant, complementary capabilities that can serve as a force multiplier in joint operations. Since 9/11 the Coast Guard has also seen greatly increased emphasis on the mission of maritime HLS/HLD and is in the process of recapitalizing its entire fleet. This session examines the Coast Guard's capabilities to support joint operations, diverse mission areas, equipment, challenges and limitations.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing U.S. Coast Guard forces as part of a joint and multinational force at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. Coast Guard forces and how other Services can capitalize upon the capabilities and offset the limitations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the interrelationship between U.S. Coast Guard doctrine and joint doctrine.

C. Background:

Founded in 1790, and having participated in every American war since, the Coast Guard is an armed service in all respects. Although multi-mission in nature, and charged with significant responsibilities in such diverse areas as pollution response and aids to navigation, the Coast Guard forces provide non-redundant complementary capabilities in support of the national military strategy. In recent combat operations, Coast Guard forces have provided a valuable capability to the joint force commanders in maritime interception operations, port operations and security, coastal sea control and other areas where the smallest service's expertise can add value.

Transferred intact to the new Department of Homeland Security on 1 March 2003, the Coast Guard functions as the lead federal agency for maritime homeland security, and in a supporting role for maritime homeland defense. While this new emphasis has placed increasing demands on the already spread-thin service, the Coast Guard benefited from additional funding in the wake of 9/11, and is growing by 25 percent and re-capitalizing its entire fleet by the largest acquisition program in the Service's history, the "Deepwater" project.

Point of contact for this session is Captain I. T. Luke, USCG, SP-214.

D. Questions:

What Coast Guard capabilities can be useful to the Joint Task Force (JTF) commander? What are the Service's strengths and weaknesses in the joint operations arena? How does a JTF commander or combatant commander request and receive USCG support, and what are the issues associated with integration into the joint force?

What Coast Guard capabilities might be useful in support of NORTHCOM's maritime homeland defense (MHLD) mission? What DoD capabilities might the Coast Guard want in support if its maritime homeland security (MHLS) mission. What are the options and considerations for C2 for the MHLS and MHLD missions?

To what extent is the Coast Guard accepting too much risk by re-capitalizing its entire surface and air fleets at once via the unprecedented "deepwater" acquisition project?

Using the ***Service Capabilities Vignette*** (**NWC 2041**), consider the range of employment options that Coast Guard forces could offer.

E. Required Readings:

Hull, James D. VADM, USCG, Cari B. Thomas, CDR, USCG, and Joe DiRenzo, LCDR, USCG. "What Was the Coast Guard Doing in Iraq?" ***Proceedings*** (August 2003): 38–40. (**NWC 3052**), (Issued).

Gerber, Michael S. "Nation's Smallest Armed Dervice Is Adjusting to Its New Role in Security." ***The Hill***, May 21, 2003. (**NWC 3045**), (Issued).

Brown, Malina. "Navy, Coast Guard Redefining Relationship In Post–Sept. 11 World." Inside Washington Publishers, March 8, 2004. (**NWC 2022**), (Issued).

Forces/Capabilities Handbook. Review the Coast Guard Chapter. (**NWC 3153I**), (Issued).

Service Capabilities and Employment Considerations. U.S. Coast Guard Briefing, CD-ROM, 2004. (**NWC 2002C**), (Issued).

Service Capabilities Vignette, July 2004 (**NWC 2041**), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Commandant Instruction M3000.3A (COMDTINST M3000.3A) ***Coast Guard Capabilities Manual*** (CAPMAN). (Library Reserve).

Coast Guard Publication 1, U.S. Coast Guard: America's Maritime Guardian, January 2002. (**NWC 2015**), (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. MARINE CORPS CAPABILITIES AND EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS (Seminar)

A military, naval, littoral war, when wisely prepared and discreetly conducted, is a terrible sort of war. Happy for that people who are sovereigns enough of the sea to put it into execution! For it comes like thunder and lightning to some unprepared part of the world.

—Thomas More Molyneux, 1759

A. Focus:

During this session you will examine the role of the Marine Corps in national defense and how it functions to fulfill its role, current Marine Corps organization, capabilities and limitations, doctrine for warfighting, and the utility of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) to an operational commander.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations of employing Marine Air-Ground Task Forces as part of a joint and multinational force at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces and how other Services can capitalize upon the capabilities and offset the limitations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the interrelationship between U.S. Marine Corps doctrine and joint doctrine.

C. Background:

The Marine Corps is an expeditionary force-in-readiness that is manned, trained, and equipped specifically to respond quickly to a broad variety of crises and conflicts across the full range of military operations anywhere in the world. The Marine Corps' philosophy of warfighting is based on the tenets of maneuver warfare and is in consonance with joint doctrine. Marines provide a unique combat capability that combines air, land, and naval forces from the sea—the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). The key characteristic of these forces is their expeditionary mindset. Marines possess the ability to adapt and engage upon arrival, and then sustain operational momentum. They are logistically expeditionary. Marine aviation is another element that characterizes the unique concept of MAGTFs. The primary function of Marine aviation is, and always has been, support of ground troops—focused, versatile, flexible, and responsive to needs on the ground.

It is the Marine Corps' ability to deliver a unique blend of ground, air, and service support elements in a responsive and adaptive manner that makes it an effective land combat, forcible entry option.

The point of contact for this session is Professor P. C. Sweeney, C-424.

D. Questions:

What is the Marine Corps warfighting doctrine for winning in the uncertain, chaotic and fluid environment expected on the battlefields of the future?

How do the Marine Corps warfighting concepts for the 21st Century fit into the network centric environment expected on future battlefields?

How are MAGTFs structured to perform missions across the range of military operations?

What are the Marine Corps' four fundamental operating concepts for the conduct of expeditionary operations?

Why are Marine Corps forces assigned to Joint Task Forces typically organized under two separate component commands—the Marine Corps component and the Navy component?

Using the ***Service Capabilities Vignette*** (**NWC 2041**), consider the range of employment options that Marine Corps forces could offer.

E. Required Readings:

Service Capabilities and Employment Considerations, U. S. Marine Corps Briefing, CD-ROM, 2004. (**NWC 2002C**), (Issued).

MCDP 1, ***Warfighting***, Chapter 4, 69–96. (**NWC 2006**), (Issued).

MCDP 3, ***Expeditionary Operations,*** Chapters 3 and 4, 61–94. (**NWC 2008**), (Issued).

Marine Corps Concepts and Issues 2001, Scan 1–27. (**NWC 2158**), (Issued).

U.S. Marines at the Time of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. (**NWC 3070**), (Scan). (Issued).

Forces/Capabilities Handbook, Review the USMC Chapter. (**NWC 3153I**), (Issued).

Service Capabilities Vignette, July 2004. (**NWC 2041**), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

FMFMRP 2-12, ***Marine Air-Ground Task Force: A Global Capability.*** (**NWC 3057**), (Seminar Reserve).

Krulak, Charles C., U.S. Marine Corps. "Operational Maneuver from the Sea," 4 January 1996. (**NWC 3022**), (Seminar Reserve).

Rhodes, J. E., and G. S. Holder, U.S. Marine Corps. "Seabased Logistics: A 21st Century Warfighting Concept," 12 May 1998. (**NWC 2009**), (Seminar Reserve).

Van Riper, Paul K., U.S. Marine Corps. "Ship-To-Objective Maneuver," 25 July 1997. (**NWC 2011**), (Seminar Reserve).

Krulak, Charles C., U.S. Marine Corps. "MPF 2010 and Beyond," 30 December 1997. (**NWC 2013**), (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. ARMY CAPABILITIES AND EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS (Seminar)

The real object of having an Army is to provide for war.

—Elihu Root, 1899

A. Focus:

This session examines the doctrine, capabilities, limitations, and organization of the Army's forces. The primary emphasis is on the contribution those forces make to joint operations.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing U.S. Army forces as part of a joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. Army forces and how other Services can capitalize upon its capabilities and offset the limitations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the interrelationship between U.S. Army doctrine and joint doctrine.

C. Background:

America's Army is the most potent land combat force in the world. The Army is indispensable to the protection and advancement of our national interests because of its utility across the full range of contingencies. This utility comes from the Army capability for executing a range of operations from nation building and disaster relief to defeating enemies on the battlefield. The Army's most fundamental capability is the exercise of sustained, comprehensive control over people, land and natural resources. Putting American soldiers on the ground is a most effective method to shape the international environment in ways favorable to our interests.

The U.S. Army is a doctrinally-based service capable of handling large campaigns as well as combat in a variety of scenarios. The 2001 edition of ***Field Manual 3-0, Operations,*** is the Army's keystone warfighting doctrine that describes how the Army thinks about the conduct of operations.

The Army recently implemented a transformation campaign designed to reorganize its capabilities to better meet the Nation's strategic requirements. Advances in information, materials, and weapons systems technologies will enable new organizational concepts that optimize the employment of Army and joint capabilities across the full spectrum of operations.

The point of contact for this session is LTC D. K. Byrn, USA, C-407.

D. Questions:

How does the Army view the battlefield framework at the operational level?

How does the Army envision the use of airpower on the battlefield?

Beyond airpower, how else can the operational commander conduct deep operations as envisioned in Army doctrine?

What are the differences in combat capability between light and heavy forces?

What is the utility of airborne and air assault forces?

What are the advantages to be gained by the Army's transformation and reorganization into units of action and units of employment?

Using the ***Service Capabilities Vignette*** (**NWC 2041**), identify the range of employment options that Army forces offer.

E. Required Readings:

Forces/Capabilities Handbook. Review the Army Chapter. (**NWC 3153I**), (Issued).

Service Capabilities and Employment Considerations, U.S. Army Briefing, CD-ROM, 2004. (**NWC 2002C**), (Issued).

Joint Publication Operational Command and Control Compendium, 30 July 2004, Read JP 3-31 C2 for Land Operations (Extract), III-1 – III-9. (**NWC 2024)**, (Issued).

Service Capabilities Vignette, July 2004. (**NWC 2041**), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

HQ Dept. of the Army. FM 3-0, ***Operations***. June 2001.

U.S. AIR FORCE CAPABILITIES AND EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS (Seminar)

. . . a buzzword for the rest of this decade is going to be integration—the horizontal integration of manned, unmanned, and space—the integration of stealth, standoff precision, space and information . . . and my mission is to close the seams that divide our capabilities today.

—General John P. Jumper, Air Force Chief of Staff

A. Focus:

This session takes a brief look at the doctrine, capabilities, and employment of air and space power. It introduces how the Air Force is organized, highlights the core competencies, distinctive capabilities, limitations, and transformation philosophy of the Air Force, and discusses considerations for properly employing air and space power effectively in a joint environment.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing U.S. Air Forces as part of a joint and multinational force at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. Air Forces and how other Services can capitalize upon the capabilities and offset the limitations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the interrelationship between U.S. Air Force doctrine and joint doctrine.

C. Background:

The Air Force is an integrated air and space force with a domain that stretches from the earth's surface to the outer reaches of space in a seamless operational medium. Department of Defense Directive 5100.1 states that the Air Force is the only U.S. Service specifically directed to "organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained offensive and defensive combat operations in the air and space" and for strategic air and missile warfare. The Air Force will employ its air and space assets globally and jointly to achieve strategic, operational and/or tactical objectives. Most air and space assets can perform multiple functions to achieve the desired level objective; some even perform these functions in a unique way. This strength is what the USAF brings to the operational planning table for the joint force commander to dominate his adversaries. By learning to appreciate this inherent Air Force versatility that also includes speed, flexibility and global reach, Naval War College students will develop into future joint force commanders who know how to exploit the air and space continuum to achieve victory within the three dimensional battlespace.

The point of contact for this session is Lieutenant Colonel D. T. Goldizen, USAF, C-407.

D. Questions:

Why does the Air Force believe that the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) and the Airspace Control Authority (ACA) should be the same person?

Why is air and space superiority important for the joint force?

Why is centralized control and decentralized execution of air and space power important?

What is an Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force (AETF)?

What is the Air Force role in homeland defense?

Using the ***Service Capabilities Vignette*** (**NWC 2041**), consider the range of employment options that U.S. Air Forces could offer.

E. Required Readings:

Forces/Capabilities Handbook. Review the Air Force Chapter. (**NWC 3153I**), (Issued).

Service Capabilities and Employment Considerations, U.S. Air Force Briefing, CD-ROM, 2004. (**NWC 2002C**), (Issued).

Joint Publication Operational Command and Control Compendium, 30 July 2004, Read JP 3-30 C2 for Joint Air Operations (Extract), II-1 through II-11. (**NWC 2024**), (Issued).

Service Capabilities Vignette, July 2004. (**NWC 2041**), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Lambeth, Benjamin S. ***The Transformation of American Air Power***, 260–296. (Issued).

AFDD1, ***Air Force Basic Doctrine,*** 17 Nov 2003. (Seminar Reserve).

AFDD2, ***Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power,*** 17 Feb 2000. (Seminar Reserve).

AFDD2-1, ***Air Warfare,*** 22 Jan 2000. (Seminar Reserve).

AFDD2-2, ***Space Operations,*** 27 Nov 2001. (Seminar Reserve).

ACH-JFACC, ***Air and Space Commander's Handbook for the JFACC*** (AFDCH 10-01), 16 Jan 2003. (Seminar Reserve).

Joint Pub 3-09, ***Doctrine for Joint Fire Support,*** 12 May 1998. (Seminar Reserve).

Meilinger, Philip S. "The Future of Airpower—Observations from the Past Decade." (**NWC 2144**), (Issued).

Air Force Handbook for the 108th Congress, Department of the Air Force, 2003. (Seminar Reserve).

THE EDGE Air Force Transformation, USAF/XPXT. (Issued).

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES CAPABILITIES AND EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS (Seminar)

A rapidly changing world deals ruthlessly with organizations that do not change and USSOCOM is no exception. Guided by a comprehensive enduring vision and supporting goals, we must constantly reshape ourselves to remain relevant and useful members of the joint team.

—General Peter J. Schoomaker, USA

A. Focus:

This session provides an understanding of the organization, capabilities, and missions of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) and their support to the regional combatant commanders. It will briefly introduce the roles of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD-SO/LIC), theater Special Operations Commands and Command and Control of SOF. The session addresses the integration of joint SOF capabilities with conventional forces and takes a brief look at SOF equipment, training, and support. Also highlighted will be considerations for interagency operations, mission employment and insights into civil affairs and psychological operations.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing U.S. Special Operations Forces as part of a joint and multinational force at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. Special Operations Forces and how other Services can capitalize upon the capabilities and offset the limitations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the interrelationship between U.S. Special Operations Forces doctrine and joint doctrine.

C. Background:

In every conflict since the Revolutionary War, the United States has employed special operations tactics and strategies to exploit an enemy's vulnerabilities. Specially designated groups with a broad inventory of unusual skills carried out unique operations at the tactical level, but often with strategic effect. Since the establishment of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in 1987, SOF have been trained, equipped, and prepared by one commander to conduct unilateral, joint, and combined special operations in peace, conflict, and war. Today, special operations are integral to supporting the regional combatant commanders, U.S. ambassadors and their country teams, and other government agencies. Each military department has established a major command to serve as the Service component of USSOCOM.

The point of contact for this session is Captain W. C. Reed, USN, C-223.

D. Questions:

What capabilities does SOF provide National decision makers?

What capabilities does SOF provide the Joint Force Commander?

What are some limitations of SOF?

What is a Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC), and what is a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF)?

What are the command relationships unique to SOF?

What are some considerations on integrating SOF into theater peacetime activities? Contingencies? Coalition warfare?

What unique roles can SOF perform in supporting counter-proliferation and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)?

What are some of the future challenges of SOF?

Using the ***Service Capabilities Vignette*** (**NWC 2041**), consider the range of employment options that U.S. Special Forces could offer.

E. Required Readings:

Forces/Capabilities Handbook, Review SOF Chapter. (**NWC 3153I**), (Issued).

Service Capabilities and Employment Considerations, SOF Briefing, CD-ROM, 2004. (**NWC 2002C**), (Issued).

Service Capabilities Vignette, July 2004. (**NWC 2041**), (Issued).

U.S. Special Operations Forces Posture Statement, 2003–2004. Read 3–72. (Issued).

Joint Publication Operational Command and Control Compendium, 30 July 2004, Read JP 3-05 ***Doctrine for Special Operations*** (Extract), III-1 through III-13. (**NWC 2024**), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Special Operations Reference Manual, January 2004. (Seminar Reserve).

OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL (Seminar)

As we consider the nature of warfare in the modern era, we find that it is synonymous with joint warfare.

—Joint Pub 1

The teams and staffs through which the modern commander absorbs information and exercises his authority must be a beautifully interlocked, smooth-working mechanism. Ideally, the whole should be practically a single mind.

—General Dwight D. Eisenhower

The only thing worse than fighting with allies is fighting without them.

—Winston Churchill

A. Focus:

This session addresses the organization and employment of joint and multinational forces. It examines and analyzes a Joint Force Commander's organizational options and considerations when standing up a joint force and then extends this to considerations (tangible and intangible), of which he should remain mindful when extending his command to the multinational arena.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the organizational framework within which joint forces are employed.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprend current joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the factors and emerging concepts influencing joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Know how C2 and battlespace awareness apply at the operational level of war and how they support operations conducted by a networked force.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how increased reliance on information technology throughout the range of military operations creates opportunities and vulnerabilities.
- From an operational commander's viewpoint, understand the practical differences between an alliance and coalition along with the associated advantages and disadvantages such relationships bring.

C. Background:

Combatant commanders face the possibility of executing missions across the full range of military operations. They must plan for Major Wars (MWs) at the high end of the conflict spectrum as well as a variety of military operations at the lower end of the spectrum. Whatever the scope or intensity of any particular action, the joint force commander must consider how best to organize a force in order to achieve the following goals:

- Clarity of Objective

- Unity of Effort
- Centralized Direction
- Decentralized Execution

To address both the mission to be accomplished and the objective to be attained, a wise commander will account for operational functions when structuring a force. To bring the seminar discussion into focus within the framework of joint doctrine, the required readings include readings from Joint Pub 5-00.2, ***Procedures for Forming and Operating a Joint Task Force*** (**NWC 2024**)**.** This reading discusses the authorized command relationships and authority military commanders can use; provides doctrine, principles, and policy for the exercise of that authority; provides doctrine, principles, and policy for organizing joint forces; and prescribes policy for selected joint activities. Additionally, this session draws on the earlier Service session discussions and the relevance of component command organization to the overall joint command picture. However, the common thread throughout is that of command relationships, an area that was first introduced during the National Military Organization session, and one that requires a thorough appreciation to effect a sound command organization.

The ***Service Capabilities Vignette*** (**NWC 2041**) should prompt the seminar to examine the various options for constructing a joint task force, debating the benefits and liabilities of each organizational option. Once U.S. organizational considerations are understood, the more thorny issue of multinational warfare can be examined.

A variety of key planning documents, including the U.S. National Security and National Military Strategies, highlight the U.S. preference for operating with alliance and coalition partners to achieve U.S. national objectives. In fact, key tenets of U.S. military strategy (e.g., forward presence and engagement) depend heavily upon other nations to realize success. Current basic joint doctrine for the conduct of multinational operations is contained in the readings from Joint Pub 3-16 (**NWC 2024**).

Multinational operations present a variety of unique operational considerations for the military commander, not the least of which is the thorny issue of establishing unity of effort/command. It has become fashionable to take the "Unity of Effort/Parallel Command" architecture, as demonstrated by the DESERT STORM operation, as the norm and to assume that Unity of Command, in its purest sense, will be unattainable. Alliances, which offer more formal and enduring command relationships, provide a range of capabilities from which the commander may draw. Organizing an allied force, however, can still present significant headaches given potential diplomatic and political sensitivities (the issue of Macedonia during the Kosovo crisis for example). The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the best-known of the formal alliances in which the United States participates. Today, the U.S. is a member of five multinational alliances and three bilateral Alliances; her obligations to each can and do vary.

Coalitions, which are normally formed in an ad hoc manner, often represent a disparate group of nation-states responding to a common specific threat at a particular time, thus posing even more demanding challenges to the commander than the more stable alliance. Designing a workable command relationship for coalition forces during Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM was one example of such challenges.

Maintaining the integrity of a coalition may become a critical factor/objective in the successful execution of a combined operation. Consequently, any planning must cater to

an astute adversary who, recognizing the strategic importance of coalition cohesion, seeks to exploit any perceived weaknesses.

As a practical matter, coalitions are most often composed of United Nations member states from a specific region or localized area. Legitimacy is claimed by invocation of the UN Charter, specifically Chapter 1, Article I: "The Purposes of the United Nations are: . . . To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace. . . . "

Much has been written about the advent of the information age causing a technology "gap" between the globally-focused United States and the more regionally-focused allied nations. Whatever your feelings to future allied operations, a degree of multi-national interoperability remains a demanding pre-requisite for success at the operational level of war.

The point of contact for this session is Captain J. N. Stafford, USN, C-412.

D. Questions:

In addition to mission and objective, what other factors might influence the selection of an organizational structure?

Some might argue that the underlying rationale for a JTF is to ensure each Service will be represented. Is this true?

How will the SJFHQ improve future JTFs?

What are some of the critical issues an operational commander must consider when planning and executing a multinational operation?

Given the long term obligations of an alliance and the turbulent, changeable world we find ourselves in, has the alliance, as a method of binding force effort together, lost out to the seemingly more flexible coalition, or are there enduring qualities that can provide operational military benefits?

What factors are relevant in establishing an effective C2 organization within a coalition? Should we still strive for true unity of command? Include consideration of the situation wherein the overall commander may not be a U.S. military officer.

How can we reconcile the United States' steadfast pursuit of advanced (and expensive) technology with the strategic directive to embrace multinational operations as the expected norm and to seek interoperability with our allies? How does this translate down to the operational commander in the field? Will a dependence on superior technology be the final straw that breaks the allies' backs?

How can a commander ensure that necessary intelligence, some of which may be the product of very sensitive sources, is disseminated and understood by coalition partners, some of whom may be future adversaries?

What can the commander do during peacetime, given a particular area of responsibility (AOR) and range of potential contingencies, to improve the effectiveness of coalition operations in a future crisis?

Using the ***Service Capabilities Vignette*** (**NWC 2041**), consider the range of joint/ multinational organizational options that the joint force commander might consider.

E. Required Readings:

Joint Publication Operational Command and Control Compendium, 30 July 2004, Read JP 5-00.2 and JP 3-16 extracts. (**NWC 2024**), (Issued).

"DOD Puts JFCOM SJFH on Fast Track,**"** ***Inside the Pentagon***, 10 June 2004. (**NWC 2001**), (Issued).

Service Capabilities Vignette, July 2004. (**NWC 2041**), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Rice, Antony J. "Command and Control: The Essence of Coalition Warfare." ***Parameters*** (Spring 1997): 152–67.

JFSC PUB 1, ***The Joint Staff Officer's Guide***, 1-45 through 1-53. (Issued).

Joint Pub 0-2, ***Unified Action Armed Forces*** (UNAAF), V-1 through V-19. (Issued).

ISR (Lecture/Seminar)

Joint warfighting is the key to greater things on the battlefield. I think that's been clearly proven here. We have very good integration. The thing that enables that and eliminates gaps and seams is the C4ISR.

—General Richard Meyers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

A. Focus:

This session focuses on ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) support to the Joint Force Commander at the operational level of war. The 2003 U.S./coalition military operation in Iraq is used as the principal case study to elicit current capabilities and limitations of ISR in support of a major multinational military operation. The primary goal is to derive insights and lessons learned with respect to ISR systems, operational concepts, and organizations. The seminar will be preceded by the lecture "ISR & The Operational Commander (or . . . The Top Ten Things a Good Operator Knows He Should Hear from His J2 about ISR)." In addition, because ISR and Information Operations (IO) are inextricably linked, the student must keep this session in mind during the follow-on IO session (OPS II-13).

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend how national, joint, and Service intelligence organizations support JFCs and their service component commanders.
- **PJE**—Understand how battlespace awareness systems (including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance [ISR] systems) apply at the operational level of war and how they support operations conducted by a networked force.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how opportunities and vulnerabilities are created by increased reliance on information technology throughout the range of military operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the factors and emerging concepts influencing joint doctrine.
- Understand the capabilities and limitations of national and theater-level intelligence assets available to the joint operational commander.

C. Background:

Information superiority (the ability to collect, process, and disseminate information while denying an adversary's ability to do the same) has become recognized as a key enabler in twenty-first-century military operations. Also known as Knowledge Superiority, it is a central aspect of DoD's ***Joint Vision 2010*** and ***2020***, and of the Navy's ***Maritime Concept.*** Essential elements of information superiority include robust employment of the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) process.

The 2003 U.S./coalition operation in Iraq (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM) provides an excellent case study that highlights the capabilities and limitations of our current ISR systems, concepts, and organizations. Within the context of this case study, this lesson explores two different but integrally related areas of information:

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR): Under the organizational responsibility of the staff J2 (Intelligence), the central focus of ISR is to establish and

maintain an accurate picture of the environment and enemy activity in the area of operations. The particular challenges to maintaining ISR effectiveness in a highly dynamic battlespace will be explored.

The principal focus of this lesson is to develop an understanding of existing capabilities and limitations in the area of ISR at the operational level of war, and to explore how our information challenges might better be met in future operations.

The point of contact for this session is Captain S. R. Neville, USN, Sims Hall, SE-120.

D. Questions:

What were the intelligence requirements to support the operations in Iraq?

What were the principal capabilities and limitations of ISR assets in theater? How were they organized? How effectively did they support the operational commander's requirements and the Coalition operations overall?

What national intelligence resources were available to the Joint Force Commanders in the region? How were they organized? To what extent did these organizations meet U.S. and coalition requirements?

What overall lessons for future operations can be drawn from ISR experiences in this case?

E. Required Readings:

JMO Department. ***ISR and Information Operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom***, 2003. (**NWC 1-05**), (**SECRET/NOFORN**). (Must sign out from Pubs in Conolly Hall basement).

Jones, Garrett. "Working with CIA." Chap. 38 in ***Intelligence and the National Security Strategist***, edited by Roger Z. George and Robert D. Kline, 497–507. (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Joint Pub 2-0, ***Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations,*** 9 March 2000. (Joint Electronic Library), (Issued). (JEL, CD-ROM, June 2003).

Joint Pub 2-01, ***Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operation,*** 20 November 1996. (Joint Electronic Library), (Issued). (JEL, CD-ROM, June 2003).

JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM (JOPES) PART 1 (Seminar)

During the fall of 1989, during DoD's regular planning process, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) recommended and the Secretary approved a shift in the principal U.S. focus in the Persian Gulf. . . . Accordingly, the Secretary directed DoD to sharpen its ability to counter such a regional conflict on the Arabian Peninsula. In turn, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) directed CINCCENT to develop war plans consistent with this shift in emphasis.

—DoD, ***Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress***

Turbulence is a constant: it is what happens when you have to balance the management requirements to plan an operation with the flexibility needed by those who will soon be carrying it out. While it may have certain flaws, the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is the baseline system for all U.S. deployments, including those supporting peace operations.

—Kenneth Allard, ***Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned***

A. Focus:

This session introduces the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). It begins with an overview of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and the roles of the Secretary of Defense, the CJCS, the Joint Staff, and the Service chiefs and their staffs in translating national policy objectives into definitive planning guidance for the Combatant Commanders and their Service component commanders. Attention will also be directed toward the guidance contained in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), a CJCS instruction which initiates the deliberate planning cycle conducted by the combatant commanders. The session then describes the deliberate planning process, and compares and contrasts it with the time-sensitive crisis action planning process. Emphasis will be on an overview of the five phases of the deliberate planning process and the six phases of the crisis action process. We will also examine the tasking and coordination methodologies, and the relationships between the key elements and products of both processes as well as the content and organization of the various plans and directives associated with the joint military planning process.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend current joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the effect of time, coordination, policy changes, and political development on the planning process.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how the U.S. military is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for joint, interagency, and multinational operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how the defense planning systems affect joint operational planning.

- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationship among national objectives and means available through the framework provided by joint planning processes.
- Know the purpose, roles, functions, and responsibilities and relationships within the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC).
- Comprehend the role of the JSCP in the Defense Planning System with emphasis on the deliberate and crisis action planning processes.
- Know the five phases of the deliberate planning process and the six phases of the crisis action planning process used within JOPES and the products and their functions derived from these processes.
- Understand how to prepare plans and orders using Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) processes and products.
- Demonstrate the ability to analyze military directives for their correct format and content.

C. Background:

As mandated by Title 10 USC, the Secretary of Defense and the CJCS are pivotal in translating national security objectives into definitive planning guidance for the combatant commanders. The Service chiefs and their staffs are also involved in the process, both as contributors to the joint planning guidance and in deriving Service plans that provide trained and equipped forces to support that process. The combatant commanders are responsible for the actual development and production of the operation plans (OPLANs), but are dependent on support from the Services, other combatant commanders, and the combat support agencies during the planning and execution process.

JOPES provides the overall framework for the military planning process—both the five-phase deliberate planning process (DPP) and the six-phase crisis action planning (CAP) process. Prior to JOPES, there existed the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) and the Joint Deployment System (JDS). The need for JOPES stemmed from the recognition, based on actual crisis situations, that JOPS and JDS focused primarily on deployment and did not adequately support employment activities. JOPES was therefore developed to give senior level decision-makers the tools to monitor, analyze, and control events during both planning and execution of joint operations.

The JSCP is the vehicle by which the CJCS initiates the deliberate planning cycle. It includes regional objectives and planning assumptions; it specifies the type of plan for each task; and it apportions major combat and strategic lift forces to the combatant commanders for their planning. The JSCP also provides the combatant commanders with a framework for the scope of their plans, plan formats, and the amount of detailed planning that is required. Deliberate planning is a complex and lengthy process, particularly when the combatant commanders are required to develop Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD).

The six phases of CAP may have to be executed almost instantaneously, and plans may have to be altered substantially once forces are ashore in the crisis area or when strategic objectives change. In certain crises, the phases may be compressed, entirely eliminated, or conducted concurrently. Moreover, the process could terminate during any of the phases should the crisis subside before the execution phase is reached. The 1983 Grenada operation, URGENT FURY, the 1989 Panama operation, JUST CAUSE,

and the 1990 Southwest Asia crisis, DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, stand as examples of such dynamic situations, as well as the latest operations in Kosovo, ALLIED FORCE, Afghanistan, ENDURING FREEDOM, and Iraq, IRAQI FREEDOM.

The current SecDef Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) and the JSCP are both based on the assumption that there is utility in developing deliberate plans that may guide the President's response to a crises. If that assumption is true, we must understand how deliberate plans can be used to guide or expedite crisis action planning and execution, and which agencies are responsible for specific portions of the planning process.

Point of contact for this session is Professor P. C. Sweeney, C-424.

D. Questions:

What is the basis for the planning tasks assigned in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan?

Why has the CJCS developed the concept of adaptive planning, and how does a combatant commander incorporate that concept into deliberate plans? How does a combatant commander address the issue of deterrence?

How are limited resources and forces matched to planning requirements necessary to support the national security strategy and objectives?

Does the JSCP address only combat forces?

How is strategic lift considered during deliberate planning?

Does the combatant commander need a tasking from the CJCS to initiate deliberate planning?

How does the combatant commander provide guidance to his staff and component commanders?

What types of plans are developed during the deliberate planning process? During CAP?

To what extent are deliberate plans really only deployment plans?

How does the combatant commander express how forces are to be employed?

To what extent is CAP sufficiently flexible for "evolving" crises? What happens when major changes occur?

How effective do you think CAP will be in meeting the challenges of the future?

Have recent U.S. military operations validated the hoped-for correlation between deliberate and crisis action planning? If so, what portions of the deliberate plan will normally need to be modified in times of crisis?

What is the "standard five-paragraph format" for plans and orders? What are the key items in each paragraph, and what are some of the "optional" parts of the directive not contained in the five paragraphs?

What is the purpose of annexes, and how are they used in directives?

What are the intended actions of, approval level requirement for, and releasing activity for: Warning, Planning, Alert, Deployment, and Execute Orders?

E. Required Readings:

"Instructional JSCP, FY 02," Joint Chiefs of Staff, 15 December 2002. (**NWC 2-03**) (**SECRET/NOFORN**), (Classified Issued) (This will be issued in class).

Joint Pub 5-00.1, ***Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning***, Washington, D.C.: 25 January, 2002. Read III-1 through IV-24 on Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning. Review Appendix C on the Theater Campaign Plan Format. (Issued).

Plans and Orders, Sept. 02. (Review). (**NWC 2159A**), (Issued).

Sample Planning Documents, August 2001. (Scan). (**NWC 2110A**), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

User's Guide for JOPES (Joint Operation Planning and Execution System), Washington, D.C.: 1 May 1995. 1–20. (JEL. CD-ROM, June 2003). (**NWC 2089**), (Issued).

CJCSM 3122.01 ***Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)***, Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures, 14 July 2000, w/CH-1, May 2001. (Seminar Reserve).

CJCSM 3122.03A, ***Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume II, Planning Formats and Guidance***, 31 December 1999, CH-1, 6 September 2000. (Seminar Reserve).

JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM (JOPES) PART 2 (Seminar)

A robust plan flows best from "plurality of perspective and the resulting competition of ideas. . . . The process may be somewhat untidy, but it is distinctly American. It works."

—Admiral J. D. Watkins, The Maritime Strategy

A. Focus:

This lesson focuses on the implementation of national strategy at the regional combatant commander level. The first step of the process comes to the combatant commander as guidance from the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Military Strategy (NMS), and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). Based on this guidance, the combatant commander develops his theater strategy by means of a strategic estimate. The combatant commander's theater strategy produces concepts to both shape the theater and respond to challenges. The final steps are constructing the Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) to shape the theater in peacetime and developing campaign plans to respond to regional threats. The JMO course has previously addressed the basic concepts associated with national strategy, campaigns, the TSCP, and operational art. This session will more closely examine the interrelationship between those concepts and their effect on the geographic combatant commander's theater planning.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend current joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among national objectives and means available through the framework provided by joint planning processes.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the effect of time, coordination, policy changes, and political development on the planning process.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how the U.S. military is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for joint, interagency, and multinational operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how the defense planning systems affect joint operational planning.
- Understand how a combatant commander uses the Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) to synchronize and unify employment of the military, diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power to assist in formulating national security direction and a strategic end state.
- Analyze fundamental challenges, considerations, and design elements of Theater Security Cooperation Planning, including integration of unified, joint, and multinational forces, and non-DoD agencies, into the Theater Security Cooperation Plan.

C. Background:

Theater strategy is the development of integrated strategic concepts and courses of action to accomplish national and multinational objectives within a theater across a wide range of military operations. The key process in developing a theater strategy and the subsequent campaign plan is the theater commander's estimate of the situation. The guidance provided in the NSS, NMS, and JSCP form the basis for the theater commander's strategy.

Today's regional combatant commander has a unique perspective on the current and projected security environment within his theater. His charge is to identify U.S. political and economic, as well as military interests in the theater. He must focus on identifying opportunities for shaping the environment in ways favorable to U.S. interests. The TSCP can be described as the "peacetime campaign plan," by which combatant commanders translate national strategy into strategic and operational concepts for their individual AORs.

The point of contact for this session is Professor P. C. Sweeney, C-424.

D. Questions:

What are the fundamental responsibilities of the theater commander to provide for strategic direction, unified action, and operational focus?

What is theater strategy, and how is it related to campaign planning?

Will the TSCP gain and maintain viability as a useful planning document?

How does the combatant commander ensure non-DoD agencies comply with CJCS's direction to integrate all theater activities into a single TSCP?

E. Required Readings:

Clancy, Tom. ***Battle Ready***. New York: G. P. Putnam, 2004. Read 310–26. (**NWC 2042**), (Issued).

Chapter 4, Theater Security Cooperation Planning***, The Joint Forces Operational Warfighting SMARTBOOK***, The Lightning Press, 4-43 through 4-50. (Issued).

Security Cooperation Guidance, April 2003. (**SECRET/NOFORN**), (**NWC 4-03**).

Note: This classified reading must be signed out from textbook issue in the basement of Conolly Hall. Read 1-7, 20-3.

USPACOM Theater Security Cooperation Strategic Concept. (**SECRET/NOFORN**), (**NWC 5-03**).

Note: This will be distributed and reviewed in the seminar room.

F. Supplementary Reading:

None.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS (Seminar)

A front from the south, one from the north, one from the west, one directly in the environment of Baghdad proper, and the fifth one was information operations.

—General Tommy Franks, on the OIF Battle Plan

A. Focus:

This session focuses on IO (Information Operations) support to the Joint Force Commander at the operational level of war. The 2003 Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) is used as the principal case study to elicit current capabilities and limitations of IO in support of a major U.S./coalition military operation. The primary goal is to derive insights and lessons learned with respect to IO systems, operational concepts, and organizations. IO and ISR are inextricably linked, and so the student must keep the previous ISR session (OPS II-10) in mind as well.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Understand how command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems apply at the tactical and operational levels of war and how they support a joint information operations (IO) strategy.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how IO is integrated in support of national and military strategies.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how IO is incorporated into both deliberate and crisis action planning processes at the operational and JTF levels.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how increased reliance on information technology throughout the range of military operations creates opportunities and vulnerabilities.
- Understand the capabilities and limitations of national and theater-level IO assets available to the joint force commander.

C. Background:

Information Operations is an organizational and doctrinal concept designed to achieve information superiority across the spectrum of conflict and at all levels of war. Information superiority, in turn, is absolutely essential to military success in both the physical and psychological domains. The doctrinal concept of IO encompasses the integrated employment of five core capabilities: electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC). Consequently, IO touches upon and is influenced by many elements of the military planning process; for an inexperienced staff, integrating IO into the overall plan can be especially challenging.

The 2003 U.S./Coalition operation in Iraq (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM) and its aftermath provides an excellent case study to highlight the capabilities and limitations of our current IO systems, concepts, and organizations. In particular, OIF saw the explicit (and successful) use of embedded media as just one component of a far-reaching information operations "perception management" strategy.

The purpose of this lesson is to explore the theoretical basis of IO, to comprehend IO capabilities and limitations, and to understand how IO is integrated into military planning at the operational level of war. The development of specific IO objectives and operational concepts to accomplish the IO mission will also be explored.

The point of contact for this session is Lieutenant Colonel D. T. Goldizen, USAF, Hall, C-407.

D. Questions:

What were IO objectives in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM?

What were IO measures of effectiveness (stated or implied)?

What principal IO assets were available to the operational commanders?

How did the IO strategy employed during Major Combat Operations (MCO) influence subsequent Stability and Support Operations (SASO)?

What lessons for future operations can be drawn from IO experiences in this case?

What do our experiences from this operation imply for our efforts to achieve Information Superiority?

E. Required Reading:

Information Operations: The Hard Reality of Soft Power (Joint Command Control & Information Warfare Staff at the Joint Forces Staff College), Extracts: Chapters 1 & 2 and Appendix C. (**NWC 3055**), (Issued).

Joint Vision 2020, "Information Superiority," 8–10; "Information Operations," 28–30. (Issued).

JMO Department, ***ISR and Information Operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom***, 2003. (**NWC 1-05**), (**SECRET/NOFORN**). NOTE: No additional reading required; this reference was used in OPS II-10 and will be referred to during this seminar.

Network Centric Warfare, Winter 2003 (Director, Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense). (**NWC 2043**), (Issued).

Chisholm, Donald. "The Risk of Optimism in the Conduct of War," ***Parameters*** 33, no. 4 (Winter 2003): 114–131. (**NWC 2045**), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Peters, Ralph. "In Praise of Attrition," ***Parameters***, 34, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 24–32, http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/04summer/peters.htm.

Berkowitz, Bruce. "An Afghan Hard Drive," in ***The New Face of War,*** 2003. (**NWC 3056**), (Seminar Reserve).

Joint Pub 3-13, ***Joint Doctrine for Information Operations,*** 9 Oct 1998. (Joint Electronic Library), (Issued). (JEL CD-ROM, June 2003).

Joint Information Operations Planning Handbook, July 2003 (Joint Command Control & Information Warfare Staff at the Joint Forces Staff College), Chapters I–IV. (Seminar Reserve).

THE COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION (CES) (Exercise)

The one who is to draw up a plan of operations must possess a minute knowledge of the power of his adversary and of the help the latter may expect from his allies. He must compare the forces of the enemy with his own numbers and those of his allies so that he can judge which kind of war he is able to lead or to undertake.

—Frederick the Great, Letter 1748

A. Focus:

The weeklong sessions will introduce you to one of the most critical aspects of the planning process and the framework and steps involved in making a decision by selecting a Course of Action (COA). We will use the Navy's Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) as a model for military decision making. The CES Workbook will be used as an instructional tool and a guide as we apply these concepts to a scenario based on warfare in a littoral region. The exercise will use a scenario in Borneo to develop a CES, and then deliver a COA decision brief. Following this, the seminar will use the selected COA to further develop a synchronization matrix and discuss its utility in developing an OPORD. While this exercise will highlight activities at all three levels of war, it will focus on the operational planning aspects and is not intended to progress into the execution phase. Additionally, we will review several other planning frameworks to provide insight and exposure to other systems in the art of decision making.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces.
- **PJE**—Explain the organizational framework within which joint forces are employed.
- **PJE**—Summarize how joint force command relationships and directive authority for logistics support joint warfighting capabilities.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how the U.S. military is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for joint, interagency, and multinational operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend current joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Formulate and defend solutions to operational problems using current joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations of employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Explain how theory and principles of war apply at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Develop an ability to plan for employment of joint forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.

- **PJE**—Through the framework provided by joint planning processes, explain the relationship between national objectives and means availability.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the effect of time, coordination, policy changes, and political development on the planning process.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how national, joint, and Service intelligence organizations support JFCs.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the fundamentals of campaign planning.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how IO is incorporated into both the deliberate and crisis action planning processes at the operational and JTF levels.
- Apply Operational Law in operational planning.
- Synthesize operational art at the joint task force level.

C. Background:

Block II began by introducing the capabilities and limitations of the various Services and several key operational issues critical to the planning process. The Commander's Estimate of the Situation applies and synthesizes these, along with doctrine and theory from Block I, for making a sound military decision.

For most of the twentieth century, and during all of its major wars, the United States military used the CES to think through real and potential military situations and the myriad of influencing factors in order to arrive at decisions. In 1909, the U.S. Army adopted the Estimate of the Situation from the German General Staff; the U.S. Navy followed a year later.

As you will find out, there is a wide range of CES experience in your seminar, ranging from none to sophisticated use on joint staffs. There are also differences in Service perspectives in the planning framework as well as ideas from outside the military. The ***main purpose*** of the CES, and any planning framework, is to provide a logical sequence of actions in analyzing a military problem and reaching a decision.

Military commanders must continually make decisions, often under unfavorable conditions. The opponent's independent will and actions can considerably affect the execution of one's own plans and actions. Moreover, the physical environment, climate, and weather can significantly interfere with the commander's accomplishment of the assigned mission. The CES is designed to ensure that no matter of importance is omitted by the commander.

These sessions focus on describing the CES planning process using the workbook and readings, and then synthesizing the knowledge through the Borneo (PACIFIC TEAK) Crisis Planning Exercise. The seminar will act as members of a Joint Task Force (JTF). This exercise focuses on the planning aspects of how to use forces during a crisis that develops in a littoral region. The group will develop a CES based on the intelligence assessment and information provided in the readings.

JTF organization will be introduced as a precursor to the Block IV Joint Maritime Exercise, when the entire class will form a JTF. Previous sessions have touched on the Information Operations Cell and the Rules of Engagement Cell. JTFs use permanent or ad hoc organizations called groups, boards, centers, and cells to facilitate the Crisis

Action Planning (CAP) process by promoting cross-staff integration. These include the Joint Planning Group (JPG), Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB), Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) and Joint Fires Element (JFE). Also discussed is the concept of Battle Rhythm—the way a JTF manages time.

An operational planner will be more effective if he or she has a good understanding of the different capabilities, limitations, and doctrines that each Service brings to the joint force. This effectiveness will be increased if the planner has a comprehensive understanding of the critical factors that affect the use of these forces at the operational and tactical levels. The seminar will discuss operational law issues relevant to the situation. The seminar will also have an opportunity to discuss other planning frameworks. By now you should recognize Operational Art and the Five Questions as a foundation to military success.

The first step in the CES is the **Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB) and Mission Analysis (MA)**. The JIPB will be used to define the battlespace's environment; describe the battlespace's effects in terms of time, space, and force; evaluate the threat; and determine enemy COAs. The MA is the single most important element of the CES. It results in a proposed, restated mission statement and the commander's issuance of his planning guidance. The mission should be constantly reviewed throughout the entire estimate process. The mission is contained in paragraph 1 of the CES and comprises paragraph 2 of the basic plan or OPORD.

The second step is to **develop friendly COAs** which should include all options available to defeat enemy COG and accomplish the assigned mission. These COAs will be developed through an analysis of relative combat power, the task organization of forces, and the development of a scheme of operation. A key portion of this step is to ensure each COA is suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete. A prepared statement and sketch will be used later to analyze and compare the COAs. The scheme of the operation will be expanded into the concept of the operation (CONOPS) if/when the COA is selected (during the Decision) and comprises paragraph 3 of the basic plan or OPORD.

The third step is to **analyze the courses of action**. The staff will select a war game method and technique to record and display the results. The staff will list all available forces, assumptions, known critical events and decision points, and significant factors and then war game each COA to assess the results against the enemy's most likely and most dangerous COAs at a minimum.

The fourth step is to **compare the courses of action** with each other to help form the basis for the decision. The staff will consider advantages and disadvantages, identify actions to overcome disadvantages, make final tests for feasibility and acceptability, weigh relative merits of the COAs, and select one COA that offers the greatest chance of accomplishing the mission. To facilitate comparison between the retained COAs, the staff considers each COA in terms of the governing factors selected by the commander in his guidance.

The fifth step is the **decision**. In this step, the staff presents a decision brief to the commander, who selects a COA to execute. The decision is based on both an objective review of the results of the tabulations and calculations of the outcome of each step in the process, as well as upon subjective analysis. The commander must rely heavily on his professional judgment in making a sound decision.

Based on the commander's decision and final guidance, the staff now refines the COA and completes the plan and prepares to issue the order. The staff turns the selected COA into a clear, concise concept of operations and often completes a **joint synchronization matrix**. The joint synchronization matrix is a staff decision and planning aid that graphically reflects the joint execution of an operation over a specific time period.

The final step is the **transition**. In this step of planning, we will discuss the orderly turnover of the plan or order to the organization charged with execution. Included here is a review of transition drills and rehearsals.

The point of contact for this session is Professor A. A. Bergstrom, C-409.

D. Questions:

What is the common thread seen throughout the CES?

What are some influences on the superior's mission that you will have to judge?

What are the shortcuts and pitfalls in planning and decision making?

What are the strengths and weaknesses of the various planning frameworks?

What is the overall situation that the Joint Force Commander (JFC) is facing? What is the purpose of the mission that the JFC has been assigned? What tasks must be performed to accomplish the mission? What are the limitations on the mission?

What are the considerations for command and control of the assigned forces? Where will the CJTF be located? How will the JTF be organized?

What are the enemy capabilities and courses of action that the JFC might confront?

What are the potential courses of action that the JCF can select?

Is the recommended course of action suitable (accomplishes the mission), feasible (accomplishes the mission with the assets available), and acceptable (accomplishes the mission with the estimated cost)?

What details must be provided in an OPORD in order for the forces to accomplish their mission?

Are actions of all participants synchronized towards this end? Will the proposed military condition lead to achievement of the political objective?

E. Required Readings:

U.S. Naval War College, ***A Borneo Case Study for Expeditionary Warfare***, August 2002. (**NWC 2095B**), (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College, ***Commander's Estimate of the Situation: Workbook for In-Class Work and War Gaming***, Sep 2004. (**NWC 4111G**), (Issued).

Joint Pub 2-01.3, ***Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace,*** 24 May 2000, Chapters I through III and Appendix A. (Issued).

Joint Forces Command, ***JTF Chief of Staff Handbook***, 6 August 2002, 33–36. (**NWC 3041**), (Issued).

Joint Pub 5-00.2, ***Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures,*** 13 January 1999***,*** IX-6 through IX-14, VII-4 through VII-8, and VIII-15 through VIII-16. (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College, ***Plans and Orders***, September 2002. (**NWC 2159A**), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Naval Warfare Publication 5-01, Rev. A, ***Naval Operational Planning***, May 1998. (Seminar Reserve).

Forces/Capabilities Handbook. (**NWC 3153I**), (Issued).

CJCSM 3122.01, ***Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, VOL I (Planning Policies and Procedures),*** CH-1, 25 May 2001. (Seminar Reserve).

CJCSM 3122.03A, ***Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, VOL II (Planning Formats and Guidance),*** CH-1, 6 September 2000. (Seminar Reserve).

CJCSM 3500.05A, ***Joint Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide,*** 1 Sep 2003.

GRADED PRACTICAL EXERCISE

A. Focus:

This written requirement will measure a student's ability to transform the concept of operations into an executable directive.

B. Objectives:

- Demonstrate the ability to leverage planning products produced in a joint planning group.
- Using JOPES formats, demonstrate the ability provide clear written instructions to subordinate commands that accurately reflect an approved concept of operations.

C. Background:

The graded practical exercise will follow the seminar's completion of the Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) (OPS II-14) exercise. Each member of the seminar will be required to transform his/her approved concept of operations (CONOPS) into paragraph 3, Execution, of an Operations Order (OPORD).

Procedurally, the guidance for the graded practical exercise will be administered as follows: The seminar moderators will distribute detailed instructions for the requirement after the final CES session on **24 January**. Each student will then work alone and will develop a paragraph 3, Execution, for his/her seminar approved CONOPS that will be due to their seminar moderators no later than **1200 on 25 January**.

The basis for evaluation of the examination will be:

1. Clear and concise articulation of the seminar's CONOPS and the requisite tasks to subordinate commands.
2. Correct application of the JOPES format for an OPORD.

Point of contact for this session is Professor P.C. Sweeney, C-424.

D. References: In addition to seminar products created during OPS II-14 CES, the following references may prove useful while completing the graded requirement:

CJCSM 3122.03A, ***Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume II, Planning Formats and Guidance,*** 31 December 1999, CH-1, 6 September 2000 (Seminar Reserve—also found on the JMO share drive)

Plans and Orders, Sept. 02 (**NWC 2159A**).

Sample Planning Documents, August 2001 (**NWC 2110A**).

BLOCK III
CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTS

INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTS

A. Focus:

Successfully prosecuting modern campaigns requires more than technical competence in the military domain, effective operational concepts, and finely honed planning skills. Military officers must also contend with a range of issues beyond the military aspects of national power. Exploring the entire spectrum of conflict, Block III addresses the range of topics necessary for understanding and meeting today's national security challenges, including historical cases covering failed and failing states, sessions concerning military operations other than war, the interagency process, nongovernmental and international organizations, contractors, insurgency, terrorism, homeland security and defense, conflict termination, and post-conflict operations. This block concludes with a synthesis event in which students use the interagency process to coordinate and apply resources in order to transition from combat to post-hostilities operations. Upon completing these sessions, students should be comfortable in translating strategic goals into feasible military objectives for operations across the spectrum of conflict.

B. Guidance:

The Military Services have historically focused on training and education at the high end of the range of military operations, while military officers have traditionally focused on mastering the application of combat power in conventional operations. This block of sessions provides the opportunity for students to sharpen different skill sets, develop a broader understanding of the complexity of military operations, and delve more deeply into some of the critical issues of the contemporary operating environment, including interagency coordination, homeland security and defense, and the political-military perspectives needed to achieve national objectives. The objective is to provide students with the tools, concepts, principles and doctrine required for accomplishing modern military tasks.

INTRODUCTION (Seminar)

We are going to see more crippled states and failed states that look like Somalia and Afghanistan—and are just as dangerous. And more and more U.S. military men and women are gong to be involved in vague, confusing military actions—heavily overlaid with political, humanitarian, and economic considerations. And representing the United States—the Big Guy with the most formidable presence in the area—they will have to deal with each messy situation and pull everything together. We're going to see more and more of that. My generation has not been well prepared for this future, because we resisted the idea. We even had an earlier Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who said, "Real men don't do MOOTW." That just about says it all.

—General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC Farewell Remarks at the U.S. Naval Institute, March 2000

A. Focus:

This introduction frames Block III's sessions within a broader issue-based approach to the full range of military operations. In so doing it considers six questions: (1) Where is the United States military likely to be conducting operations for the foreseeable future? (2) What sorts of operations will it be conducting there? (3) Who will it meet when it gets there? (4) With what other agencies will it work in conducting these operations? (5) What is the applicability of operational art to these operations? (6) How can the seams between these different types of operations be managed effectively? Block III's sessions address possible answers to these questions in detail.

Upon completion of Block III, students should be comfortable translating strategic objectives into feasible military objectives and operations separate from, preceding, or subsequent to more traditional, conventional military operations.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend how the U.S. military is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for joint, interagency, and multinational operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination, as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns, and major operations.
- **PJE**—Explain how theory and principles of war apply at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the fundamentals of campaign planning.
- Understand the principles of MOOTW and how they relate to the classic principles of war.
- Understand the application of operational art to MOOTW.

C. Background:

The Services have tended to focus on training and education at the high end of the operational continuum or range of military operations. Individual military officers have focused their careers on mastering the application of combat power for conventional warfare. However, whether called "Small Wars," "Unconventional Warfare," "Low Intensity Conflicts," "Military Operations Other than War," "Operations Other than War," "Peace Operations," "Post-Conflict Operations," or "Stability and Support

Operations," the full range of military operations have always been important and the principal focus of our efforts.

Operations ENDURING FREEDOM-AFGHANISTAN and IRAQI FREEDOM dramatically demonstrated the complexity of modern operations and the importance of effective transitions from combat to post-hostilities operations. Lessons from operations in Panama, Somalia, Haiti, and Kosovo have shown a variety of ways to terminate hostilities with leverage and transition smoothly towards the desired end state. Joint doctrine has increasingly addressed these critical seams over the past decade. At the same time, states will continue to fail, the U.S. military will continue to conduct humanitarian operations and assist other states in counter-insurgencies, while the rise of well-resourced, non-state trans-national actors, such as Al Qaeda requires careful attention to problems counter-terrorism across international boundaries. In these operations, the military will inevitably work with a broad array of non-military organizations, ranging from other U.S. government agencies to civilian contractors to non-governmental organizations, and in some operations will not be the lead agency. We also may be confident that some of these operations will take place in locations where few among us now anticipate U.S. involvement.

Block III is designed to better prepare officers for the rigors of operational warfighting across the entire range of operations by providing the tools, concepts, principles, and doctrine required for the tasks of the future. During these sessions, students will be required to translate the strategic national guidance of the President and the Secretary of Defense into a Theater Commander's strategic plan to terminate combat, transition to post-conflict operations, and set desired end state conditions.

The point of contact for this session is Professor D. W. Chisholm, C-422.

D. Questions:

What constitutes the full range of military operations?

How can the military work effectively with non-military agencies and organizations?

What is the connection between planning for conflict and planning for post-conflict operations? Why does it matter when you do this planning?

Who determines the terms and conditions for conflict termination?

What types of military capability are normally appropriate for post-conflict operations?

What military activities are necessary for stability operations and what activities broach into nation building?

Are the principles of MOOTW applicable to current operations in the war against terrorists?

E. Required Readings:

Barnett, Thomas P. M. "The Pentagon's New Map." ***Esquire*** (March 2003). (**NWC 3066**), (Issued), (Review).

Peters, Ralph. "The New Warrior Class." ***Parameters*** (Summer 1994): 16–26. (**NWC 3067**), (Issued).

Wheeler, J.R. "Is the Operational Art Applicable to Operations Other Than War?" Canadian Forces College, 1998. (**NWC 3071**), (Issued).

Zinni, Anthony. "Address by General Anthony Zinni, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)." Naval Institute Forum 2003, Arlington, Virginia, 4 September 2003. (**NWC 3078**), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Joint Pub 5-00.1, ***Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning***. Chs. 1–2. (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-07, ***Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than W***ar. Chs. 1–4. (Scan), (Issued).

FAILED STATES (Lecture and Seminar)

One of the principal lessons of September 11 is that failed states matter—for national security as well as for humanitarian reasons. If left to their own devices, such states can become sanctuaries for terrorist networks, organized crime and drug traffickers as well as posing grave humanitarian challenges and threats to regional stability.

—***Play to Win: Final Report of the Bi-partisan Commission on Post-conflict Reconstruction***. Association of the Army of the United States and Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2003

A. Focus:

This session focuses on the Failed State phenomenon and examines the degree to which the U.S. military may effectively address the problem. The session comprises two parts. The first half is a lecture on the general problems of failed states. In the second half, each seminar will produce a concept of operation for a complex contingency operation based on a case study.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the effect of time, coordination, policy changes, and political development on the planning process.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination, as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns, and major operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- Introduce the concept of Failed (or Failing) States.
- Analyze the pathology of the degeneration of states.
- Examine the effects of Failed States on U.S. national interests.

C. Background:

The modern "state," characterized by a permanent bureaucracy and a standing military force is a western European invention, generally considered to date to the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. At a minimum, states control their own borders, conduct external relations with other states, and provide internal security and stability. The effectiveness of the state compared with other forms of social organization, and the rise to dominance of European powers, coupled with their vast colonial empires, created the modern international system of states.

The modern phenomena of "weak," "failing," and "collapsed" states began with the post-World War II process of de-colonization. This process was temporarily stayed by the Cold War. Former colonies, typically lacking the political maturity and economic wherewithal to prosper as independent nation states, were kept viable as client states, as Washington and Moscow competed for their loyalty. With the Cold War's end and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, more new states arose, often driven by previously

suppressed ethnic and religious differences, adding to the number of governments whose future viability was and remains dubious.

The close of the twentieth century saw a growing number of states unable to survive as viable entities. The resulting deterioration of governance in these states gives rise to serious problems, ranging from economic collapse to genocide and other human rights abuses, hunger and starvation, population dislocation and migration, insurgency, international terrorist activity, and internal instability. These problems inevitably affect neighboring states, the region in general, and increasingly, have global effects.

In Block III we focus on the failed state phenomenon because it so often commands the involvement, willingly or unwillingly, of outside powers, especially the United States, in what have become known as "complex contingency operations." Our national leadership is regularly confronted by difficult policy decisions concerning U.S. ability to intervene, the appropriateness of intervention, and the options available for the application of military resources. The present U.S. National Security Strategy (2002) specifically addresses U.S. interest in failed states. Apparently simple problems (e.g., famine relief in Somalia) usually prove to be much more complex and dangerous than initial appraisals indicate. The assessment of U.S. options and seminar discussions of the military role in dealing with complex contingency operations are the goal of the session.

The point of contact for this session is Professor D. W. Chisholm, C-422.

D. Questions:

What are the characteristics of a state described as "failing" or "failed"?

What are the causes of state failure?

Are there common threads to state failure or is each unique?

If such states are outside our region, should the U.S. care?

What "danger signs" warn of impending failure?

Should United Nations-led intervention be the preferred option of choice?

What are the risks to the U.S. of acting unilaterally?

How can military resources be applied most effectively or ***can*** they be?

E. Required Readings:

Rice, Susan. "The New National Security Strategy: Focus on Failed States." Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, Policy Brief #116, February 2003. (**NWC 3074**), (Issued).

JMO Department. "Crisis in Sudan" (Case Study). Naval War College, 2004. (**NWC 3086**), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

State Failure Task Force. "Report: Phase III Findings." (September 2000). (**NWC 3079**), (Issued).

Ballard, John R. ***Upholding Democracy: The United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994–1997*** (excerpt). (**NWC 3084**), (Seminar Reserve).

Cohen, Stephen Philip. "The Nation and the State of Pakistan." ***The Washington Quarterly***, Summer 2002, 109–122.

Commission on Weak States and U.S. National Security. "On the Brink: Weak States and U.S. National Security." Center for Global Development, June 2004.

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MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (Seminar)

Like it or not, most of you will find yourselves in a place you never heard of, doing things you never wanted to do.

—General John Shalikashvili, CJCS (1993–1997), Addressing U.S. Troops, Spring 1994.

A. Focus:

This session introduces the array of military operations loosely described as Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). The types of MOOTW and problems inherent in the conduct of MOOTW are examined.

B. Objectives:

PJE—Comprehend the relationships among all elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) and the importance of interagency and multinational coordination in these elements, including homeland security and defense.

PJE—Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.

PJE—Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination, as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns, and major operations.

PJE—Comprehend the effect of time, coordination, policy changes, and political development on the planning process.

PJE—Comprehend the fundamentals of campaign planning.

C. Background:

Change is ever-present in military operations. The relative ease with which U.S. forces improvise, adapt, and overcome obstacles sets us apart from any other military. Our doctrinal characterization for the use of military assets, short of war, has also evolved in this changing world environment. Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) was originally termed "Low Intensity Conflict" (LIC), and was developed as part of the Air-Land Battle doctrine of the post–Viet Nam War era. As the Cold War began to wind down in the late 1980s, and military assets began to be employed in many atypical missions, the term LIC soon gave way to MOOTW. As the process continued to mature, and military forces continued to deploy on a myriad of non-conventional missions focused in the joint/interagency environment, MOOTW morphed into Operations Other Than War (OOTW). However, this term was not fully embraced, and MOOTW once again surfaced as the joint term of choice. Now in 2004, warfighters find themselves in a world that focuses on the benefit of not only joint, but also Combined/Multinational Operations. MOOTW, although still the current joint term, is being reviewed and reevaluated, and likely will be stricken from the joint pubs only to emerge as Stability and Support Operations (SASO). It is noteworthy to mention that as the Army aligned its "Operations" manual (FM3-0) with the joint doctrine numbering system, SASO has already been embedded in Army doctrine in anticipation of the Joint Pub 3-0 revision.

Current joint doctrine describes MOOTW as a "***wide range of activities where the military instrument of national power is used for purposes other than the large-scale operations***

usually associated with war." (Joint Pub 3-0, V-1). These activities include such actions as Combating Terrorism; Counterdrug Operations; Humanitarian Assistance; Peace Operations; Noncombatant Evacuation Operations; Show of Force; Strikes and Raids; Support to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency; and Domestic Support Operations.

This session introduces the array of activities of MOOTW and examines the Principles of MOOTW in a joint operations environment. Additionally, the seminar will address the questions posed below. Subsequent Block III sessions will delve more deeply into the various types of MOOTW.

The point of contact for this session is COL S. G. Ciluffo, USA, C-411.

D. Questions:

Are MOOTW new missions for the U.S. Armed Forces?

The American view is to distinguish between War and all the other ways military assets could be employed. How useful is the distinction?

How do political objectives in MOOTW differ from those in "traditional" large-scale conflicts?

What effect do political objectives have on the selection of military objectives?

What is meant by a more fragile battlefield in the MOOTW environment?

Is there really a difference between the Principles of War and Principles of Military Operations Other Than War?

Is there a substantive difference in training for War and for MOOTW?

E. Required Readings:

Joint Pub 3-0, ***Doctrine for Joint Operations***, Chapter V and Glossary. (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-07, ***MOOTW***, Chapters I–IV and Glossary. (Issued; Joint Electronic Library, CD-ROM).

Fishel, John T., "Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, The GAP, and Things That Go Bump in the Night." ***Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement*** 4 (Winter 1995): 372–398. (**NWC 3077**), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Joint Pub 3-07.2, ***Antiterrorism***, Chapter I. Joint Pub 3-07.4, ***Joint Counterdrug Operations,*** Chapter I. (Seminar Reserve; Joint Electronic Library, CD-ROM).

Martin, David C. and John L. Walcott. ***Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of America's War Against Terrorism***. New York: Harper and Row, 1988. Chapter 10, "El Dorado Canyon."

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THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS (Lecture/Seminar)

Our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq highlight the need for a comprehensive strategy to achieve longer-term national goals and objectives. The United States must adopt an "active defense-in-depth" that merges joint force, interagency, international non-governmental organizations, and multinational capabilities in a synergistic manner.

—National Military Strategy of the United States, 2004

A "marriage of necessity and convenience" between two temperamental cultures (Defense and State) is slowly evolving; a relationship based on trust and respect; but with each still wary of the other. To achieve foreign policy goals both must clearly recognize, acknowledge, and respect the differences of the other. In the end this will dramatically reduce confusion, friction, and conflict while improving communication.

—National Defense University, "Defense Is from Mars, State Is from Venus," 2003

A. Focus:

Modern military operations require the appropriate application of all elements of national power. Operational commanders frequently state, however, that interagency coordination is one of their biggest challenges. With this thought in mind, students must understand the key principles associated with the interagency process (both in Washington and abroad) in order to enhance the prospects for success during joint operations. This session addresses joint doctrine for interagency coordination; the national, theater and operational interagency coordination processes; the basic roles and authorities vested in a U.S. Ambassador and country team; and the concepts associated with Security Assistance.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend current joint doctrine as it applies to interagency coordination.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how the U.S. military is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for joint, interagency, and multinational operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the purpose, roles, functions, and relationships of the President, National Security Council (NSC), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commanders, Joint Force Commanders (JFCs), and Combat Support Organizations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among all elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) and the importance of interagency and multinational coordination in these elements, including homeland security and defense.
- Comprehend the interagency coordination process at the National, Theater, and Operational levels.
- Understand the role of the U.S. Ambassador and the organization and functions of a Country Team in U.S. embassies abroad as they affect military planning.
- Comprehend how to coordinate U.S. military plans and actions effectively with other government agencies and non-governmental organizations.

C. Background:

Military commanders and their staffs must understand how national security policy is formulated through the strategic-level interagency process and how non-military government agencies contribute to the successful prosecution of modern joint operations. At the operational level, developing effective working relationships among affected U.S. Ambassadors, the combatant commander, joint or combined task force commanders, and their staffs hold the key to success. Clearly understanding these relationships will materially improve officers' ability to coordinate across the full spectrum of military operations.

At one level, when the military has the lead, other government organizations can provide resources and capabilities that the military requires but does not itself possess. For example, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) can provide a range of information relevant to both military and political success, either via the in-country Chief of Station, or the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) representative to the combatant commander, or (along with other members of the intelligence community) as part of a National Intelligence Support Team (NIST).

Moreover, the military will not be the lead agency across a range of important operations in which it will be involved. For example, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) in the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) acts as the lead federal agency for foreign disaster assistance. In some circumstances, the Department of State, in the person of the in-country ambassador (the President's direct representative), will be the lead agency, with military forces cast in a supporting role. Similarly, the Department of Homeland Security takes the lead in matters of homeland security, while Department of Defense through Northern Command has the lead for homeland defense.

At the same time, every government organization has its own distinct missions and roles, structures and procedures, resources, culture, and constituencies. Just as they must do for the other military services in the context of joint operations, operational commanders and their staffs must take these differences into account as they navigate their way through the interagency process.

Apart from civilian government resources, the commander also has military assets particularly well suited for accomplishing tasks across the spectrum of operations. For example, civil affairs units and SOF are useful both in their "traditional" roles and as liaison officers between the military and external agencies or other military forces. In the latter case, liaison officers have been effective in establishing and maintaining unity of effort in a multilateral environment. The civil-military operations center (CMOC) is a proven method of improving coordination during operations. At the combatant commander level, the Joint Interagency Coordinating Group (JIACG) has emerged as a tool for planning coordination.

The point of contact for this session is Professor D. W. Chisholm, C-422.

D. Questions:

What is meant by "interagency coordination" and why is it important?

How does the interagency process function in Washington? What do we mean by the term "lead agency"?

What is the mechanism for interagency management of complex contingency operations?

What are the responsibilities of the U.S. Ambassador and the country team for interagency coordination?

Why should the operational commander be concerned with interagency processes and non-DoD resources?

How may we organize best for successful interagency operations at the operational level?

E. Required Readings:

PDD-56, ***National Security Council White Paper on Managing Complex Contingency Operations***. (**NWC 3072**), (Issued). (Scan).

NSPD-1 "Organization of the National Security Council System" (March 2001). (**NWC 3089**), (Issued), (Scan).

Flournoy, Michele. "Outline of Remarks on 'Historical Lessons, Learned and Unlearned.'" SAIS "Nation Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq," Conference, 13 April 2004. (**NWC 3073**), (Issued).

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F. Supplementary Readings:

Ballard, John R. "Political Military Actions and Interagency Coordination." Lecture, CD-ROM, 7 May 2004. (**NWC 3124**), (Issued).

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Kelleher, Patrick N. “Crossing Boundaries: Interagency Cooperation and the Military.” ***Joint Force Quarterly*** (Autumn 2002): 104–110.

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Simmons, Barry K. “Executing Foreign Policy Through the Country Team Concept.” ***Air Force Law Review*** 37 (1994): 121–136.

Walsh, Mark R. and Michael J. Harwood. “Complex Emergencies: Under New Management.” ***Parameters*** (Winter 1998): 39–50.

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (Lecture and Seminar)

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) do not operate within the military or the government hierarchy or the chain of command. Therefore, the relationship between the armed forces and NGOs is best characterized as an association or partnership.

—U.S. Army FM 3-07

A humanitarian operation using military assets must retain its civilian nature and character. While military assets will remain under military control, the operation as a whole must remain under the overall authority and control of the responsible humanitarian organization. This does not [imply] any civilian control over military assets.

—United Nations. "The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies." March 2003.

A. Focus:

No combatant commander or joint task force commander can ignore the presence of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) and International organizations (IOs) in the contemporary battlespace. This session addresses the diverse types of NGOs and IOs, the challenges they pose for the joint commander in mission accomplishment, especially with respect to operational functions, and doctrinal and other practical solutions for meeting these challenges.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how the U.S. military is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for joint, interagency, and multinational operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among all elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military and economic) and the importance of interagency and multinational coordination in these elements, including homeland security and defense.
- Understand the diverse types of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) and International Organizations (IOs) and their effects on military planning and execution.
- Understand the challenges of working with NGOs and IOs at the operational level of war and solutions developed for those problems.
- Develop an ability to plan for employment of joint forces at the operational level of war.

C. Background:

OPS III-4 addressed the challenges of working effectively with other U.S. government organizations at the operational level of war. Modern operations also require a practical understanding of methods for developing unity of effort among the international and regional organizations (United Nations and regional bodies, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Organization of American States), along with the dozens

(sometimes hundreds) of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) that will almost inevitably be operating in the battlespace.

There has traditionally been a distinction between military and non-military domains, built upon principles of international humanitarian law that distinguish combatants from noncombatants. In recent years, however, the military has become increasingly involved in operations other than war, including relief to local populations. Simultaneously, the humanitarian community has faced increased operational challenges along with greater risks and threats for their workers in the field, which at times have compelled some to seek military support or protection. Thus, practical realities have necessitated various forms of civil-military coordination for humanitarian operations.

Typically focused on various dimensions of long-term development and/or near-term humanitarian relief, NGOs and IOs bring with them certain objectives, assets, and needs—and these are not necessarily congruent with those of the U.S. military. They will be present during complex humanitarian emergencies and peacekeeping operations. They will also be present during post-conflict phases of operations. The military does not control their presence in the battlespace nor can it command and control IOs and NGOs.

Moreover, NGOs and IOs constitute an extraordinarily diverse range of types and sizes of organizations. These organizations bring with them assets and needs, their own ways of doing business, and their own objectives. They often do not understand the military way of doing business; most prefer to go about their affairs independently of the military; some are actively hostile to the military; and, they are sometimes in competition with one another. Some will contract with local individuals or organizations to provide logistics support and/or armed security, others with external private security firms. Most of them, however, will want support in one form or another from the military. In some areas they may have long-standing experience; in other areas, they may never have operated before.

The presence of NGOs and IOs in the battlespace profoundly affects operational functions for the joint task force commander—especially operational security, force protection, and logistics. The military has doctrinally available mechanisms, such as the Civilian-Military Operations Center, which have been employed with varying success in operations ranging from Haiti to Afghanistan to Iraq.

The point of contact for this session is Professor D. W. Chisholm, C-422.

D. Required Readings:

Bishop, James K. "Combat Role Strains Relations Between America's Military and Its NGOs." ***Humanitarian Affairs Review*** (Summer 2003): 26-30. (**NWC 2048**), (Issued).

Byman, Daniel, Ian Lesser, Bruce Pirnie, Cheryl Benard, and Matthew Waxman. ***Strengthening the Partnership: Improving Military Coordination with Relief Agencies and Allies in Humanitarian Responses.*** Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2000. Chapter 4, "Military Tasks in Complex Contingencies;" Chapter 6, "Overview of the Relief Community;" Chapter 7, "Advantages to Better Coordination with the Relief Community;" Chapter 9, "Barriers to Improved Coordination with Relief Agencies." (**NWC 2049**), (Issued).

James, Eric. "Two Steps Back: Relearning the Humanitarian-Military Lessons Learned in Afghanistan and Iraq." ***Journal of Humanitarian Affairs*** (October 2003). http//:www.jha.ac/articles/a125.htm. (**NWC 2050**), (Issued).

United States Agency for International Development, Bureau for Humanitarian Response, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. ***Field Operations Guide*** (Version 3.0), VI-34 – 49 (No Date). (**NWC 2051**), (Issued), (Scan).

E. Supplementary Readings:

Davidson, Lisa Witzig, Margaret Daly Hayes, and James J. Landon. ***Humanitarian and Peace Operations: NGOs and the Military in the Interagency Process.*** Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1996.

Dearfield, Mark. "The CJTF and NGOs—One Team, One Mission?" Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1998. [CNW student paper].

Natsios, Andrew S. "Commander's Guidance: A Challenge of Complex Humanitarian Emergencies." ***Parameters*** (Summer 1996): 50-66.

United Nations. Inter-Agency Standing Committee. Reference Group on Contingency Planning and Preparedness. "Inter-Agency Contingency Planning Guidelines for Humanitarian Assistance." November 2001.

United Nations. Inter-Agency Standing Committee. "Civil-Military Relationships in Complex Emergencies." 28 June 2004.

United Nations. Standing Committee on Humanitarian Relief. "Position paper on Humanitarian-Military Relations in the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance." No Date.

United Nations. "The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies." March 2003.

United States Army. FM 3-07 (FM 100-20) ***Stability and Support Operations***. Appendix A, "Interagency Coordination."

CONTRACTORS IN THE BATTLESPACE (Seminar)

In all countries engaged in war, experience has sooner or later pointed out that contracts with private men of substance and understanding are necessary for the subsistence, covering, clothing, and moving of any Army.

—Robert Morris, Superintendent of Finance, 1781

The end of the Cold War left a huge vacuum and I identified a niche in the market.

—Eben Barlow, Founder of Executive Outcomes

A. Focus:

This session addresses the general problem of civilian contractors in the modern battlespace. In so doing it: (1) considers prevailing trends in the use of contractors and the underlying causes for those trends; (2) provides a general classification scheme for types of contractors; and, (3) addresses operational planning considerations in light of the impact of contractors on key operational functions.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how the U.S. military is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for joint, interagency, and multinational operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- Comprehend the types of contractors employed in the battlespace.
- Comprehend the strengths and weakness of employing contractors in the planning and execution of military operations.

C. Background:

Contractors in one form or another have almost always been present on the battlefield and at sea.

The United States, for example, issued "letters of marque" to privateers as late as the War of 1812. However, personal, private armed forces ultimately gave way over the centuries to state-monopolies on force. That trend has now turned in the other direction. Since the end of the Cold War, in particular, there has been a steady upward trend in so-called "private military forces" (no longer called mercenaries).

At the same time, support services, such as logistics and maintenance, have historically (by 1775 European armies had used a contract system for more than 150 years) and continue regularly to be supplied from the private sector. In the present period, we confront an unprecedented, bewildering mix of civilian contractors in the battlespace, whose numbers have increased dramatically, and who have in common only that they are civilians under contract to the military, to other government agencies, or to non-governmental organizations. They range from cooks and latrine cleaners to truck drivers to intelligence functionaries to interrogators to operational planners to armed security personnel, some of whom conduct combat operations. Put differently, contractors are

now employed for a wide array of core military functions as opposed to peripheral or support functions.

The United States is by no means the only nation that has increased its reliance on civilian contractors. Our most steadfast allies, such as Great Britain, have also embraced civilian contractors. Moreover, we may be confident that in the near future we will face foes advised by if not actually commanded by private military forces that hail from third-party states not directly involved in the conflict at hand. We need look no further than the Balkans conflict for evidence of this trend.

Why the steep upswing in the use of contractors? The causes include: (1) U.S. public policies since 1966 favoring outsourcing of public services to the private sector; (2) gradual development of relevant capabilities in the private sector; (3) legal or administrative limits on uniformed personnel, both overall and to be deployed to specific locations; (4) the All-Volunteer Military and the Total Force concepts; (5) availability of a pool of former professional military personnel in consequence of post-Cold War force drawdowns; (6) increased complexity of combat systems and support requirements (a greater tail to tooth ratio); (7) expansion of the size of the battlespace; and (8) an increase in the number and frequency of complex contingency operations whose effective execution requires capabilities not necessarily present in the military inventory.

To date, however, there is little service doctrine (Army doctrine, largely addressing logistics contractors) and less joint doctrine governing contractors. There has been relatively little written discourse about the problems associated with contractors in the battlespace by either serving officers or professional researchers. Most has dealt with contractors in traditional logistics and support roles. Nevertheless, no combatant commander or joint task force commander can hope to plan and execute operations effectively without including careful consideration of contractors in his area of operations, especially with respect to their consequences for key operational functions, including command and control, operational security, force protection, and logistics. The presence of contractors in an area of operations also raises complex and mostly not yet resolved legal issues concerning Status of Forces Agreements, Rules of Engagement, and the Law of Armed Conflict, not to mention problems of fiduciary responsibility.

The point of contact for this session is Professor D. W. Chisholm, C-422.

D. Questions:

In what ways do contractors alter the level of risk for the joint commander? Is the risk military, political, or both?

What can a joint commander do to mitigate the risks posed by contractors?

What is the responsibility of the joint commander for contractors in his area of operations (e.g., force protection)?

How do contractors affect the management of operational security?

How should the joint commander plan to deal with contractors to the enemy?

E. Required Readings:

Avant, Deborah. "Mercenaries." ***Foreign Policy*** (July–August 2004): 20–28. (**NWC 2054**), (Issued).

McCullough, James J., and Abram J. Pafford. "Contractors on the Battlefield: Emerging Issues for Contractor Support in Combat and Contingency Operations." West Group, June 2002. (**NWC 2055**), (Issued).

Shrader, Charles R. "Contractors on the Battlefield." Arlington, VA: AUSA Institute of Land Warfare, 1999. (**NWC 2056**), (Issued).

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Army, Department of, United States. ***FM 3-100.21 Contractors on the Battlefield.*** Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, January 2003.

Campbell, Duncan. "Marketing the New 'Dogs of War.'" Center for Public Integrity. 30 October 2002. www.publicintegrity.org/bow/report.aspx?aid=149.

Campbell, Gordon L. "Contractors on the Battlefield: The Ethics of Paying Civilians to Enter Harm's Way and Requiring Soldiers to Depend Upon Them." A Paper Presented to the Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics 2000, Springfield, Va., 27–28 January 2000.

Fortner, Joe A. "Institutionalizing Contractor Support on the Battlefield." ***Army Logistician*** 32 (July–August 2000): 12–15.

Fortner, Joe A. "Managing, Deploying, Sustaining, and Protecting Contractors on the Battlefield." ***Army Logistician*** 32 (September–October 2000): 3–7.

Garcia-Perez, Isolde K. "Contractors on the Battlefield in the 21st Century." ***Army Logistician.*** 31 (November–December 1999): 40–43.

Higgins, Peter J. "Civilian Augmentation of Joint Operations." ***Army Logistician*** 35 (January–February 2003): 14–15.

McPeak, Michael and Sanda N. Ellis. "Managing Contractors in Joint Operations: Filling the Gaps in Doctrine." ***Army Logistician*** 36 (March–Apri1 2004). www.almc.army.mil/alog.

Mattox, Philip M. and William A. Guinn. "Contingency Contracting in East Timor." ***Army Logistician*** 32 (July–August 2000): 30–34.

Orsini, Eric A. and Gary T. Bublitz. "Contractors on the Battlefield: Risks on the Road Ahead?" ***Army Logistician*** 31 (January–February 1999). www.almc.army.mil/alog.

Peterson, Laura. "Privatizing Combat, The New World Order." Center for Public Integrity, 28 October 2002. www.publicintegrity.org/bow/report.aspx?aid=148&sid=100.

Reeve, David W. "Managing Contractors in British Logistics Support." ***Army Logistician*** 33, No. 3 (May–June 2001). http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/MayJun01/MS639.htm.

Singer, P.W. ***Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry.*** Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003.

van Niekirk, Philip. "Making a Killing: The Business of War." Center for Public Integrity. 28 October 2002. www.publicintegrity.org/bow/report.aspx?aid=147.

Young, David B. “Planning: The Key to Contractors on the Battlefield.” ***Army Logistician*** 31 (May–June 1999).

Zamparelli, Steve J. “Contractors on the Battlefield: What Have We Signed Up for?” Maxwell, Ala.: Air War College, Air University: March 1999.

HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE (Seminar)

On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country. Americans have known wars—but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties of war—but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks—but never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day—and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack.

—President George W. Bush

Our job will be to preserve the Nation's security by defending the American people where they live and work, and support civilian authorities as needed. We will also prepare for the inevitability of uncertainty and surprise. This will be a team effort from start to finish—our servicemen and women are ready for the challenge.

—General Ralph "Ed" Eberhart, Commander,
U.S. Northern Command

A. Focus:

This session examines the complex topic of Homeland Security and Defense with a focus on the Department of Defense role in support of the President's National Strategy for Homeland Security. The DoD Armed Forces support the strategy through two distinct but interrelated mission areas—Homeland Defense (HD) and Civil Support (CS). DoD has the lead for homeland defense but will act in support of U.S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies, designated law enforcement activities and other civil support missions approved by the Secretary of Defense. Seminar discussions will focus on the challenges and various issues involved in this rapidly evolving area where the two major players, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) didn't even exist on 9/11/01. The session will also help the student appreciate the necessity of military and interagency cooperation, the tremendous complexity of defending a large democracy—with its open borders, and the synergy possible with a unified response.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among all elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) and the importance of interagency and multinational coordination in these elements, including homeland security and defense.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how the U.S. military is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for joint, interagency, and multinational operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Explain the purpose, roles, functions, and relationships of the President and Secretary of Defense, National Security Council (NSC), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, joint force commanders (JFCs), and Combat Support Organizations in homeland security.

- Understand U.S. national policy and general objectives with regard to Homeland Security and Homeland Defense.
- Comprehend the responsibilities of DoD, other government agencies and the combatant commanders in protecting the United States, its possessions, and bases against attack, threat of attack, or hostile incursion.

C. Background:

The attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 awakened many in the United States to the reality that their homeland was no longer as safe as they had once assumed. In the aftermath of these tragedies, the U.S. government reevaluated its homeland security posture and made significant organizational adjustments, including creation of a cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and creation of a combatant commander (NORTHCOM) with a geographic area of responsibility that for the first time included the continental United States.

With such sweeping changes to the Executive Branch (the most significant sine the National Security Act of 1947) and with potentially overlapping responsibilities, new organizational relationships needed to be developed. Although much progress has been made, that development continues as a work in progress. Even the definitions of homeland security and homeland defense engendered much debate and are not yet universally agreed upon. While cooperation among the various involved parties has been good from the start, much remains to be done at the operational level before the envisioned seamless effort of securing the homeland from overseas, to the borders, to the heartland by DoD, other federal, state and local agencies will be a reality.

The point of contact for this session is Captain I. T. Luke, USCG, SP-214.

D. Questions:

What agencies have responsibilities for the security of our homeland and who is/should be in charge overall? How will coordination occur? What are the command and control arrangements?

What role does DoD play in Homeland Security? In Homeland Defense? What is the dividing line between Homeland Security and Homeland Defense? Is that line a seam our enemies can exploit?

To what extent are there overlapping jurisdictional responsibilities, and how will these be deconflicted?

Does the newest UCP adequately address homeland security responsibilities? Are any changes needed?

E. Required Readings:

The White House, ***National Strategy for Homeland Security***, July 2002. (Issued). Read: vii–xiii (Executive Summary), 1–5 (Introduction), scan remainder.

Wilson, J. R. "A Single Game Plan." ***Armed Forces Journal*** (May 2004): 48–52. (**NWC 3025**), (Issued).

Lehrer, Eli. "The Homeland Security Bureaucracy." ***The Public Interest*** (Summer 2004): 71–85. (**NWC 3031**), (Issued).

Kennedy, Harold. "U.S. Northern Command Actively Enlisting Partners." ***National Defense 88, No. 607*** (June 2004): 42, 44–45. (**NWC 3037**), (Issued).

JMO Department. "Homeland Security—Civil Support. How DoD plugs into the Interagency C2 structure", September 2004. (**NWC 3065**), (Issued).

Unified Command Plan. Read page 3, para. 11.a., page. 7, para 16, pages 10–16, and Enclosure (1). 30 April 2002. (**NWC 2021B**), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Butler, Glen. "Noble Eagle is Not Your Average Operation." ***U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*** (August 2003): 48–51. (**NWC 4013**), (Issued).

Kennedy, Harold. "Pentagon Prepares for Defending U.S. Homeland." ***National Defense 88***, No. 607 (June 2004): 40–42. (**NWC 3034**), (Issued).

COMBATING TERRORISM (Seminar)

. . . long-term success demands the use of all elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland defense. If we favor one tool while neglecting others, we leave ourselves vulnerable and weaken our national effort . . .

—9/11 Commission Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton, 22 July 2004

A. Focus:

This session focuses on the interagency nature of any plan to combat global terrorism, the applicability of all the instruments of national power in dealing with it, and the role of the operational commander with respect to the challenges and complexities this presents in terms of planning.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among all elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) and the importance of interagency and multinational coordination in these elements, including homeland security and defense.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how the U.S. military is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for joint, interagency, and multinational operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination, as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns, and major operations.
- Understand the key characteristics of terrorism and how they may have changed.
- Understand U.S. national policy and general objectives with regard to combating terrorism.
- Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces in combating terrorism.
- Analyze joint operational art in regard to combating terrorism and, especially, its application via the joint task force.
- Comprehend the considerations for response to terrorist use of WMD against U.S. military forces, civilians, or allies.

C. Background:

While the State Department maintains overall responsibility for U.S. combating terrorism activities outside the United States, USSOCOM has the lead for planning and executing the DoD's contributions. With the "War on Terrorism" declared after September 11, 2001, all combatant commanders have found themselves directly involved in plans for combating terrorist groups. Further complicating the situation, if the President has previously authorized a covert action program to combat terrorism in a

particular area, and later calls on the military to become involved, the CIA may already be on the ground with significant programs and local ties that will need to be considered in any military plan. DoD Anti-Terrorist (AT) activities are integrated within regional combatant commands and the Services to counter terrorist threats to military installations, bases, facilities, equipment, and personnel.

The trend in terrorism over a period of years has been a movement from state-sponsored terrorist organizations to loose networks of international terrorists without state sponsorship. Extremist groups claiming legitimacy based on their versions of religious teachings have demonstrated the ability to mount sophisticated attacks against the United States and its allies. The long term goal of at least one of these groups, al-Qaeda, is the overthrow of a number of regimes in the Middle East and elsewhere, and the creation of religious-based states; they see U.S. power and influence as the main obstacles to achieving this goal. They clearly consider weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as desirable tools to achieving their ends.

Al-Qaeda appears to be adept at finding ways to provoke U.S. responses that are likely to alienate international public opinion. The challenge for the operational commander and his interagency partners is to figure out how to defeat this adversary while avoiding that trap. Meeting this challenge may translate into determining how best to use military forces in dealing with particular terrorist groups, or it may mean providing military support to other instruments of power, if those other instruments are likely to be more effective in helping create the desired end state. The principal purpose of this session is to increase student awareness of the problems facing the joint force commander in combating terrorism and to think through, using OpArt, how and when to use various types of military forces in dealing with this type of problem.

Point of contact for this session is Professor E. A. McIntyre, CIA, C-425.

D. Questions:

Is the U.S. national objective to defeat "terrorism" or to defeat the groups that choose to use it as a tactic? Why?

If one accepts the notion of a "new" type of terrorism, how would defining al-Qaeda as having a "catalytic" strategy influence how one might best take offensive action to defeat it? How might such a definition assist in determining how best to protect our own center of gravity from attacks by al-Qaeda?

Given that global terrorist groups are "non state actors" vice nation states, what special challenges would WMD attacks by such groups include? How could these be mitigated?

What are the regional combatant commanders' responsibilities for combating terrorism? What are some ways the combatant commander can plug into the interagency resources needed for an effective plan to combat terrorism?

What are some strengths and weaknesses of the use of military force in combating terrorism in general, and al-Qaeda (or any other global terrorist group) in particular?

How might one take advantage of the strengths and mitigate the weaknesses of using military force to combat terrorism? Provide examples to illustrate your points.

What other "instruments of power" are important in any campaign to combat terrorism? What are the strengths and weaknesses of each? Why do these other "instruments"

matter in practical terms to a combatant commander constructing a plan to combat terrorism in his theater?

E. Required Readings:

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, Washington, D.C., Feb. 2003. (Issued). Scan 1–10, Read 11–28.

Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Against the United States, Chapter 2, "The Foundation of the New Terrorism," GPO, Washington, D.C., July 2004, 47–70. (Issued).

Conetta, Carl. "Dislocating Alcyoneus: How to Combat al-Qaeda and the New Terrorism," ***Commonwealth Institute Project on Defense Alternatives,*** Briefing Memo #23, 17 June 2002. (**NWC 3011**), (Issued).

Biddle, Stephen. "War Aims and War Termination," The U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, Defeating Terrorism: Strategic Issue Analysis. (**NWC 3030**), (Issued).

George, Roger Z. and Kline, Robert D., editors, ***Intelligence and the National Security Strategist*** Chapter 39, Andrew Koch. "U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Forces: Covert Warriors," 509–515. (Issued).

Staff Statements No. 5, 6, and 7 for the Public Hearings of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Against the United States, "Diplomacy," "The Military," "Intelligence Policy," March 23–24, 2004. (**NWC 2060**), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003. Department of State. 22 June 2004 (corrected version), http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/c12153.htm, sections A, B, I, J, K, O.

Joint Pub 3-07.2, ***Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism,*** Chapter I-III. (Joint Electronic Library), (CD-ROM, June 2003), (Seminar Reserve).

Joint Pub 3-40, ***Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction,*** Chapter I. (Joint Electronic Library or http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_40.pdf), (8 July 2004).

Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Against the United States, Chapter 3, "Counterterrorism Evolves," "What to Do? A Global Strategy," GPO, Washington, D.C., July 2004, 71–107, 361–382. (Issued).

ELEMENTS OF INSURGENCY (Lecture and Seminar)

There are no easy shortcuts to solving the problems of revolutionary war.

—Bernard Fall, "The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency." (1965)

Today the United States actually confronts transnational, theologially based, radical Islamic insurgent movements, rendering the so-called Global War on Terrorism a misnomer. In Afghanistan and Iraq these insurgents are working with local insurgents that comprise elements of the deposed Taliban and Ba'athist regimes, respectively, and other internal groups as well. The insurgents' objectives are quite similar to those of their ancestors. Simply stated, they desire to overthrow regimes they consider illegitimate, seizing power for themselves, and to evict any vestige of foreign influence associated with the existing order.

—Andrew Krepinevich, "The War in Iraq: The Nature of Insurgency Warfare." (June 2004)

A. Focus:

This session examines the Elements of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency (CI), a specific type of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). It begins with a comparative analysis of insurgency, then focuses more closely on the U.S. supporting role in El Salvador (Lecture). From those lessons learned the discussion will shift to more current examples of insurgency, exploring root causes and the effects globalization is having on the modern-day insurgent. The seminar will examine the El Salvador case using elements of operational art and Principles of War/MOOTW, and then apply those tools to analyze the current situation in Iraq.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend how national policy is turned into executable military strategies.
- **PJE**—Analyze how time, coordination, policy, politics, doctrine, and elements of national power affect the planning process.
- Apply campaign-planning techniques to a situation involving political, economic, informational and military issues.
- Demonstrate an understanding of how CI doctrine and practice operated in El Salvador and the soundness of projecting that experience into future insurgency situations.
- Assess the price paid for the failure of military planners to practice regressive planning and to deal with the challenges of what happens after the cessation of conflict.

C. Background:

In many ways it is easier for the American military to conduct conventional war than conflict at the lower end of the spectrum. The application of conventional forces in the counterinsurgency (CI) arena is relatively rare, and sometimes less than fully effective. Of the various types of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), counterinsurgency is likely to be among the most challenging, often the most misunderstood, and the least likely to respond to the application of conventional military force. Assuming insurgencies will continue, students must comprehend how to operate in such a murky warfighting environment, where often there is no single solution,

rather, only a few examples of previously successful counter-insurgency campaigns to serve as a guide.

Despite similarities to other crises, ***every insurgency has unique properties.*** In conducting their analyses, students should keep in mind that the military should never design counterinsurgency campaigns in a vacuum. Nations vary greatly, especially those in the "Third World." Each requires a unique application of the elements of national power (especially the military). More often than not, the Department of Defense will not be the leading player in MOOTW. Advice from a military officer on the role that the United States may play in such operations must be compatible with broader U.S. national interests and policy objectives. This assumes that the applicable national strategy is clearly defined, which, in such low intensity conflicts, may not always be the case.

The point of contact for this session is COL S. G. Ciluffo, U.S. Army, C-411.

D. Questions:

What U.S. national interests were at stake in El Salvador?

How do the FMLN's organization, objectives and strategy compare with other models?

How did the Principles of MOOTW apply to the El Salvador case?

What made the campaign in El Salvador successful?

What lessons can be learned from El Salvador that might assist U.S. efforts in current operations?

What are the defining types and elements of Insurgency, and how is the U.S. likely to combat them now and in the future?

How is globalization impacting how insurgents view the battle space, employ their assets, and resource their cause?

What role, if any, does the interagency play in counterinsurgency operations, specifically in relation to the application of elements of national power and the development of a national strategy?

E. Required Readings:

Waghelstein, John. "El Salvador: Observations and Experiences in Counterinsurgency." Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1985. (**NWC 3014**), (Issued).

CIA. "Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency." (**NWC 2228**), (Issued).

DCI Report. "Analyzing Insurgency: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Goals, Capabilities, and Prospects." DCI Environmental and Societal Issues Center, 27 November 2000. (**NWC 3063**), (Issued).

Evans, Ernest. "El Salvador Lessons for Future U.S. Interventions." ***World Affairs*** (Summer 1997): 43–48. (**NWC 3004**), (Issued).

Hoffman, Bruce. "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq." RAND Corporation, Nation Security and Research Division, June 2004. (**NWC 3046**), (Issued).

Tomes, Robert R. "Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare," ***Parameters*** (Spring 2004): 16–28. (**NWC 3064**), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Boot, Max. ***The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power.*** New York: Basic Books, 2003.

Bundt, Thomas S. "An Unconventional War: The Philippine Insurrection, 1899." ***Military Review*** (May/June 2004): 9–10.

Calder, Bruce J. "Caudillos and ***Gavilleros*** versus the United States marines: Guerilla Insurgency during the Dominican Intervention, 1916–1924." ***Hispanic American Historical Review*** 58 (1978): 649–675.

Callwell, C.E. ***Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice.*** 3rd ed. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1996.

Cassidy, Robert M. "Back to the Straeet Without Joy: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam and Other Small Wars." ***Parameters*** (Summer 2004): 73–83.

Conetta, Carl. "Strange Victory: A Critical Appraisal of Operation Enduring Freedom and the Afghanistan War." Cambridge, MA: Commonwealth Institute, Project on Defense Alternatives, 2002.

Fall, Bernard B. "The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency." ***Naval War College Review*** (Winter 1998): 46-57.

Karl, Terry L. "El Salvador's Negotiated Revolution." ***Foreign Affairs*** 71 (Spring, 1992): 147–64.

Linn, Brian M. "Provincial Pacification in the Philippines, 1900–1901: The First District Department of Northern Luzon." ***Military Affairs*** 51 (April 1987): 62–66. (**NWC 2061**), (Issued).

Marine Corps, United States. ***Small Wars Manual***. With an Introduction by Ronald Schaffer. Manhattan, KS.: Sunflower University Press, [Originally Published 1940].

Marks, Thomas A. "Columbian Army Adaptation to FAC Insurgency." Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, January 2002.

Marks, Thomas A. "Insurgency in Nepal." Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, Army war College, December 2003.

Nagl, John A. ***Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife.*** Westport, Conn.: Praeger Press, 2002.

Tse-Tung, Mao. ***On Guerilla Warfare***. 2d ed. Samuel B. Griffiths, editor. Champaign, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 2000.

Waghelstein, John. "Ruminations of a Pachyderm or What I Learned in the Counter-Insurgency Business." ***Small Wars and Contingencies*** 5, No. 3 (Winter 1994): 360–78.

White, Jeffrey B. "Some Thoughts on Irregular Warfare." ***Studies in Intelligence*** 39, No. 5 (1996): 51–57.

CONFLICT TERMINATION (Seminar)

When the President decides to use force, the military mindset is to deploy, defeat the enemy, then rapidly exit, turning affairs over to diplomats. Intense interagency coordination generally occurs only at the beginning and end. The military's hasty exit breaks continuity and detracts from shaping the environment for winning the peace and securing the desired endstate. Military culture is often oriented on its own finish line at the expense of long-term national objectives.

—Major John R. Boule, II, USA, "Operational Planning and Conflcit Termination."
Joint Force Quarterly (Autumn/Winter 2001–2002)

A. Focus:

This session addresses the challenge of conflict termination at the interface between the diplomatic and military elements of power. Although few officers will be in a position to set the terms for termination of hostilities, history shows that the specific timing and the conditions established during planning for the termination of hostilities has had a major impact on the ability to achieve the desired end state. Consequently, it is important that students understand the complexity of conflict termination, appreciate the meaning of terminating conflict with leverage, and understand the impact of termination on all subsequent activities. Students should be comfortable translating strategic goals into feasible military objectives that precede or follow more traditional military activities.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the fundamentals of campaign planning.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination, as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns, and major operations.
- **PJE**—Apply solutions to operational problems using current joint doctrine.
- Understand conflict termination and its place in a campaign.

C. Background:

Past operations have clearly demonstrated the complexity of modern conflict termination and the importance of transitioning from combat to post-hostilities operations. Evolving joint doctrine has increasingly addressed this critical seam more during the past decade. Historical lessons from operations have shown various ways to terminate hostilities with leverage, transitioning smoothly toward the desired end state. During this session, students will examine a number of operational situations in order to better understand the issues of conflict termination. Students will then apply the lessons learned from past operations to current challenges in Iraq. At the end of this session, students should be able to translate national strategic guidance (from the President and the Secretary of Defense) into a plan to terminate combat, conduct post-conflict operations, and transition to desired end state conditions.

The point of contact for this session is CAPT S. D. Kornatz, USN, C-420.

D. Questions:

Who determines the terms and conditions for conflict termination?

What is the relationship between the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commander during conflict termination?

What does terminating conflict with leverage mean in modern operations?

How does the theater combatant commander translate the political objectives of a conflict into military conditions to be achieved as a product of a campaign?

E. Required Readings:

Ballard, John R. "Finishing the Job: A Historical Appreciation for Conflict Termination." (**NWC 4012**), (Issued).

Cordesman, Anthony**. "**Iraq and Conflict Termination: The Road to Guerrilla War?" Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 28 July 2003. (**NWC 4028**), (Issued)

Fondaw, Jeffrey E. "Conflict Termination—Considerations for the Operational Commander," U.S. Naval War College, 16 May 2001. (**NWC 4017**), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Bailey, Sydney Dawson. ***How Wars End: The United Nations and the Termination of Armed Conflict 1946–1964***. New York, Oxford University Press, 1982.

Berdal, Mats R. ***Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil Wars: Arms, Soldiers and the Termination of Armed Conflicts.*** New York, Oxford University Press, 1996. 88 p. (Adelphi Papers, no. 303)

Boulé, John R. "Operational Planning and Conflict Termination," ***Joint Force Quarterly***, (Autumn/Winter 2001-2002): 97–102.

Cimbala, Stephen J. ***Through a Glass Darkly: Looking at Conflict Prevention, Management, and Termination.*** Westport, Conn., Praeger, 2001.

Cimbala, Stephen J. and Sidney R. Waldman, eds. ***Controlling and Ending Conflict: Issues Before and After the Cold War***. New York: Greenwood Press, 1992.

Clarke, Bruce B.G. "End-State Planning: The Somalia Case." in Max G. Manwaring and William J. Olson, Editors. ***Managing Contemporary Conflict: Pillars of Success.*** Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996.

Grey, Colin S. "Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory," U.S. Army Institute for Strategic Studies, April, 2002.

Holbrooke, Richard. ***To End a War***. New York, Random House, 1998.

Kahn, Herman, et alia. ***War Termination Issues and Concepts; Final Report***. New York, Hudson Institute, 1968.

Phinney, Catherine. "Enhancing Conflict Termination Through Problem Solving***."*** ***Peacekeeping & International Relations*** 26 (January–February 1997): 15–17.

Reed, James W. "Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning." ***Parameters***, (Summer 1993): 41–52.

Rotermund, Manfred K. “The Fog of Peace: Finding the End-State of Hostilities,” U.S. Amy Institute for Strategic Studies, November, 1999.

Salem, Paul. ***Conflict Resolution in the Arab World: Selected Essays.*** Beirut, Lebanon: American University of Beirut, 1997.

Sorfleet, K. R. “Conflict Termination: Implications for Military Officers.” ***Defence Studies*** 1 (2001): 49–74.

POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS (Case Study – Panama)

As JUST CAUSE moved from initial combat to CMO, units became responsible for running major cities and towns. This follow-on mission for combat arms commanders required identifying what was important in terms of rebuilding a local infrastructure, reestablishing law and order, and dedicating resources to unfamiliar tasks. These unfamiliar tasks included food distribution and medical treatment of the local population, law enforcement, garbage collection, and traffic control.

—Stacy Hagemeister and Jenny Solon. ***Operation Just Cause: Lessons Learned*** (Bulletin No. 90-9). Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Center for Army Lessons Learned, U.S. Army Combined Arms Command. October, 1990.

The most important thing in all of this is causing the level of violence to go down so that governance can move forward.

—General John Abizaid, USA, CENTCOM,
referring to post-conflict operations in Iraq, 16 July 2003.

A. Focus:

In this session we focus on post-conflict (or post-hostilities) operations which follow the use of military force. Having considered the complexities of the interagency process, nongovernmental and international organizations, and contractors, and addressed the challenges of combating terrorism, we now examine the special challenges posed to the joint commander by what comes "after the shooting stops."

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the fundamentals of campaign planning.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among all elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) and the importance of interagency and multinational coordination in these elements, including homeland security and defense.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination, as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns, and major operations.
- **PJE**—Analyze a plan for employment of joint forces at the operational level of war.
- Assess the price paid for the failure of military planners to practice regressive planning and to deal with the challenges of what happens after cessation of conflict.

C. Background:

Many real world cases of MOOTW are supportive in character (disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, etc.). Others require the threat or actual use of coercive force (counterinsurgency, raids, NEOs, etc.). The problem of how to achieve U.S. objectives in an unclear and often undefined situation affects the response of the regional combatant commander and the JTF commander. The problem is especially thorny when the U.S.

must "go it alone." Moreover, the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff often act more than passive observers in these types of operations, and may, on occasion, be dominant players. Consequently, it is vital for the joint staff officer be aware of the dynamics at the national level that may affect the operational commander.

Although one might wish that another U.S. government agency (like State) would assume the role of "campaign planner" for that period ***following*** hostilities, the lead role has in the past—more often than not—initially fallen to the military. Joint doctrine, therefore, includes the basic elements of "post-conflict activities" and the essential planning involved for them. Not surprisingly, however, combatant commanders' planners have historically been inclined to emphasize planning for hostilities over the need to look at how stability is restored "when the shooting stops." Such was the case in Panama in 1989 and 1990. Much can be gained by examining what went right ***and*** what went wrong in this first post-Goldwater-Nichols use of military force.

In early 1989 President George H. W. Bush faced a dilemma in Panama. He had, during his victorious campaign for president, argued for a tough stand against General Manuel Noriega. Despite economic, political and diplomatic efforts, Noriega not only remained in control, but increasingly challenged U.S. policy in the region. By fall 1989, as General Colin Powell assumed the position of CJCS and a new commander took over U.S. Southern Command, with its headquarters still at Quarry Heights in Panama, the situation had reached the crisis stage. American lives and interests, the integrity of the Panama Canal, the quest of the Panamanian people for democracy, and the U.S. fight against illegal drug trafficking all were being threatened by the Noriega regime.

During this session, we will look briefly at the nature of the crisis and the planning that was done to resolve it. Attention will focus, however, on the way the United States dealt with post-conflict challenges in Panama. Analysis of these two phases, JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY, will offer opportunities to see historic "illustrations" of the "theory and doctrine" we have studied throughout the trimester: the Principles of War, the Principles of MOOTW, the challenges of interagency planning, and the selection of DoD assets during operational planning. Few examples of military planning in recent history better illustrate the crucial need for timely, thorough planning for what comes after the cessation of hostilities.

The point of contact for this session is CAPT S. D. Kornatz, USN, C-420.

D. Questions:

In defining the breadth of operational options at the regional combatant commander's disposal in MOOTW, which specific actions would best complement the economic and diplomatic FDOs being employed?

As a theater commander witnesses the progressive failure of economic and political measures being taken by the President to deter military conflict, to what extent can he and should he proceed with plans for dealing with the ultimate failure of deterrence?

In planning for post-conflict operations, what agencies are available to assist? To which can you turn for optimizing planning? From the vantage point of the operational commander, what are the "pros and cons" of interagency involvement?

When the "helm" is finally turned over to a non-DoD agency, how can ***military*** assets best be used to support interagency efforts in assisting a democratic government?

E. Required Reading:

Shultz, Richard H. Jr. "In the Aftermath of War: U.S. Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building in Panama Following Just Cause," Air University Press, 1993, 1–65. (**NWC 2175A**), (Issued).

Traub, James. "Making Sense of the Mission." ***New York Times Sunday Magazine*** (11 April 2004), 32–37, 55–56, 62-63. (**NWC 2172**), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Dobbins, James. "Nation-Building: The Inescapable Responsibility of the World's Only Superpower." Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2003.

Donnelly, Thomas, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker. ***"Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama.*** New York: Lexington Books, 1991, 20–35, 57–69, 70–87. (Seminar Reserve).

Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin. "Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States***" International Security*** 28 (Spring 2004): 5-43.

International Peace Academy. "The Future of UN State-Building: Strategic and Operational Challenges and the Legacy of Iraq." Policy Report, Pocantico Conference Center of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Tarrytown, New York, 14-16 November 2003.

Joint History Office (Cole, Ronald H.). ***Operation Just Cause—The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama—February 1988–January 1990.*** Washington D.C.: November 1995. (Seminar Reserve).

Joint Pub 3-07, ***MOOTW,*** Chapter IV. (Issued).

Siegel, Adam B. ""Observations from a Haitian Vacation.***" Journal of Low-Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement*** 8 (Autumn 1999): 102–136.

Terry, James P. "Law in Support of Policy in Panama," ***Naval War College Review*** 43 (Autumn 1990): 110–118.

Woodward, Bob. ***The Commanders.*** New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991, 82–196. (**NWC 3058**), (Seminar Reserve).

OPERATION *PACIFIC SHIELD* (Exercise)

Joint force commanders frequently state that interagency coordination is one of their biggest challenges.

—Joint Pub 3-08

A. Focus:

This exercise synthesizes and reinforces Block III's learning objectives by challenging the student to apply military planning logic in the preparation of an interagency Political-Military Implementation Plan (Pol-Mil Plan), in accordance with Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56) and National Security Presidential Directive 1 (NSPD-1). Military officers have in the past, are now, and will be called upon ever more frequently to employ the interagency process to prepare for and manage contingency situations. Students need to understand the military interface with other U.S. government organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations, and regional organizations that the Department of Defense will need to provide as a part of a broader U.S. government response to a complex contingency.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend how the U.S. military is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for joint, interagency, and multinational operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination, as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns, and major operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the fundamentals of campaign planning.
- Apply national strategic guidance in the process of planning for operations in an interagency environment.
- Demonstrate the ability to develop input to an interagency Pol-Mil Plan.
- Analyze the multinational and interagency challenges inherent in post-conflict operations.

C. Background:

This exercise follows from the Block II CES Exercise ***PACIFIC TEAK.*** A subsequent operation—***PACIFIC SHIELD***—is intended to resolve the multinational and interagency challenges following completion of the initial major military operation and to reach the U.S. desired end state.

Comprising an introductory session and two planning sessions, culminating with a student presentation of their seminar's draft Pol-Mil plan, this exercise constitutes the synthesis event for Block III.

Building from their seminar's recommended course of action developed during the Block II CES ***PACIFIC TEAK*** exercise, students will come to the first planning session

prepared to conduct an analysis of the current situation in the affected region and to prepare a draft DoD input to the PDD–56 Pol-Mil Plan for ***PACIFIC SHIELD*** in accordance with the session's required readings. In the second session, students will role play as PACOM planners tasked to draft the PACOM input to the interagency planning process. Students will consider how their plan interfaces with other U.S. agencies' planning, how other agencies affect DoD's role in the crisis, and the effects of non-governmental and international organizations in the area of operations. The objective is not to produce a polished Pol-Mil Plan, but to improve student abilities to analyze such situations and to familiarize them with the PDD-56/NSPD-1 interagency planning process.

The point of contact for this session is CAPT S. D. Kornatz, USN, C-420.

D. Required Readings:

JMO Department. Operation ***PACIFIC SHIELD*** Case Study. (**NWC 2173**), (Issued).

JMO Department. Operation ***PACIFIC TEAK*** Case Study. (**NWC 2095B**), (Issued).

NSPD-1, ***Organization of the National Security Council System*** (March 2001). (**NWC 3089**), (Issued).

PDD-56, ***National Security Council White Paper on Managing Complex Contingency Operations***. (**NWC 3072**), (Issued).

National Defense University. "Interagency Management of Complex Crisis Operations Handbook." January 2003. (**NWC 3088**), (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-08 Volumes I and II, ***Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations***. (Issued).

BLOCK FOUR
JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS EXERCISE

STANDING JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS (SJFHQ) (Lecture)

The SJFHQ is meant to fill in [the chain of command gap between senior national leaders/combatant commands and component tactical forces] on a day to day basis, and to serve as a core of experts to stand up joint task forces much more quickly in our joint warfighting chain of command.

—Brigadier General Marc Rogers, USAF

A. Focus:

This session considers the origins, conceptualization, and implementation of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ). The SJFHQ is intended to "provide each combatant commander with a trained and equipped standing, joint command and control element, knowledgeable in regional operations and characteristics, and organized to reduce the lag time involved in establishing a joint task force headquarters ready to rapidly and decisively conduct operations," all geographic combatant commanders are required to organize and establish a SJFHQ by FY 2005.

The SJFHQ session (lecture format) is designed to introduce an emerging concept prior to the end of the course JFC/JTF Exercise. Even though the SJFHQ concept will not be implemented during the exercise, the benefits of such a concept will become evident during game execution.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the organizational framework within which joint forces are employed.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how the U.S. military is organized to plan, execute, sustain and train for joint, interagency and multinational organizations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the factors and emerging concepts influencing joint doctrine.

C. Background:

A priority of Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), the SJFHQ has been under development for several years as an integral part of the ongoing transformation of U.S. military forces.

The SJFHQ is intended to provide each geographic combatant commander with an informed and in-place command and control capability, with the aim of reducing the "ad hoc" nature of the prototypical joint task force headquarters activation. By improving situational understanding of a crisis before the employment of military forces, the SJFHQ will give the combatant commanders an advantage in factor time.

By using collaborative planning tools, the SJFHQ is intended to develop a pre-crisis knowledge base of an adversary's systems and capabilities, which will form the foundation for the "operational net assessment." The SJFHQ is intended to support pre-crisis efforts of combatant commanders' planning directorates, facilitating improved planning and execution during crisis response.

The SJFHQ is organized functionally with four joint teams—plans, operations, information management, and information superiority—forming the core of a joint task force command structure. Combatant commanders may employ the SJFHQ to serve as

the core of a joint task force (JTF) headquarters, augment a component or other headquarters designated as a JTF, augment the combatant command headquarters or serve as its forward element when the combatant commander functions as the joint force commander.

The SJFHQ concept was tested in Milliennium Challenge 02, followed by several limited objective experiments. JFCOM is now in process of assisting the geographic combatant commanders in developing SJFHQs tailored to specific requirements and operating environments. All geographic combatant commanders are required to have in place an SJFHQ by FY 2005.

Point of contact for this session is CDR P. A. Povlock, USN, C-414.

D. Required Readings:

U.S. Naval War College, ***Understanding Joint Force Headquarters***, Newport, R.I.: (**NWC 5013**), Issued.

E. Supplementary Readings:

United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, ***Doctrinal Implications of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ),*** Pamphlet 3, 16 June 2003. JMO Exercise Website/Reference/Pamphlets/SJFHQ.

JFC/JTF HQ EXERCISE

The war with Japan had been re-enacted in the game rooms at the War College by so many people and in so many ways, that nothing that happened during the war was a surprise—absolutely nothing except the kamikaze tactics towards the end of the war.

—Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, 1960

A. Focus:

Block IV of the JMO curriculum consists of the JFC/JTF HQ Exercise. The purpose of the exercise is to synthesize and reinforce the JMO course material through practical application in a realistic staff environment. This is an educational, planning exercise, designed to provide students with an opportunity to apply the principles and concepts studied throughout the trimester. While the issues students confront in this exercise are real, the situations used to highlight these issues and the solutions students select are only hypothetical.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the organizational framework within which joint forces are employed.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how joint force command relationships and directive authority for logistics support joint warfighting capabilities.
- **PJE**—Comprehend current joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Apply solutions to operational problems using current joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Analyze a plan for employment of joint forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the effects of time, coordination, policy changes, and political development on the planning process.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how national, joint, and Service intelligence organizations support JFCs and their Service component commanders.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the fundamentals of campaign planning.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how information operations are integrated to support of national and military strategies.

- **PJE**—Comprehend how information operations are incorporated into both the deliberate and crisis action planning processes at the operational and JTF levels.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how increased reliance on information technology throughout the range of military operations creates opportunities and vulnerabilities.
- Introduce collaborative-distributive planning tools to support the military planning process at the operational level of war.

C. Background:

The JFC/JTF HQ Exercise will be conducted over two weeks, scheduled generally from 0830-1630 each day. The first introductory session will take place in student seminars. The objective of the introductory session is to introduce the exercise structure and set the stage with a "Road to War" presentation. Students must read the JMO Exercise Book **(NWC 5000A)**, and the IT Tools User Guide **(NWC 5012)** prior to the introductory session. Some additional research will be required by students to enhance their exercise roles once assignments have been made.

Following the introductory session, seminar integrity will not be maintained. Students will be assigned roles on staffs at the theater-strategic, operational and operational-tactical levels of war and will associate with that exercise cell for the remainder of Block IV. Assignments to specific billets will be disseminated several weeks prior to the exercise. Certain billet holders will be contacted individually by exercise cell moderators and scheduled to receive orientation on specific tools and/or procedures unique to their assigned billets; however, all students will receive a general introduction to the exercise, a public affairs orientation, and McCarty-Little information technology and network training.

The exercise will be conducted in three phases: crisis development and deployment, decisive operations, and post-hostilities.

In the crisis development phase, staffs will organize and familiarize themselves with the communications system and read information concerning the developing crisis.

As the crisis unfolds, staffs will begin the process of crisis action planning. The exercise is designed to highlight the realities of distributive, collaborative, concurrent, and parallel planning in a networked environment, including the interaction of boards, cells, staff sections, and centers. All staffs will conduct their own estimates, make recommendations up the chain-of-command, and respond to tasking from their superiors. Similarly, the flow of information and events will challenge staffs to deal with immediate events while planning for future operations.

The decisive operations phase presents the staffs with the opportunity to respond to new and unexpected situations that will require new planning or execution of various branches or sequels to their original plans.

Issues of how to terminate hostilities and how to deal with post-conflict issues comprise the post-hostilities phase of the exercise and relate to the desired end state, as defined by the political objective(s).

The Control Team for the exercise will be comprised of faculty moderators, War Gaming Department representatives, and representatives from the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) detachment. Within each board, staff section, center and cell there will be a

faculty moderator to assist you with organization, exercise mechanics, intelligence/information, and assessment. The Control Teams will provide feedback to student staffs in the form of event injects or intelligence assessments, enabling the control group to adjust the scenario and tempo to meet exercise objectives.

Throughout the exercise, several activities will recur with which the students will have to deal, such as: staff processes that integrate political, military, informational and diplomatic factors; information operations; mine warfare; strategic mobility; WMD; conflict termination; and post conflict operations.

The point of contact for this session is Captain M. D. Seaman, USN, C-423.

D. Required Readings:

U.S. Naval War College, ***CNC&S Exercise Book***, Newport, R.I.: (**NWC 5000A**), (Issued separately).

U.S. Naval War College, ***IT Tools User Guide***, Newport, R.I.: (**NWC 5012**), (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College. ***Commander's Estimate of the Situation: Workbook for In-Class Work and War Gaming***, Sep 2004 (**NWC 4111G**), (Issued).

E. Supplementary Readings:

Since the exercise involves application of material covered throughout the JMO curriculum, students can decide which references will be needed, based on the role assigned and individual knowledge and experience. In addition to the Joint Publication set, the documents listed below may be helpful:

CJCSM 3122.01, (JOPES Vol. I), ***Planning Policies and Procedures***, 14 July 2000. (Seminar Reserve).

CJCSM 3122.03A, (JOPES Vol. II), ***Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II, Planning Formats and Guidance***, 31 December 1999, CH-1, 6 September 2000 (JEL), (CD-ROM, June 2003), and (Seminar Reserve).

Naval War College, ***Blue Force Standing Rules of Engagement***, Newport, R.I.: (**NWC 2012A**), (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College, ***Forces/Capabilities Handbook***, Newport, R.I.: (**NWC 3153I**), (Issued).

Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M, ***The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations***, Chapters 5-10. (Issued).

COURSE SESSION CRITIQUE NOTES
BLOCK ONE. COURSE FOUNDATIONS AND OPERATIONAL ART

OPS I-1 Course Overview (Lecture)
Comments:

OPS I-2 Introductory Seminar (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS I-3 The American Way of War (Lecture)
Comments:

OPS I-4 Operations Research Paper (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS I-5 The Naval Way of War (Lecture)
Comments:

OPS I-6 The Strategic Objective (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS I-7 National Military Organization (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS I-8 Diplomacy and Military Force (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS I-9 Introduction to Operational Art (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS I-10 Operational Art and Doctrine/Principles of War (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS I-11 Leyte Operation: Strategic Setting (Lecture)
Comments:

OPS I-12 Operational Factors (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS I-13 Levels of Command (War) and the Theater (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS I-14 Methods of Combat Force Employment (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS I-15 Elements of Operational Warfare (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS I-16 Operational Warfare at Sea (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS I-17 Operational Functions (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS I-18 Operational Planning (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS I-19 Operational Leadership (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS I-20 The Falklands/Malvinas Conflict: A Case Study (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS I-21 Operational Art Examination
Comments:

OPS I-22 Use of Force Under International Law (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS I-23 Operational Law and Factor Space (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS I-24 Law of Armed Conflict (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS I-25 Rules of Engagement (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS I-26 Operational Law Case Study (Seminar)
Comments:

BLOCK II. PLANNING

OPS-II-1 Operational Logistics (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS II-2 Strategic Deployment (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS-II-3 U.S. Navy Capabilities and Employment Considerations (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS-II-4 U.S. Coast Guard Capabilities and Employment Considerations (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS-II-5 U.S. Marine Corps Capabilities and Employment Considerations (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS-II-6 U.S. Army Capabilities and Employment Considerations (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS-II-7 U.S. Air Force Capabilities and Employment Considerations (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS-II-8 Special Operations Forces Capabilities and Employment Considerations (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS-II-9 Operational Command and Control (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS-II-10 ISR (Lecture/Seminar)

OPS-II-11 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Part I (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS-II-12 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Part II (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS-II-13 Information Operations (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS-II-14 Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) (Exercise)
Comments:

OPS-II-15 Graded Practical Exercise
Comments:

BLOCK III. CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTS

General Comments:

OPS-III-1 Introduction (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS-III-2 Failed States (Lecture and Seminar)
Comments:

OPS-III-3 Military Operations Other Than War (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS-III-4 The Interagency Process (Lecture and Seminar)
Comments:

OPS-III-5 NGOs/IOs (Lecture and Seminar)
Comments:

OPS-III-6 Contractors in the Battlespace (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS-III-7 Homeland Security and Defense (Seminar)

OPS-III-8 Combating Terrorism (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS-III-9 Elements of Insurgency (Lecture and Seminar)
Comments:

OPS-III-10 Conflict Termination (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS-III-11 Post-Conflict Operations (Case Study)
Comments:

OPS-III-12 Operation PACIFIC SHIELD (Exercise)
Comments:

BLOCK IV. JFC/JTF HQ EXERCISE

General Comments:

OPS-IV-1 SJFHQ (Lecture)
Comments:

OPS IV-2 JFC/JTF HQ Exercise
Comments:

END OF COURSE QUESTIONNAIRE

The paper form on the pages which follow is provided to assist you in preparing your electronic response to our end of course questions.

We solicit your honest and thoughtful responses to this questionnaire in order to help us make the JMO course better. Please take the time to read the questions closely. Answer each question with the most objective response you can based on your experience in the course. Each section of this questionnaire has somewhat different rating parameters, so please pay close attention so that you do not inadvertently provide misleading data.

Please work through the form sequentially. Your comments will be collated in order to provide key insights to accurate data interpretation; please take the time to write comments. It is important to get 100 percent participation so that the department gets a clear picture of the student body course assessment.

Please submit the questionnaire electronically no later than 1630 on Thursday, 3 March 2005*. Responses to the questionnaire will not be released to the faculty until grades are posted.

Thank you for your help,

CAPTAIN A. J. RUOTI, U.S. Navy
Chairman,
Joint Military Operations Department

* Electronic input is anonymous and no faculty/staff member knows who submitted ratings/comments; additional information will be provided later in the trimester.

END OF COURSE QUESTIONNAIRE

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA will be used for analysis purposes only.

Seminar Number: _____

Service/Organization:	USN/USCG	1
	USMC	2
	USA	3
	USAF	4
	Civilian	5
	International Officer	6

Component:	Regular	Reserve	Civilian
	1	2	3

Previous PME:	Resident	Non-Resident	Both	None
	1	2	3	4

Mark the boxes for your previous duty experience:

Joint Duty	Yes	No
Fleet/Corps/Air Force staff:	Yes	No
Service staff:	Yes	No
Multi-national Operations:	Yes	No

1. The knowledge I gained from the Joint Maritime Operations Course should be valuable to me in future joint assignments.

   Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

   Comments:_____
   _____
   _____

2. Overall, I learned and benefited from this course.

   Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

   Comments:_____
   _____
   _____

3. I feel prepared to apply what I learned in this course in my future work assignments.

   Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

   Comments:_____
   _____
   _____

4. This course was well-planned and organized.

   Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

   Comments:_____
   _____
   _____

5. The pace of this course was appropriate.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree
Comments:_____
_____

6. Course difficulty was appropriate for my background.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree
Comments:_____
_____

7. This course was an appropriate mix of lecture and discussion.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree
Comments:_____
_____

8. The moderator team created an environment where all seminar members were encouraged to participate in discussions and ask questions.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree
Comments:_____
_____

9. The moderator team respected my opinions.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree
Comments:_____
_____

10. The moderators were fair and unbiased in the treatment of all students in this course.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree
Comments:_____
_____

11. Course assignments and readings helped me to learn on my own.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree
Comments:_____
_____

For questions 1–22, grade the JMO Course in terms of the degree to which the course enhanced your understanding of the following subject areas:

	Very Little						Very Much
12. Forces Capabilities and Employment Considerations:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
13. Operational Art Concepts:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
14. National Military Strategy:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
15. Joint Doctrine:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
16. Multinational Operations:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
17. Military Planning Process:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

18. Military Operations Other Than War:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
19. Information Operations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
20. The Interagency Process:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
21. Post-conflict Operations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
22. International Law/ROE:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Comments:_____

_____

For questions 23-34, grade the value of each of the following in helping you to learn in this course.

23. Seminar discussion:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
24. JMO Exercise:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
25. Class-wide lectures:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
26. Operational Art Exam:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
27. Research Paper:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
28. Discussions outside of class:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
29. Student presentations:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
30. Case Studies:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
31. Moderator team:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
32. Law Moderator:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
33. Required readings:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
34. Supplementary readings:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Comments:_____

_____

Rate the JMO Course in the following areas:

	Not Enough						Too Much
35. Amount of reading:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
36. Amount of writing:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
37. Amount of class time/week:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
38. Number of tests:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Comments:_____

_____

Rate the overall atmosphere in your seminar:

39. Boring	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Stimulating
40. Threatening	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Supportive
41. Few dominate	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	All contribute

42. Divisive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Teamwork

Comments:_____

43. Considering study, research, and reading outside of the classroom, I devoted about _____ hours per week to the course.

Comments:_____
_____

44. Are there any additions to the JMO course that you can suggest?

_____
_____

45. Are there any deletions from the JMO course that you can suggest?

_____
_____

46. Which topics were most beneficial?

_____
_____

47. What did you like most about the JMO course?

_____
_____

48. What did you like least about the JMO course?

_____
_____

49. Do you have any other comments of suggestions that can help make the course more relevant and timely?

_____
_____

50. Do you have any recommendations regarding the readings for Block I, Block II, Block III, or Block IV?

_____
_____

51. Do you have any recommendations regarding the content of Block I, Block II, Block III, or Block IV?

_____
_____

NAME/RANK/SERVICE	PHONE	ROOM	STATUS
Araki, Layne	17378	M-13	Faculty
Ballard, John R.	16415	C-421	Faculty
Baker, Frank, CDR, USN	16462	C-415	Faculty
Barker, Jeffrey L. (“Jeff”)	16457	C-420	Faculty/Block I
Bell, Paul G., Lt Col, USAF	16465	C-414	Faculty/Block III
Bergstrom, Albion A. (“Al”)	16484	C-409	Faculty/Block II
Bryn, David, LTC, USA	16468	C-407	Faculty
Burns, John C., COL, USA	16570	C-408	Faculty
Butler, James P. (“Jim”)	14146	C-415	Faculty/Phase II JPME
Carrington, David (“Dave”)	16230	C-412	Faculty
Chisholm, Donald W. (“Don”)	12328	C-422	Faculty/Block III Div Head
Ciluffo, Scott G., COL, USA	12598	C-411	Faculty/Block III
Clarke, Patti	12596	C-417	Staff
Critz, Michael R., CAPT, USN.	12532	C-217	Faculty/NOPC DIR
DellaVolpe, David	17377	C-413	Faculty
Duffié, David A., CAPT, USN	16474	C-410	Faculty/Block IV
Dutton, Peter A., CDR, JAGC, USN	16457	C-420	Faculty/Law Div Head
Falk, Ben H. G., CDR, RN	16415	C-413	Faculty
Findlay, Richard, J. (“Sleeps”), COL, USMC	16478	C-425	Faculty/Block I Div Head
Gatchel, Theodore (“Ted”)	13467	C-413	Faculty/Block I
Gibbons, Thomas J., COL, USA	12134	SP-212	Faculty/Senior USA Adv
Goldizen, Derrill T., Lt Col, USAF	16482	C-407	Faculty/Block II
Hartig, William, (“Bill”), LTCOL, USMC	16741	C-410	Faculty
Hime, Douglas N. (“Doug”)	16463	C-423	Faculty/Block IV
Horne, Fred B., CAPT, USN	16458	C-203	Executive Assistant
Huizenga, Thomas (“Dutch”), Lt Col, USAF	16476	C-410	Faculty
Kornatz, Steven D. (“Steve”), CAPT, USN	16460	C-420	Faculty/Block III
Litman, Mark	14709	SE-117	Support Staff
Logan, Susan (“Sue”)	12519	C-217	Support Staff
Luke, Ivan T., CAPT, USCG	12397	SP-214	Faculty/Block III/USCG ADV
Lynch, Hugh F.	16564	C-421	Faculty/Block I
Neville, Santiago R., (“Sandy”), CAPT, USN	16485	SE-117	Faculty/Block II
Newkirk, Bryan T., LTC, USA	13209	C-415	Faculty

Povlock, Paul A., CDR, USN	16465	C-414	Faculty/Block IV
Reynolds, Nicholas E., CIA ("Nick")	13394	C-425	Faculty
Richardson, Walter J. Jr. ("Jody"), CAPT, USN	16466	C-421	Faculty/Block II
Roberts, John D.	13277	L-116	Faculty/Block IV
Romanski, Paul A.	12534	C-217	Faculty/NOPC
Ruoti, Anthony J. ("Tony"), CAPT, USN	13556	C-203	JMO Chairman
Seaman, Mark D., CAPT, USN	16477	C-423	Faculty/Block IV Div Head
Seerden, Christie, CTA1, USN	16488	SE-117	Support Staff
Stafford, Joe N., CAPT, USN	16477	C-412	Faculty/Block II
Stewart, Carol	14120	C-203	Support Staff
Sweeney, Patrick C. ("Pat").	16480	C-424	Faculty/Block II DIV HD
Vaughn, Mark	17379	M-13	Faculty
Vego, Milan N.	16483	M-11	Faculty/Block I
Wall, Alan R., CDR, USN	16486	SE-117	Faculty/Block IV

NOVEMBER 2004 CNC&S

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY
15	**16**	**17**	**18**	**19**
		1300–1400 † OPS-I-1 Course Overview 1415–1545 * OPS-I-2 Introductory Seminar	0830–1000 † OPS-I-3 The American Way of War (Lecture) 1015–1145 * OPS-1- 4 Operations Research Paper-Review	Student Research
22	**23**	**24**	**25**	**26**
0830–1000 † OPS-I-5 The Naval Way of War (Lecture) 1015–1145 * OPS-I-6 The Strategic Objective	0830–1000 * OPS-I-7 National Military Organization 1015–1145 * OPS-I-8 Diplomacy and Military Force	**Thanksgiving**	**Thanksgiving**	**Thanksgiving**
29	**30**			
0830–1000 * OPS-I-9 Introduction to Operational Art 1015–1145 * OPS-I-10 Operational Art and Doctrine /Principles of War	0830–1000 † OPS-I-11 Leyte Operation: Strategic Setting (Lecture) 1015–1145 * OPS-I-12 Operational Factors			

Spruance Auditorium † Seminar Rooms * Classified Session ♠

DECEMBER 2004 CNC&S

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY
		1	**2**	**3**
		0830–1000 * OPS-I-13 Levels of Command (War) and the Theater 1015–1145 * OPS-I-14 Methods of Combat Force Employment **ELECTIVES BEGIN**	0830–1000 * OPS I-15 Elements of Operational Warfare 1015–1145 * OPS-I-16 Operational Warfare at Sea **ELECTIVES BEGIN**	Student Research
6	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**
0830–0945 * OPS-I-17 Operational Functions 1000–1145 * OPS-I-18 Operational Planning **Paper Topics Due NLT 1630**	0830–0945 * OPS-I-19 Operational Leadership 1000–1630† * OPS-I-20 The Falklands/Malvinas Conflict: A Case Study The Strategic Setting † (1000) Falklands Film † (1100)	0830–1145 * OPS-I-20 The Falklands/Malvinas Conflict: Preparation **ELECTIVES**	0830–1145 * OPS-I-20 The Falklands/Malvinas Conflict: Presentations **Exam Read-ahead Distributed** NSC 10 IPV **ELECTIVES**	Student Research Operational Art Exam Preparation (Optional) Tutorials NSC 10 IPV
13	**14**	**15**	**16**	**17**
0930 * OPS-I-21 0perational Art Examination Distribution (Due at 1600) NSC 10 IPV	**Even Seminars** 0830–1000 * OPS-I-22 Use of Force Under International Law 1015–1145 * OPS-I-23 Operational Law and Factor Space **Odd Seminars** 1300–1430 * OPS-I-22 Use of Force Under International Law 1445–1615 * OPS-I-23 Operational Law and Factor Space NSC 10 IPV	**Even Seminars** 0830–1000 * OPS-I-24 Law of Armed Conflict 1015–1145 * OPS-I-25 Rules of Engagement **Odd Seminars** Student Research NSC 10 IPV **ELECTIVES**	**Odd Seminars** 0830–1000 * OPS-I-24 Law of Armed Conflict 1015–1145 * OPS-I-25 Rules of Engagement **Even Seminars** Student Research **Tutorials** NSC10 IPV **ELECTIVES**	Student Research NSC 10 IPV
20	**21**	**22**	**23**	**24**
0830–1145 * OPS-I-26 Operational Law Case Study Tutorials	0830–1000 * OPS-II-1 Operational Logistics 1015–1145 * OPS-II-2 Strategic Deployment	0830–1045 * OPS-II-3 U.S. Navy Capabilities and Employment Considerations 1100–1145 * OPS-II-4 U.S. Coast Guard Capabilities and Employment Considerations	**Christmas Recess**	**Christmas Recess**
27	**28**	**29**	**30**	**31**
Christmas Recess	**Christmas Recess**	**Christmas Recess**	**Christmas Recess**	**Christmas Recess**

Spruance Auditorium † Seminar Rooms * Classified Session ♠

JANUARY 2005 CNC&S

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY
3	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
0830–1000 * OPS-II-5 U.S. Marine Corps Capabilities and Employment Considerations 1015–1145 * OPS-II-6 U.S. Army Capabilities and Employment Considerations	0830–1000 * OPS-II-7 U.S. Air Force Capabilities and Employment Considerations 1015–1145 * OPS-II-8 Special Operations Forces Capabilities and Employment Considerations	0830–1145 * OPS-II-9 Operational Command and Control ELECTIVES	0830–1145 * † OPS-II-10 ISR ♠ ELECTIVES	Student Research
10	**11**	**12**	**13**	**14**
0830–1145 * OPS-II-11 Joint Operation Planning and Execution Systems (JOPES) Part I ♠	0830–1145 * OPS-II-12 Joint Operation Planning and Execution Systems (JOPES) Part II ♠	0830–1000 * OPS-II-13 Information Operations ♠ 1015–1145 * OPS-II-14 CES Introduction **Exams Returned** ELECTIVES	0830–1145 * OPS-II-14 CES (Cont.) ELECTIVES	Student Research
17	**18**	**19**	**20**	**21**
Martin Luther King, Jr. Birthday	0830–1630 * OPS-II-14 CES (Cont.)	0830–1145 * OPS-II-14 CES (Cont.) ELECTIVES	0830–1145 * OPS-II-14 CES (Cont.) ELECTIVES	Student Research
24	**25**	**26**	**27**	**28**
0830–1630 * OPS-II-14 CES (Cont.) 1630 IOS-II-15 Graded Practical Exercise Issued	**0830–1200** **OPS-II-15 Graded Practical Exercise (Due at 1200)**	0800–0845 * OPS-III-1 Introduction 0900–1145 † * OPS III-2 Failed States ELECTIVES	0830–1145 * OPS-III-3 MOOTW ELECTIVES	Student Research NSC 10 IPV
31				
0830–1145 † * OPS-III-4 Interagency NSC 10 IPV				

Spruance Auditorium † Seminar Rooms * Classified Session ♠

FEBRUARY 2005 CNC&S

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY
	1	2	3	4
	0830–1000 * OPS-III-5 NGOs/IOs 1015–1145 * OPS-III-6 Contractors in the Battlespace NSC 10 IPV	0830-1145 * OPS-III-7 Homeland Security and Defense NSC 10 IPV ELECTIVES	0830–1145 * OPS-III-8 CombatingTerrorism NSC 10 IPV ELECTIVES	Student Research NSC 10 IPV
7	8	9	10	11
0830–1145 †* OPS-III-9 Elements of Insurgency (Lecture/Seminar)	0830–1145 * OPS-III-10 Conflict Termination	0830–1145 * OPS-III-11 Post-Conflict Operations ELECTIVES	0830–1145 * OPS-III-12 PACIFIC SHIELD Exercise Intro ELECTIVES	Student Research
14	15	16	17	18
OPS Paper Due (1630)	0830–1630 * OPS-III-12 PACIFIC SHIELD Exercise	0830–1145 * OPS-III-12 PACIFIC SHIELD Exercise ELECTIVES END	0830–1100 † OPS-IV-1 SJFHQ ELECTIVES END	0830–1000 * OPS-IV-2 JMO Exercise Introduction and Road to War 1015–1630 OPS-IV-2 JMO Exercise Training (MLH Cells)
21	22	23	24	25
Holiday	0830–1000 † OPS-IV-2 Information Management 1015–1630 OPS-IV-2 JMO Exercise Training (MLH Cells) **NSC OPS Paper Due**	0830–1630 OPS-IV-2 JMO Exercise (MLH)	0830–1630 OPS-IV-2 JMO Exercise (MLH)	0830–1630 OPS-IV-2 JMO Exercise (MLH)
28				
0830–1630 OPS-IV-2 JMO Exercise (MLH)				

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AS OF: 16 SEP 2004

MARCH 2005 CNC&S

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY
	1	2	3	4
	0830–1630 OPS-IV-2 JMO Exercise (MLH)	0830–1630 OPS-IV-2 JMO Exercise (MLH)	0830–1630 OPS-IV-2 JMO Exercise (MLH)	
7	8	9	10	11
Intersessional Conference	**Ops Research Paper Return** Intersessional Conference	Graduation		
14	15	16	17	18
21	22	23	24	25
28	29	30	31	

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